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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Thesis 
This thesis examines Friedrich Nietzsche's social philosophy and 
attempts to present it as systematically as possible. This is no easy 
task. Even now, after more than fifty years of exhaustive study, there 
is no universal agreement about what Nietzsche stands for. This is the 
result of several causes. Foremost among them is Nietzsche's style of 
writing. Oftentimes, Nietzsche overpowers and sweeps his readers along 
without making it entirely explicit what he is proposing. Similarly, 
because Nietzsche writes very disarmingly, he can be misinterpreted 
quite easily. Nietzsche says he enjoys hiding his real meanings under 
various guises. And unless the reader thoroughly concentrates, his 
conclusions may be quite different from what Nietzsche intended. For 
example, Nietzsche does this sort of writing in presenting the concept 
of the Will to Power and the DoctrinB of the Eternal Recurrence. Never-
theless, to protect himself from being misunderstood, Nietzsche always 
asks his readers to study his works carefully, by noting the context as 
well as his earlier and later works. Nietzsche warns that if his writing 
is incomprehensible for anyone or is a "jar on his ears," then the fault 
lies within the individual. 1 For Nietzsche assumes that one has read all 
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Horace B. Samuel 
in The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: Random House, Inc., Lf8817 
1927), p. 6,30. 
1 
his books and has "not grudged them a certain amount of trouble .n1 
Because of these facts, while paying strict attention to Nietzsche's 
work at hand, the reader must keep the entire gamut of Nietzsche's writ-
ings in mind if he is to see the steady progression and continuity in 
Nietzsche's development. 
In addition, there is still another important reason why Nietzsche 
is misunderstood. This is due to Nietzsche's sister, Elizabeth. After 
Nietzsche had become mentally ill in 1889, his work begah to draw notice. 
His sister, Elizabeth, then began to fashion the belief that Nietzsche 
was a German nationalist and a super-Aryan social philosopher. Having 
legal access to Nietzsche's unpublished writings, Nietzsche's sister 
blended this yet unpublished material into her interpretation of what 
Nietzsche meant. And nobody had the authority to challenge her inter-
pretations because she was the guardian of the unpublished material. 
Every few years Elizabeth Nietzsche had an edition of her brother's 
collected works edited in which she often rearranged material. More 
critical, however, was her decision to patch together Nietzsche's notes, 
which he had accumulated and was working on at the time of his illness. 
These she published in two volumes (1895, 1901) as Nietzsche's major 
work. Nietzsche's sister chose the title of The Will to Power because 
there are some included aphorisms that bear this slogan. It is signif-
icant to note, though, that Nietzsche includee the essence of many of 
these aphorisms in previous works, particularly in The Antichrist. This 
publication of The Will to Power as Nietzsche's fihal and most systematic 
work has been and still is a main obstacle to a coherent interpretation 
1. Ibid. 
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of Nietzsche. 
However, after enough scholars had made a study of Nietzsche's 
writings, they reasoned that Nietzsche's The Will to Bower was not meant 
to be taken as the slogan of brute physical strength, but was intended 
to connote spiritual supremacy. There is ample evidence to support this 
conclusion from Nietzsche's writings. In one of his drafts Nietzsche 
sayss 
The Will to Power. A book for thinking, nothing 
elses it belongs to those to whom thinking is a 
delight, nothing else. That it is written in German 
is at least untimely: I wished I had written it in 
French in order that it might not appear as a yonfir-
mation of the aspirations of the German Reich. 
Thus, Nietzsche's thought is not as hopelessly ambiguous and self-contra-
dictory as it may appear on first glance or is so widely believed. 
On the other hand, while interpreters of Nietzsche grant that 
Nietzsche is a highly penetrating thinker, some disagree with the majority 
opinion about the interpretation of Nietzsche's political philosophy. 
Notable among the dissenters is Baumler, the official expert on Nietzsche 
for the Nazis during World War II, and M. A. ~Ugge, a champion of White, 
English supremacy. These men point to statements in Nietzsche's works 
which, if taken out of their original context, uphold Nietzsche as their 
prophet. For instance, MUgge claims that 
if we follow the advice of Nietzsche we shall in 
some degree return to the breast of nature, and 
retard the descent without giving up culture. 
Such a course will be espeqially valuable if 
we look at the matter from a racial standpoint. 
We, the White race, by maintaining the supremacy 
which we have held for so long, by seeing that 
breed does not decay but improve, shall obviate 
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Notes, trans. Walter Kaufmann in The Portable 
Nietzsche (New York: The Viking Press, Lf882f 1954), p. 442. 
the advent of the time when the New Zealander is 
to sit on London Bridge, and when the yellow and 
black peril is to become more real--and thus shall 
retard the inevitable doom.l 
This writer does not believe that Nietzsche advocates this type of race 
supremacy. 
Yet because there still remains this difference in opinion about 
Nietzsche's social philosophy, further exposition of Nietzsche is 
warranted. 
2. Sources 
Following are the chief primary sources and their dates of writ-
ing for this study: The Birth of Tragedy (1~72), uon the Use and Abuse 
of History" (187)), parts of "Schopenhauer as Educator" {1874), Human, 
All-too-Human (1878), parts of "The Wanderer and His Shadow" {1880), 
The Dawn of Day (1881), The Gay Science (1882), Thus Spake Zarathustra 
{188)-85), Beyond Good and ~il (1886), The Genealogy of Morals (1887), 
parts of The Wagner Case (1888), The Antichrist (1888), Twilight of the 
Idols (1888), Ecce Homo (1888), and extensive portions of The Will to 
Power. 
Several secondary sources have been compared as a geheral aid to 
understanding Nietzsche. Among them are Walter Kaufmann's Nietzsche: 
Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist; George Allen Morgan(s What 
Nietzsche Means; Willard Wright's What Nietzsche Taught; and Emile 
Faguet's On Reading Nietzsche. 
). The Methodology of the Thesis 
This thesis will be developed in five stages. First, Chapter II 
1. M. A. Mugge, Friedrich Nietzsche--His Life and Work (New York: 
Brentano's 1915), p. 368. 
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begins the study by investigating Nietzsche's basic principles, the Will 
to Power and the Eternal Recurrence, and endeavors to show how they set 
the framework upon which Nietzsche formulates and constructs his social 
philosophy. These two very important concepts are probably the most 
misunderstood elen:ents about Nietzsche. This writer traces the develop-
ment of both concepts through Nietzsche's writings and shows how 
Nietzsche finally concludes that there is a monistic force constantly at 
war with itself in the universe. Nietzsche's cosmology sees the universe 
as constituting two realt11s, one of spirit and another of impulse. While 
each strives to overcorre the other, Nietzsche believes both are but the 
manifestation of one central force, the Will to Power. 
Acjually, Nietzsche is interested in relating the Will to Power 
hypothesis to human beings. Nietzsche thinks that the psychological 
expression of the Will to Power, explicable in terms of intellect and 
spirit, is greater than its antagonistic counterpart, impulse and passion. 
Nietzsche then postulates that the will is diffusely spread among the 
human population, but is expressed best among the strong in psychical 
power. Through the Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence Nietzsche illus-
trates how those who possess strong wills wish to live each moment of 
their lives in its entirety. It will be pointed out that Nietzsche thinks 
of the Eternal Recurrence as the moral imperative to which the strong 
willed persons will dedicate themselves in the task of beeomming as 
perfect as they are able. When the strong souls have harmoniously organ-
ized the chaos of their passions, Nietzsche assumes they will be ready 
to create the beautiful and do the good. 
As mentioned above, Nietzsche shows that all men possess the Will 
to Power, but in varying degrees. Consequently, Nietzsche constructs a 
"Scale of Excellence" in which he can measure degrees of power. This is 
mentioned in chapter II and is taken up in more detail later. However, 
the important fact is that Nietzsche constitutes the idea of a dual 
system of morality which he believes can be defended empirically. Along 
similar lines of empirical explanation, Nietzsche assumes that the weak 
souls, those dependent upon external laws and prohibitions to regulate 
their conduct, have risen to the fore in modern society. 
Chapter III then goes on to outline the cultural, educational and 
political systems of Europe as Nietzsche sees them. Nietzsche exp~ains 
that because the weak in psychical power have championed their values as 
the sole moral code Western society has degenerated. As a result, Nietzsche 
maintains that there is no real culture or true education in his era. 
Similarly, Nietzsche acknowledges that the nationalism, so rampant on the 
European continent in the late Nineteenth Century, is but a sign of small 
power on his "Scale of Excellence." 
After it is shown how Nietzsche evaluates his own age, chapter IV 
traces Nietzsche's explanation of why Nineteenth Century Europe has become 
degenerate. Nietzsche believes that the weak "barbarians," those on the 
bottom of the "Scale of Excellence," gained political supremacy and 
brought on a "slave revolt in morals" in former times. And Nietzsche 
thinks that the weak 1 s acceptance of Christianity, which he sometimes 
classifies as a religion for degenerates, has been the pinnacle of their 
feeling for revenge against the strong. Chapter IV also abstracts from 
Nietzsche's theory of history the elements which Nietzsche uses to con-
struct his theoretical system. It will be seen how Nietzsche concludes 
that the strong at the top of his "Scale of Excellence" will rise to 
supremacy after a "nihilistic" period in human history and will rededi-
6 
cate humanity to a new cultural epoch. 
Chapter V will deal more fully with Nietzsche's hape for this future 
period. This chapter explains Nietzsche's ideal society and theorizes 
how the best and most powerful individuals are to be propagated. By a 
return to the hardier virtues, such as honesty, integrity, and deci-
siveness, Nietzsche contends that the strong souls will break away from 
conventional morality by setting up and maintaining a "Master Morality" 
with its own system of virfues. This transformation will necessitate a 
dual system of ethics since the weak in the "Scale of Excellence" will 
still have the usual code to live by. Thus, the meaning of Nietzsc~e 1 s 
"RevaluAtion of all Values" is made more clear. It assumes that there 
will be two systems: one for the "overman," or the strong in psychical 
power, and another for the masses, those at the bottom of the "Scale of 
Excellence." 
Fihally, Nietzsche's social philosophy culminates in wishing that 
the strong will construct a ucaste-system" based on the two systems of 
morality. Nietzsche's aim therefore turns out to be an aristocracy 
where those who have learned to master their impulses can free themselves 
from the usual cares of daily living and be free for creating. The thesis 
concludes by discussing Ancient Greece as a possible quintessence of what 
might be exemplified as a Nietzschean ideal society. 
Chapter VI evaluates Nietzsche's philosophy in the light of the 
merits and weaknesses which have been discerned in the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
NIETZSCHE'S BASIC PRINCIPLES 
Becauae Nietzsche is interested primarily 1n man, he centers his 
attention moJ'e em human 'than on oollldo atf'airs. Ntwertheleae, Niet,sohe 
li!Jks an wSt.h his pb)-aical environment by proolaizning t.M Will to Power 
as t.he basio toroe Wlderl7inc all e.ot.ivity. N1etzeohe beU.eves that thia 
oonoeption ot the Will to Power 
le commanded b7 \he coneoience or 19&1!!1 lUbe'• Not. 
to aee'UDlfJ ...,eJB.l kllule ot eaual1 Yt eo l011g aa the 
att..pt to get along with a alngl• one ba• not ken 
push-.1 to u.a twthe.t eatent •• • • The queat1on is 
ultS..\el7 whet.her we really recognize the will as 
,.,,~, vhtt.her w believe in the oauaalltr ot the 
v 111. we do ao--ud f'Undar:lent.all7 our 'beliet Ja .Y!!!. 
h just our belief in oau•l1t)r lt .. lt....,e .!9!1 make-.Jie 
attempt to poalt hJpothetioally '\he ce.uea11\f~o1' the 
w111 as the onl7 oauaalit.y •••• GJoe.nt.H, finally, that 
we sucoeeW in explain1ng our en\1re 1nst.1not1Ye lite 
a.s \he development and ramit1ce.t1on or one funclamental 
torm ot wU1~•17• \he Will to Power as a tbee1e 
puts 1t1 •• , one voul4 thus have aoquil'ed the right 
t.o 4etine !U. aot1Te fot'Oe unequlvocablJ as J.UJ. lQ. 
Pnn· 
This conoep\.ion of 'l'he W111 to Power pointe to an emphasis on the 
oontlmdty bet•en nature and culture. i'her8"oH• N1e\aaoh6 m&.f explain 
both poU.t.lcal and oult.ural achievements 1n terms of the lUll to Power. 
1. The WU 1 to Power 
On the h'UIDIUl level Nietzaohe enyieagee t~ Will to Power aa pqoho• 
logical drives and propo1ee to explain ell behavior in terme ot 
will. Nietzsche contends that this approach has not been utilized by 
previous philosopher•. 
All peychology hitherto bae run aground on moral 
prejudice and timidities, it ha.e not dand to launch 
out. into the depths. • • • It seeld u if nobocl7 had 
;yet harboured the notion ot pqohology as . the .Mor• 
pbolog and ~nlo~octri!!• of the WUl to Power, 
as l oonceive of ~ e p;;;; of moral pre3u3loee 
has penetrated deeply ttt\o the moat intellectual world, 
the world apparantl;y most indifferent and unprejudiced, 
and has obTiouly opere.tect in an injurious, obs\I"Uotive, 
blinding. and distorting tnan..'1er.l 
this peychologiaal condderatio:n leads Nietzsche to 8\lg.gest the possi-
blU.ty ot showing how T&.lues cab " gel1erated out. ot nature. In the Datm 
t;t P&, vh•re Niet.zsche first deale with the problenl of finding a basis 
tor relating man to the world, Nietzsche thinks that all men haTe the 
desire t:' feel power. But. N1etzsoho goes on to point out that the actual 
concentration of power 1a unequally displayed in humanity. Nietzsche 
talks of power and tear 1:n paycbologioal terma 1n The Dawn and coneiders 
both ae aspects of the urd.verJal Will to row.r. Nietzsche then •xplai:ns 
that the majority ot mankind being about equal in abilit7 oontorm for 
their own protection. Niet-zsche says nothing new here. Hobbes said it. 
before in the ~iat.ban. Onl7 Nietzache holda that. this situation ls 
baaioe.llr nang and should be overtbrovn tor znm"ald.nd •a own good. 
Nietzsche next goes on to draw the implicatlons ot the Wlll to Power 
&,pothesis together. In the section on •eur Striving for Dieti:n~tion• 
!n The De.:m Nietzsche reduces praotieallr all human behavior to the 
sl~pl• atrivtng for power. Nietzsche proceeds to do this in terms of a 
soale. At the bottom of the scale Nietzech• places the barbarian vb.o 
tort.urea othere; at the top Nietzsche ont.hronea tb(!t ascetic who tortures 
1. Jblct., P• 4o6. 
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Our' at.r1ving af't.er dlst.ino\S.on urges us to keep a 
aonatant watch on the neighbOr and hie feeU.ngs1 
but the 8Jmpa~ and secrecy which are essentials 
tor the grat.1fltat.1oa ot t.hie otoaving are tar from 
being harmless, oompass!onat.e or kind. On \he 
oontrar)', we want to not.ice os- to diYine how we can 
make our neighbor sutter eithctr extei'M.Uy or inter-
nall:n and even if the one wht is at.r11'1.ng att.er 
d1at1not1on makes, and wishes to rnake a jO)'ful 
elevating or cheering 1mpreaalon, he yet cmjoys thia 
success no'\ 1naamuoh as he theJ"eb7 gives pleasure to, 
elevates or oheera hi a neighbor' 1 but 1nasm\loh as he 
improsses Mm.eelf on the atn:ncor 11 soul, transforming 
ita shape and rulixlg over it at hie own troc will. 
The RJ'iYing after dletlnction is the atriYiDg att.er 
asoendanoy over OM' a neighbor, be it. only a vert 
indirect one, or one onlr felt. or dftamt. ot. '.!.'here 
are arq stages in t!d.e "etetoly desired. aao.nclanoy 
and a complete record of the same would be identical 
with a history of okiliaat1on, from the f!rat anttoa 
ot barbarin. up to the caricature of over-refinement 
and morbid 1dealtam. 'l'he et.rivt»g attar 4ln1not..1on 
entails to the neighbor-to •nticm only a fn I"UQgS 
of this long ladder-tort.un, hlowa, t.enor, ••• 
8l'lcl aelf•intliction of tort.ure,-here, at the top of 
the ladder, we fmct t.he anetlo aM ~. who r .. t. 
ttUpl'_. satiataotion, htmeelt obt.&.lning e. a the nsul t 
ot his oraYing tor 41.-t.iftOt.tcm, the very thing which 
the barbarian, h1a antit,-pe on the yery tlrn rung ot 
the ladder, makes other• sutter, by whom e.n4 before 
whom bl wishes to prore his excellenoy.l 
In t.hia section of The O&:rp ot Da.z Nietzsche begins to exple.ift his 
~tal philosophy. Nietzsche rOYeals that it is ·:an •a continuous wish 
to O'f'ervhelm, excel, and ft'erpower hia neighbor that leads to culture. 
Nietzsche shows that the 'ba.7barian does lt. by torturing his neighbor. 
In the light of Nletzache 1a comment. ht appear& to possess a low degree 
ot power, else he woul4 not need to inflict hurt. 
Toward the middle of the aoe.le Nietzeohe deacribea what may be 
called the e.yerage degrees of power. Hen Nietzsche diecloeea that 
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Vf· Dawn of O&,;x, trans. Johanna Volz {Londona 
f. Fisher Umf1n, fjse · 90~). PP• i05-o6. · 
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mediocre peonle gain a sense of power by evoking envy and admiration from 
their contempora.rios. An4 at the top of tho ecalo Nietzsche places the 
ascetlo. At this stage of his thlnld.!lg Nietzsche believed that the great-
eat feeling of power resided in the asootios. Nietzeche oontendsc •Indeed, 
happiness, ooneeivod as the most vivid souation of power J'lOVheH on earth 
has reaohed a higher pitch than 1n tho souls of the euperatltioU. ascet1os.•1 
From what Nietzsche says it. oan be maintained that the degrees of 
power oonospond t.o varioue forme of behavior and of culture. In !b!. 
Dawn, 9f Da.z and in his pnvioue works NS..-t.zsche ccm.eidore tho aa1nt, the 
artiet, and ~ philosopher as the men powerf\11 men and the uncul. t.urod 
barbarian as tho least powertul. Nietzsche also believe• that. political 
power is just enotber form of barbarism. Nietzsche oxpreseolr emphasizes 
this point in denyS.Dg the Gerun lteich as a source for true culture. In 
fact, Nietzsche thin.l<:s that chauvin1st.1e nationalism, baaed on military 
strength, is not a sign ot l'trength but. of weakness. 
Reither necessity nor destre.wnay, the love of 
~,. le the demon of manldncl. Give them anytb1ng 
you like, health, food• ••• they are and will 
ever be unhappy and whlmsioala for the demon is 
ever on the alert. and longing to be gratified. 
Take everything from them ancl gratifJ this OJ'!:Yinga 
t.hen t.heJ will almoet. " happ,._....s happJ, at least., 
as men and clemons oan be. But why do I say this? 
L\lt.her has already eaid it1 and better t.han I, 1n 
the von••• •And t.houch they t.ak• o\IJ' lite, goode, 
honour, children, wlfoJ yet is their profit amall 1 
t.hese t.hinrrs shall ...m.sh all. 'rho Kincdom 
rematnot.h.1 Ay1 Ay ! 'rho Kingdom 12 
While Lut.her probably had the Kingdom of God in mind, Nietasobe looks 
upon Biemarok•e German Reich ae a nation thrilled by ita love of phJsioal 
1. ~·• P• 106. 
2. Ibid., PP• 241-42, 
power. This tne of power is Mt what Nietaache deetn1.1 An4 t.o avoid. 
being aocepted as a f*ropONmt of only ~aical atrength IiS..tesche, 1n 
D:• Ge.x §Qifn!!• introcluoea knotrlri.ge and ep1ritue.lit;y as int.egral pe.rt.s 
ot his standards in the mea.auremeR'\ of values. 
Por, believe me, the atcret ot the greaten ta.ithtul• 
MIS an4 the greaten enjo)'mtmt. of edetenoe itu to 
~ d!!!&•r!!!!IZl Bu114 yov cities Ultdel" Veawiusl 
S 70\11' ehips into UDeharted ..... 1 Live at val' with 
)'0\U" peen an4 yourselves! s. robbere an4 ocmque"'l'St 
as long as rou ~t lie l'Ulws and owners, Jft l<mt!'a 
ot lmwlKgeS soon the age will be pe.llt when pu could 
1M tJatistied to live like shy deer, hidden in the wooclsl 
At lcmc laet the pursuit. ot tmowle4g• will .-.oh out fo'l: 
its duea s.t. wUl want to J:Hl! a.nd .2!it· a.n4 pu w1\h i\.12 
Hownert by introducing k:mndedgfJ and. sp1rS.tual1t;y into his value aeheme 
NS.et.zsohe 1n.jects othe:r f01'0es into hie philosophy. 
But with his next wol'k1 l!»!s SR!Jp if.n~tm, Nietzsche repudiat.es 
the a.ntS.thesia between Jh:vSS.oa.l ni'Ctngth a.n4 apS.rit.ua.lit:r and proclaims 
t.he Will to Ponr as t.he Oil$ and onlr tone in the univ•r•• Up to Thus 
SP!ke ~iE~ Nietssohe had accepted the dualism ot matte~ and epirlt-
uaU.ty. or ln ethel' words, betweeJ'i power and. t.fU power. Nietzsche now 
cwel'comea this dus.U.em by eugg•nln& that. there !.a only a 11D!l1sm ot the 
Will to Power, 1n the btea t.hat the n.-toua degnea of poww might. them• 
eelYea be the meaSUI'e of Yfll-., Thus, IU.et.zache*e theol')" ot values 
becomes clearer. '.t'he real clif'fererutes 'bet.veen \he '¥&1'10\Ul moclea ot power 
are redueiltle t.o a mo.-. ba.a1e clri~ UlliveJ"'&l Will to Power. Hence, 
Ni.t.zache thinke t.hat th• 4egrees ot power mu.et be tM ~awe of ftlue, 
1. ..~ •• 'Uans, We.lt.ez Ka~! in 1~ P$!D!Jrle Nl•H••• (New Yorkt 
Viking Preas, .£.18Slf 195o4h P• 2. 
2. Friedrich Nietzache, 'I'M gg. So&~• t.ra.ns, Walter Kauf'ula.ftn S.n 
l'J1! Po$blf ~let.aeeh!' (Newforkae V1ldng PI'•••• Lf88il 1~). 
PP• 97 • 
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'4; 
In the chapter on •tbe Thousand ancl OM Goals• in !Jl!thpptra 
Ni.Usohe epeake ot 1 t.he Will to Power. • In this aection Nietzsche 
a.ppeare to emphasize moral nlati'fism. Nietzsche bl41oatee \hat V'U'ious 
nations have dltfe:Hnt goals and moral codes. Yet. beneath theae cU.:N'erent 
goals a.nd codes Niet.ssohe diaoeme that they have one thlng in oonmon-
the Will to Power. Niet&eohe believes that the possession of the Will to 
Power I.e the common element. which makes oompe.rative ~· ot n.luea 
possible between the •ral o•dea of ftrlows aooietlets. It ts •a t.a'blet 
ot the good /ibie!il bangs over ., • ..,. people. Behold, it is t.he tablet of 
their overoomingsJ behold, tt. 1a the 'f'Oioe of \heir will to pover.•1 
At this etage Nietzache Snt.Jood.uces the WUl to Potter as t.he will t.o 
OYel'oOIId.ng. Nietzsche 8878 that the Will t-o Power is oOJDmerl8\Q'&t.e with a 
llvlng being. And whel'e Hletaeohe tlnda the U.vtnc he ftnds the Wlll t.o 
Pover.1 This Will to Pcnrer Nietzsche deeorlbes as something 1vhioh must 
alware overcome ltaelt.•' However. besides aelf-overoomtng Nietzaobe la 
also interested 1n the oompet.itS.cm kt.ween the indiviclual and his rteigh-
bor. In the disoueslon on t.he •striying tor D1etinotion1 in TbJ Dawn 
!Uetzeche preaent.ecl a nale or degrees of excel ·;.ence wherein the et.rivlng 
to arouse one's neighbora 1 tear is nea.nr \be \)at tom of the nale, while 
the .tr·:.vtng to arouae admiration, o to ehow cme• s power by elevating 
neighbors, is nearer the i,op. Nietzsche oxteruls this oonoept.ion of the 
.t.ru1~1e between 1nd1Yidus.ls to sticms and augests that in an lcleal 
world eommublty each nation will t.~ to oreroome itself \o such a degree 
1. 
2. .DJ:!·· 1'• 226. 
,. Ibid., P• 22.7. 
that. it. will arouse ita neighboJ"s • em)". In this way all nations oa.n rle 
with an4 en4eavor to excel eaoh other. In so doing they may apur anc1 
tnoito one another to great t.ate. 
However, Nietanho • a the017 ot ftlues cannot rel7 on any united world 
order to aee to it that moral justice prevails. An7 such wish or 1nterpre• 
tatlon of hla\ory as a graduated aucceaa etorr ls tar t'J'om Nie-t.zuhe • a 
mind. Consequently, 1Uetaeohe1s problem remains the aa.met how to delineate 
!Httween power and tl"Ue power. To eacape the dilemma Nietzsche ajplln posits 
a scale and considers \rue power as simply the greateat e.mount ot self-
organization 1n aey liviD& being. 
But vherover I found the living, there I heel"d 
also \be epeeeh on obeclience. Whatever lives, o'bqs., 
And this is the seoon4 point 1 he who oamot obq 
himlelt ie oomman4e4. That ie the nature ot the 11vtng.1 
Htm.oe, Nietaeohe otrers e. eolu\ion to the M.l"11er problem of how to 
me&l~ .. luea in a moni.tio universe. Instead ot aeeuming different 
prlnolplee, such as physical strength and. spirituality, N1etaeehe reduoes 
both to the more single fundamental tore•• t.he Will to Power. Nietzsche 
now explains the distinction between mere phJsioal power and '\he true 
power ot the spirit in tel'l!ls of the tU .. rter-..e between d.egnee o~ power. 
Nevertheless, the problems which Nietzsche faces when he auggee-t.e 
some general plan for valuee are what OYercollling means a.ru1 how \he degrees 
of pow• in a monistic univeree are to be gauged? Nietaache does not. 
entirel7 clarity these proh1ema. However, Nietzeahe d.oe• naint.ain that 
lpirit\18.1 'faluee are more lm:ponant than physical ones. N1etaache •it.e•• 
'And lt 7011 oannot. 'be sainte ot knowledge, at least be ita warriors. They 
are the champions and forerunners of svch eaintbood.12 Lt::ewise, in t.lut 
1. J!li•• P• 22~• 
2. Ibid•• P• 1;9. 
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chapter on "self....()yercoming" in Zarath\UI!r,[e. N'1etzsohe hints that there rrAy 
be a common ctetini tion of all moral codes. But before acJUS.llJ considering 
Nietasche 1s oonceptions of morality, it may be advieable to say something 
about Kant who may have lntluenoed Nietzsche. 
In The Oritigue ot h1L2*iocq Rea!on Kant says that moral worth is 
solely a tunotion of the rationality. Any inconsistency, Kant thinks, l!!Ay 
be made explicit by uniYeraa.U.zing the maxim of the Categorical Imperative 
and determining whether ita uniYersal adoption would give rise to a 
attuation 1n which it. could no longer be e.pp11od.1 In this respect Kant • s 
ethic exhibits overcoming. In like :.";B.ftnert Nietzsche inters that a moral 
code m~t DOt restrain the individual nor permit him to act solely on 
impulse. However, while Nietssohe assumes. as Kant does 1 that knovledge 
and critical reflection are neoeaaar,y tor development, Nietaaohe aleo 
believes that any action which coa\radiota the proposition ot self-over• 
coming is virtually immoral. This suggestion lea~te one to believe that 
Nietzsche considers self-development to be the indispensable element 1n the 
ccmstruotion ot e.ny sound individual and in any healthJ oult.we. 
And life itself confided this secret to met 
8Beho14, 1 it said, "I am tbat wb~cb must alwaxs 
a:ttrtome itae;t. Indeed, you call it a w1il to 
prooree.te or a drive to an en4 1 to something higher, 
fQri.her, more ma.nifolda but all this is onet and 
one aeoret. • 2 
Even so, Nietzsche must soon face the problem of interpreting which 
acta are good and. which evil. Nietzsohe partly a.nawered this problem b:y 
implying that morality conaista in not yielding to passion.' Nnert.heless, 
1. Immanuel Kant, the 9r1t19!J of mwo!l Rea.&9J! (Chicago • Londona 
Eno:yclope41a Britarm1oa, ll'lo., 17~ 19?2), PP• ~ tt. 
2. Nietzsche, &tnth!ft£!• P• 227. 
5• lJU!•t PP• 226-27• 
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before Nietzsche solves the problem ot good an4 ev:U be tackles the more 
!aecl1ate problem ot ••11'-overcardng. lietseche define a ~ act.ual 
process ot 01'erooming the paaaJions as 'aubU.mation.' Fit'st using this 
word 'eublimat.1on" in HuwAtna, £1.11-!d?g•l!!f!!!h Nietsache beliwed that 
impulses pn be c:annelecl ln.to a. creative, apit'itual activity inst..ad of 
being tultilled directly.1 f1 the wori "eubU . .matton• Nietzsche does not., 
however, intend t.o COJUJld.er O'V8MODliftg &8 aelfOOIIIInOri.ificatlon. tUetzsche 
makes '\hie quite clea.r ln. tbt R!E of RN:• 
lle who can ..S.ure tt an4 vho t.hl.ftke it J"H.aonable to 
weaken and •uppNaa hie whole phyeioal and. epiritual 
organization, thewb71 ot oourn, U.kewlee attains 
his purpoae of wea.kenini a ain,gle impetuous ora•llagJ 
a.a, tor inatance, thoae vho like unto the a.acet.S.ca, 
starve their eeniWlU.ty but, at. the same time, etane 
a.n4 degrade their pb.Ja~cal strength and, !lOt in"tre-
quntly • their reason. 
Nietzsche concludes that by .ubltmatlon he meana that 
We m/47 be the ge.rd.-.rs ot our 1Mlinntiona, ancl-
whioh the ma.jctrltflgne.-.....as rt.obly and ad.-nm-
t.ageously cult!vaw the get"mtt ot anger, pitr, 
1nqut.altS.veneas1 vazd ty, as we trail a beautiful 
h'ldt along tu wal~ !• nay do eo with a gardener's 
good. or b&cl ta.te. L'anJI we rti!A.y al eo gt•• tull scope 
to Ne.twe, onlr heN aftcl there applying some 
embelU.ahment. or a.d.omment ·' 
Nietzsche insists \bat what Hn;e.lne att.eJ" aublima.tlcm is t.he eaaenee 
anj what is che.npd is a.oc14enta.l. Thue, Nlnzsc~ oonsidel'e the uni• 
vereal Will t.o Pow•• which J"emaina thl"oughout. the proeeas as the essence, 
while all ita maniteetatlons are onlr a.toid..m&l and changing a.ttrlbut.ea. 
In other wotda, ao-oa.lled objeotlTea are menly acc1d.enta1 attl'ibutea ot 
a more baalc striving. Antiotpat.btg heud 1n one respect, Nletzaobe says 
1. Friedrich Ntet.zeohe, ~::JP•1f~.J' trans. Alexander Haney (Ohioagoa Charles H. X.J"r Co., 1908), PP• 19-20. 
2. Nietzsohe, I:be De.wp, trans. Volz, P• 100. 
3• Ibid.., P• ,SO. 
that auua.U.tr is ••'1"1 !laporte. t.. Jet Nietzsche does not reduce the Will 
to Power to a mere seXtal libS. o. Sexue.lit7 is an example of the universal 
basic drive of U.fej but it ia Oflmtelled in IU'bllme.tlon ancl cannot be 
considered the easenoe of that pulsating d1"1Ye. Suualit,' ie merel7 a 
foreground ot aomething elM ich lemon basloa \be Will \o ~. 
N1etzHhe, however, oonaU•a hat it !8 the teeU.ng ot potency vhioh la 
auuallty neecl mt be baM ll IIebe empbaalzea eoutantly. In tact, 
Dan7 of hie polemS.oe againat rl.U..nitr a.re k .. d. on hla opinion that 
Obl-ist.U.rd.ty baa tended. to o aider aexualitq as baae.1 Aocoriing t.o 
t the aex.Ulve might lie aublimated 
Ohr'ist.la.nlty repudlat.e4 it,. The churoh tights passion with excision in 
........,. MnMI ita praot.1oe, it •ewe,' la casVe.\tam. • • • It has at all 
times lo.ld the stress or dieo pltne on ext.lrpatlon • a 
Tbie eont.raat of t.M Hp 1at.ion ani extlrpatlon ot the paaeiona on 
the ozw slcle1 and of their o t.rol aml aublimation on the o~r, is an 
important point. in lietzeehe • O.V.lopwmt. NietzMhe wondel'e whether 
modern man has bMorae caecul ted and baa even \he abiU.t1 to do what 1a 
commonly oalled e¥11. Niet.s he deolaret t.hat. to be moral ia to be able 
to overoome one • a passiOlla. ut it one doe a not have any pa.aaiona, t.hen 
he ca.MO\ 4o the goo4 DOl" o t.e the beautU'ul.' A man wl th atrong 
passl01'18 might do •evu• be ae he bas not learned to subU.mat.e his 
pe.sslons. But. 1t he sho'll4 cquir• selt-oont.ro1 Hletasohe believes he oa.n 
1. Freidrioh lfietssehe! ~;.;.;~...._rwoo;•-.t.• t.re.ns. Walta~ I<Aufmtum 1n tpe 
£tD!'bll ~&!\!soy \lew 1k1ng Press, 1.188§7 19_';4), P• ~. 
2. Fl"S.eclrloh NietzSOhet ols t.n.as. Wa!te!7Xautma.nn 1n ~DQ;l.!e. ~&•ts~t!a! • · Preas, L168§! 1954). 
P• 1407• 
'• .D!i•; PP• 5,S.,9. 
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the blind. rtelding to a passion, whether lt. be 
generostt.rt pttr• or hosttlity1 is the oa.UH of 
the uea.teat eYU. Greatness ot chaftcter does 
not oouiat in not poaaead.ng theae paaston.....-on 
the oontftl71 a man should. possess them to a 
terrl.bl! 4egree 1 but he ahoul4 lead. thew. b7 the 
bridle. 
Wba t Nietzsche means when he eaya one has to •orgal'lize the chaos • in 
Maeelt ftOW hftOMs oleater. The paasiou origl.nll1ly are in a. at.ate of 
ohaoe. The be!Dg portl'ayln; t.heee pauiona thinks oae way, !!1&7 live !n 
another, and. often apJ*U"e .Ull d.1tt.,..t.. What 11etzao~ tnt.ends ie 
\bat no man can ll'f'e without. briagiag eome oi'Cler lnt.o thia obaos. On the 
one ha!Ml 1 this •r he dou ttr weak•lrtg '\he whole organism thl'ough the 
repwU.atlon and repreaaton ot manr paeeloaa. But Nietzsche '•11ft'es that 
the reault tn thb oa" 11 only a ca.a\rat:lon., Oft the other handt 
Nletasche thlnke that thee ia another war to organize-namely, by 
sublimation, which allows tol' \he achievement ot an organic harmony both 
1n the indl't'S.dual IU'ld in oul t.UI'e • 
Howeyer• the question ot how subUmati<m ls possible wi'th1n t.be 
trsmework of Nietzsche's mon1em et.Ul must be corteideJted.. It must be 
pointed out that Nie\zsohe does not consider it legitimate to accept 
uaquest1one4 tracU.t.ional beliefs. Having questioned the exittenoe of God, 
N1etzaohe also queationa the aupre.4111ft8.t.unl origins of ree.aon. Orit.ioe 
eay tba.t et:~pirioal atud1•• then led Nietzaohe to aetnJM that all human 
behaYior could. be exple.ifted in terms of the WUl to Pover.2 Nletzeehe '• 
own obNrn.tions, oouiled with his hiat.orioal studies, espec1all7 of Greek 
1. Priedl'S.oh Nietzaolw, f" W&tl t.2 fove[ 1 1n Willud Huntington Wright, 
What. Nlt'tffthe Tf!C~ New orka D. W. Huebsoh, 191,), P• ~6. 
2. George Allen Morgan, What Nietzsche Means {Oambridgea Harvard 
University Press, 1941), P• 64. 
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cul:t.vre• Mems to have oon1'1noecl hila t.hat. "the tdll to powv is the moat 
tundam4mtal tact which we can get. at.. •1 Hence, Nie\zsche ooncluclea that 
not onl7 the paas1cms, but. alao the apil'it. rnay 'be 1nt..rpreted. as an 
lnet~ ot the un:11'vaal Will to Power, which hoOlllH t.be world~ 
tor Ktet.zeche. The reeult is that Nietaache gives ap1ritualit7 a unique 
etat.ua 1n his OYerall aoheme beoauae lt caanot. be cancelled 1n the pi'OPJa 
of eubllmatlon, as aexuallt.y is able. While the spirit and the eex-clr1ye 
are both a.apeot.s of the Will to Powt"t Ntetzeobe ccmslclel'a t.be aex-41-ive 
ae cml7 a passt.onJ and when OM )'lelda to u. l1l ita uneuhU.ma.ted torm he 
hoomes a alaTe to his pus lema. 1M aplrS:t., though, allows one to gain 
ma.ate..,. ov• h1mae1t. And as NS.etzacbe bell..,-ee thtt Will to Power la 
essentially the •t.nat.lnct ot tHedom, • he concludes that \he vlll oe.n tiNt 
fulfillment best t.bl"'ugh spirS:\ua.l en4eavore. ll'or eaample, Nletzsehe 
•1• t 'Be who le apU'i t.ual'r rlch ami trutepenclent is a lao the mori. poweri'ul 
man 11'1 anr •••• tt2 
While JO.etzsohe t.hinka that atrengt.h of will and tnt.elllgence are 
8J'Dt)ftl man•s h1gheat faoulttea, ~ at.lll kees his view on the power atanfl-
u4. Nletsaohe beU.evee that. 1ntell1genoe te the tanl\7 which enables 
t.he oJ-ganllm to clft'elop toreeight., helps to organize the paestone into e. 
harmony, an4 41at1nguiahe• t.he higher fl>om t.n. lower man.' Int.erest.tngly 
enough, Nlet.zeohe'• e.\taek on •aystba• te 'baeecl on h1a objeot.ioae to the 
.... IJ'ratloality he finds tn their taUve to q,ueetton pr.tses. Much of his 
at.taok on Ohriattantt.y is e!mJ.Iulr baaed on whAt Nietsaet. takes to M i.he 
1. Nietzsche, :£M WIJ 1 !e lr!t£• b1 Morgan, !fl!efr NlfH•St Mee.n,lt P• 94. 
2. Rletseohe, D.- imta!og ot MoJ!l.l• th 705· 
~· Nat.uohe, 'l'N! 6481~, P• 52'• 
•• !f1etssche, D! P!m• in D• Po£!:!b~e N&O'tifiCb!t P• eo. 
' 
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C~iatian repwU.at!on of reaaon and t.he glorittcatlon ot the dale in 
powr.1 For instance, N1etzaohe aa.ys that Chr18t1an acholan 
athanoe their eob'•tvee as blandl7 a.a <logmaa ancl 
are barily ..,.,. ho!wnly ,-rpleaa 'by the •Uf••ta ot 
a Biblical verse. Apia and aca1n they ear, I am 
right. tor it la vritt•• • a.n4 t.he 1n\erpretat1cm 
that tollO'tft!J ls ot auob tmpu4ent. ublt.ra.riness that a 
philologist. is etoppe<l in hta traeka, tom between 
anger and la.ughWr, a.n4 teepe aaldng himseltt Is it 
posa1bleY Xa this honeet.1 I8 it even 4eoenU2 
Thus, as a phtlosophel' N1etzeohe oonaiara phlloaophy as 'the most. 
aplrit.ual Will t.o Power• and. pNpo"a to measure power and ..-.akneaa !n 
terms of me.n•a wUU.ngness to subject enn his melt oheriahe<l belief's 
to J'&t.lona.Ut.y.' fhoae who take ret'uge in dogma or qetems which u. 
based. on unquest.lonod p:rend.ees appear weak to Jfietaaohe. fhle point ma7 
be ioo~ted from N1etaaohe 1a lat.el' wol'kSt namelr, tb• Pmftlog of' 
Mo£!1! an<l !b! 9!1fhr11Je. 'The priest lmowa onlr one gNAt dangua that 
is eoienoe, the sound eonoeptS..n of' oe.u• and lltfeot.•4 B7 solenoe 
Nlet.saohe means the wlll!ngneaa to quettlon, t.o submit one1a expression• 
to e:q>W1men.ta, and to N'V'lee .me's beU.eta in the light ot new evidence. 
Nlnzeohe's later wo1'ke arct quite cl.,. a-egardtng hie experi.ment.a.lism and 
affirmation of ~:r1tio1sm.5 N'i.t.aeo~ Wl'lt.eat 11 am too 1nquia1tiTe1 too 
skept.ioal, tAo B.JTOgaat, to let J%!1selt be sat.1et1ecl vi'\11 an obvious and 
OJ'&as solut.ion ot t.ld.ngs.•6 ln these later works Nietaache still l'egar4a 
powe'!' aa the sol• atan<lar4 of valtMh But. re.ttoa11t.y and. lntelligenoe are 
1. Ntetzeohe, Ill! A!D1fbl1fJ:• P• 627. 
a. Nletstohe. IH lla.1f.!!t P• so. 
'• Nlet.asohe, lllflDS\ Q224, !H, Jh'll, P• ;s89. 
1+., li•tzeohe, De Anft1!!!!10.• PP• 629-,50. 
5· Nietzsche, !hi Jd.oU,, P• 482. 
20 
6. Fried:rtoh l!U.etaeehe• Bfclalio!!• tn.ne. Cls.fto.a ~!iman in 19.• ~loe;ehl 
of W&etz!!b! (N• torkt rulom Heuse, Inc., IJ.88§1 1927). P• 8~ 
valuable only 1naotar as they are the ma.rrl.tena'\tons of true power. The 
result ls that N1etzeohe holds '*the most spiritual men" to he 't.he st.I'O!Ig• 
eet. ones• because Uwy possese both lmowle4ge and. lntel11gence w:S:t.h 
etrengt.h ot wlll. 1 
&tnce1 one aspect of Nietzsche • s argument is that the WUl to Power 
ta neither ldentioal with nor opposed to J'eal0n1 but is potentially 
rational. This tmpllcatton ubderlies the tact that the universe ls not 
pl"e""'Pltmned and guided by a 41rin1t.J• It does not indica.t.e, however, that. 
the universe is totally lrre.tioa&lt tor Ntet.zsohe says that there are 
evidenees ot J'atlonallt.y. 'A Alllit ...._.on, to be aure. a ned of w16dom. 
scattered trom. na.r to star--\hls leavtm is m.iDd 1n vltb all thingea tor 
hllr*s sake, wisdom ls m.bed in with all tld.nge.•2 Thus, when m8l'lt 
through his tnt.lU.genoe, eoatrols his pa.estens ill the proce.e of selt• 
development Nietzsche concludes that. the WUl to Power' oveJ"Oomes itself. 
J 
In ad.d.lt.ion, lUet.zsohe sees tlle Wtll to Power a.s abrars being at war with 
itself. The battle between the epirit an4 the paeeicme ie only one of the 
man)' i!lkirmishes. Nietzsche views all natural events, all bletoey, and the 
development ot eveey humaa being through euoh ~1••• ln tact, 
Nietzeobe thinks that. man can beoome more pel'f'eot. and gain masteey over 
him .. lf only through a measure ot asoet.ioia:m a.nct aelt-denial. Attaching 
th1a conception ot hvma.n morality to ~ universe at large• Nietzsche' a 
ph1losophf takes on a ooemto setting. 
Onoe this ia done 1 t van be maintained that Nietzsche' 1 thought makes 
a full eirole. In his eu11er 'books, IRlOh as tB• Dawn ot l?!J:a Nietzsche 
explains the univ8J'se by t.nalog with the human psJCheJ it will be shown 
1. Ni.t.ztohe, 1M Antlobl161 P• 645. 
2.. Nietzsche, Zara1.huatl!• P• 2713. 
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below, in the notion on the Eterhal Reet.Wrence1 that Nietzaohe a.lao 
explains the individual thl'ough the setting of the cos:mos. 
Nevertheless, it must be rem.ember~ that. Nietuche la mainly ooa• 
corned with the individual. In the end, Nietzsche's empbae1e 6n indivld• 
uality leads him to the concep\iou of an order ot rank band on power. 
'fbe.t kB1!1!ft ~~- bzoinge with it arrangements 
which re..mle  eologioal clee1p-t that the 
apparent !.!!Y are not intencled but., as 10oa as tho 
aupremaq ovel" a esllet power is eate.bllshecl and 
'\he lat~r worke as tuaotlon of the greater; an 
oror &f D:lllf:• of Ol'ga.nlzation must awaken the 
sembltmete of an order of tnMU'I.8 and end.l 
As Nietzsohe sees it., curbing the b.tpule• ts an attempt to obtain more 
life and power. In this sense Nt.tzaohe bel14Wee that moat men ober the 
laws which otheres impose on them 'beoawtfl they want power. The majority 
of mankind believe that t.h1a ta the way to g4tt a.heacl and become suoceastul. 
l4'ore important.. though• is Nt.etasoho •a luistenoe that it la O'ftlr a sign 
of small power to obey ex\ernallr imposed laws. Nietzsche assumes that 
most would not obey suoh J"Ules lt they could clisregal"d them, Thel'efol'e• 
Nietzsche asserts that only th.a weak need to be oonatraiucl by '\he rule 
of law because it they were not anarchy would result.2 
The .Vong......S.lled man, bove'fer, ls able t.o pnerate his own stand• 
aris. This point is beat un4eJ'$od 1n terms of tUetzsohe 'a oont.ention 
that. the Will to Power is a onat.ive foroe. The ~ man 1s the 
cl'eatlve man who is not 11kelr to abide by previously established norma. 
Since a genuinely wreat.S.ve act contains l'\s own nol"m8, Nietzsohe declare• 
tba:t eTe'l1f ol'eatlon be~• a creation of new norma. 1Whoever muat be a 
crea\or in geod and evil, verily he muat. firat be an annihilator and. break 
1. Nietzsche, !he Wlll to Pour, 1n 1'-Drge.n, W!J!.t Ni,tapohe Means, P• 82. 
2. Nietzsche, The J~Wts4om1 trans. Tbotllfls Oommon (New York• 
Ma.omlllan Co., 2~92,, P• 1"78• 
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yalues. 'fhua the higheet. evU belongs to the hipeat. goodneasa 'but thie 
S.s c,._tlYe. •1 Nl4tt.zsohe' 1 attack a.galnl't his age's oul ture and a.galnet 
Chri st.lani t.)' nov are c 1 ee.Hr • It is NS.etzeohe 's contention that eeta b-
U. sheet codes do ut allow tor new crea.ttae and at.itle the initiative of 
\he st.ro!lg in power. Nietzsche expresses 1.h1e point well in Bmrut Go!d 
sf. !!l~. Ua1ng a paraphrase Nietzsche v1t.eea 'Jeeu said to his Jew•• 
'the Law was tor senantsJ-love God as I lo•• him, as hia Sonl What have 
we Sona ot God to do with JDOJ'l\ls' •2 
However, Nietzsohe•s opposition to esta.bU.shM codes does not lead 
him to repudiate al1 disclpline. Nietzsche does not. have in mind a rejec-
tion of all existing rules. "It, is the w-.k oharactera wlt'.out. power over 
themselTes who !!!!! the oonet.ralnt. ot style' an4 •are alwaye out. to inter-
pret t.hemaelYOs and their environment as tree na.tur.......,Ud, arbiwary, 
tanta.stio, disorderly, astonishing.'' In this 88Jlle aphorlem where Nietzsche 
pictures t.ho weak as the wild, 4S.eorderlr ones, be presents hie picture 
of the powerful. 
OM thl!!§. 1• aeedtul. •otvtng style" to one • a 
obaJ"&ctif=igra.'t IHI ''fire art.& It. ie exero1ee4 b;y 
~se who aee all thlt ltr-ath ancl weaknetses of t.he11" 
own natures and then eompreMncl them in an a.ri,iatle 
plan until ev~ appevs ae art ancl reason and 
..en weakness delight.• the .,e. • • • It w!ll be the 
et.roag and dominMril\g na\urea who enjOJ their tiMet. 
gaie\7 1n suoh oom.ptislOl'lt in auoh aorurt.ralnt. and 
perfeot.lon Ullderf.t. law ot their OtmJ the paaslon ot 
their V.mencloue wlll relents when ooatront.ed with 
st.rlized, conquered, ami sei'Tbg nature, eftn when 
t.hey have to builcl palaoea an4 lq O\lt gardena, ther 
4emure at giYing Datura a tree hand.4 
1. Nietzsche, Zan.!-huM, p. 228. 
2. Nletzaohe, lflgn4 Good y4 ivU, P• 1469. 
'• Niet.ssohe, Thf Gay §olenct, P• 99 • 
.\ • .wi• • PP• 98-99. 
This is the height of power for Nietzsche. Nietzsohe thinks the man who 
conquers himself shows greater power than the one who conquers others. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche finds 
strength where one does not look for ita 1n simple rd.ld, 
and pleasant people, without the leas\ desire to rule-
and, oonYeraelr, t.he d.esire to rule has otten appeared 
to me as a sign of 1mlard weakn.essa t.her1tea.r their own slave soul and shrowd it in ro,.al oloak. 
F1na111t Nietzsche thinks t.hat real power consists in controlling, 
sublimating, and eplorirtc one's passions rat.her than considering them as 
eYll and fighting them. But before man can aocomplleh this self over-
coming and create the bea.utitul he has to flUtter. ruetzsohe stresses 
the autfering which is called for in such self-perfection and insists on 
man • s cruelty against himself. If Nietzsche 1 a cruelty is so \D'lderstood as 
J 
the individual's attitude toward himself, one my grant that 1almost 
eveJ"1t.h1ng that we oall 'higher oul ture' ls baae4 upon the sriri tualizing 
and intensif)ing of Ct!l!l tx • 12 Nietzsche brings this out furt.her in !h!, 
Gene!J.ogr ot Moz:all where he deals with the 'bad conscience. • 
'l'his secret self-~, t.hls cruelt.,. of the artist, 
t.his delight 1n giving a form to one's self as a piece 
of d1fticultt retraoto17, and autferin& material, 1n 
burning a rill, a or1 tique, a oontradiotion J this 
sbdster and ghastly labolll' of lne on the part of the 
soul, whose will is clO'fen in two within itself', which 
makes itself sutter traa delight in the affliction of 
eutferingJ this whollr aol!Sa!:d conscienoe has fi-
nally ••• produotMI an a e of novel and 8.l::l&Zing 
beauty and af1'1J"1DDlt1on, and perhaps baa reallr been 
the first to give 'birth to biMt.ut.r at all., 
So, Nietzsche concludes that the bad conscience is a necessary evil 
through which the oreator mun pass before he can be •reborn.• In this 
1. Nietzsche, The Da.wp, in Kaufmann, Nietasohtt P• 221, 
2. Nietzsche, B!lond Good and J!J,lt P• '''• 
5• Nietzsche, The Gfmtalog:r of Mo£!1s, P• 705• 
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llf• Niet.asche thinks t.ha.t the artin and philosopher come closest to the 
ata~e of being whe7e they are able to giTe style to their oha~acte~• and 
to create a. world ot beaut.y. Reaogni:dng this tact., Nietzsche ult.itttat.elr 
concludes, aa Goethe did 1.tt t.M last portion of his f!!:!!t.• that the Will 
to Power can be contained and employed t.o full adft.ntage through self• 
peri'ection. In Nietzsche's est.imat.ion t.1w pel'feot. ~ is the passionate 
man who has nast.ered his impulses. 111 hie early works Nietesohe had: 
errritaged the a:rtiet.1 the asoet..lc, an4 the philosophel" as the supr.e 
triad of humanity. .But b7 the t.lm.e he bad uitt.en Ve AnS:i!br&D• in 1888, 
Niet.zaehe evaluated them ditt..-.nt.ly. The uoetio Nietzsche now piot.ures 
as the man vho has extiJtpated his p&sdona and has uet.aooyed his ohanoe 
of oreatingJ t.t. artist and philosopher, however • employ t.helr paaeS.ons 
1n OH&tlng. Hence, Nietzsche belieYee that they are the moet. ftlua.ble 
2. The Eternal R"""'ence 
Once Nietzsohe•s o01l0eptlcm of the powerful man who baa dS.sc1pl1ned 
himselt 1Jt\o Whol--88 it! unclerl'toOdt ~~ietZSCM I 8 clOCJtl'iJl8 Of the iteJ'M.l 
Recurrence beoom.ee more eaplica.ble. the etrongM~~Willed man looks upon 
every moment of his life as eomet.hing preoious and momentow-.. Ff'Om i.hls 
perspective one 'does not enri.-ge aalvation tn the pro•••• but L1••1!7 
1 
the world iJ f'Wehed in fife., eS.ngle morunt and its end attained. It This 
passage suggeete \be 1ntin1te value of the moment and ot the individual 
who exper1eneea it. 
Tbe doctrlne ot the Etemal RctcUJ>renoe oan thus be construed. as 
Ni~t.aeche • e moral 4ottrtne by which the powerful man at:fil'ms his own being. 
1. Frle4rioh Niet.seohet •tru. Use and Almae of Uiart.ory1 " trans. Julian 
Kraft (New torkt The Libel'&l Arts Pnea, /187$11949). Jh 47. 
Like Goethe's Faust, Nietzsche believes that the man who has organized 
the chaos of his passions, and has integrated every feature of his charac-
ter, will realize how inextricably his own being is involved in the 
totality of the universe. 
Such a spirit who has become free stands amid 
the cosmos with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in 
the faith that only the particular is loathsome, and 
that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole--he 
does not negate any more.l --
In the "drunken Song" in Zarathustra Nietzsche also relates his conception 
of the Eternal Recurrence to the feelinc of joy, which he analyzes as the 
conscious aspect of the possession of power. This is the powerful man's 
faith. In saying that 11 joy wants the eternity of~ things, wants deep, 
wants deep eternity," Nietzsc~1e brings out the relation between joy and 
Eternal Recurrence. 2 
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? 0 my 
friends, then you said Yes too; to all woe. All 
things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you 
wanted one thing twice, if ever you said 11 You please 
me, happiness! Abide, moment! 11 then you wanted all 
back. All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, 
enalliored--oh, then you loved the world. Eternal ones, 
love it eternally and evermore; and to woe too, yo~ 
say: go, but return! For all joy wants--eternity. 
This is the highest manifestation of the universal essence of being. In 
this outlook the conception of Nietzsche's 11 overman" becomes inseparable 
from that of the Eternal Recurrence. 4 
This suggestion of the Eternal Recurrence can also be thought of as 
having points of contact with Kant's concept of the Categorical Imperative. 
1. Nietzsche, The Idols, P• P• 554. 
2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 4;6. 
3· Ibid. 
4. Nietzsche, The Idols, P• 554. 
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It can now be maintained that the man who believes in the recurrence 
will act in such a manner that he would wish his acts to recur eternally. 
But it is problematical whether Kant ever meant to appeal to man's psycho-
logical disposition. Kant takes hardly any concern with emotional 
consequences whereas the man who believes in recurrence would be deterred 
from certain actions by his response to their consequences. 
On the other hand, Nietzsche is not so concerned with particular 
actions as he is with the state of being of the whole man. Those who 
achieve self-perfe=tion and affirm their own being do not concern them-
selves about details. They want an Eternal Recurrence out of the fulness 
of their happiness in the moment. They 11 live life" as it were. Because 
of this experience, Nietzsche affirms the universe 11 for all eternity" not 
only to endure the necessary, "and on no account conceal it," but "to 
love it."l 
It is noteworthy that Nietzsche also says this feeling of joy, 11 amor 
fati," is his formula for the greatness of a human being.2 Power is still 
Nietzsche's standard of value; but this joy is the conscious feeling which 
is connected with the possession of power. "My formula for greatness in 
man," Nietzsche remarks, 11 is amor fati: that a man should wish to have 
nothing altered, either in the future, the past, or for all eternity.") 
The man who experiences this joy is the powerful man, and he gains meaning 
for his life by achieving perfection. This interpretation is corroborated 
by an aphorism in The Gay Science. 
Excelsior! "You will never pray again, never 
adore again, never again rest in endless trust; you 
1. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 853. 
2. Ibid. 
). Ibid. 
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deny yourself any stopping before ultimate wisdom, 
ultimate goodness, ultimate power, while unharnessing 
your thoughts; you have no perpetual guardian and 
friend for your seven solitudes; you will live without 
a view of mountains with snow on their peaks and fire 
in their hearts; ••• there is no reason any more in 
what happens, no love in what happens to you; no 
resting place is any lange~ open to your heart, where 
it has only to find and no longer to seak; you resist 
any ultimate peace, you want the eternal recurrence of 
war and peace. Man of renunciation, do you want to 
renounce all this7 VJho will give you the necessary 
strength7 Nobody yet has had this strength." •.• 
Perhaps that very renunciation will also lend us the 
strength to bear the renunciation itself; perhaps man 
will rise ever higher when he once ceases to flow into 
a god.l 
This passage answers the problem of providing an incentive for man to 
raise his state of being from carnal to true humanity. It also explains 
why Nietzsche thinks that his Eternal Recurrence doctrine is required. 
Nietzsche maintains "a doctrine is required, strong enough to have the 
effect of breeding: strengthening the strong, paralyzing and breaking 
2 
the world-weary. 11 
However, while one c~:u1 crasp Nietzsche 1 s conception of joy when h~ 
feels glorification in the moment, it seems that Nietzsche's Doctrine of 
the Eternal Recurrence, as a metaphysical doctrine, does not bear 
testimony to Nietzsche's overall position. It must be remembered, though, 
that Nietzsche does not present the Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence 
as dogma but as an expression and experience of joy that redeems and 
justifies lif"e. It is doubtful if Nietzsche comprehensively thought out 
all the metaphysical implications of the Eternal Recurrence theory. In 
his notes in The Will to Po;.rer Nietzsche may have believed that this 
doctrine was really scientific. He describes it as 11 the most scientific 
1. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 98. 
2. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 286. 
1 
of all possible hypotheses." As pointed out in the introduction, 
however, the notes in this work were merely tentative. Nietzsche might 
only have meant to imply that all events may be repeated endlessly, and 
that there is no plan nor goal to history or to life. This gives the clue 
that Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence does not mean primarily 
a cosmological theory but is a. methodological device used to transform 
humanity. 
1. Ibid., in lc}organ, \'/hat Nietzsche Heans, p. 285. 
CHAPTER III 
NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF .ViAI\!KIND 
1. The Task of History 
It is to the historical mind that Nietzsche concedes the task of 
establishing continuity between human beings and the universe. Because 
man can derive insight into history from the viewpoint of the Will to 
Power hypothesis, Nietzsche contends that there is a continuity between 
the individual and the universe. "The powers in history are doubtlessly 
discernible, i~ one strips all moral and religious teleology. They must 
be ~ powers which also operate in the entire phenomenon of organic 
1 
exister.ce.• This link between man and the cosmos is even better illus-
trated in the treatise on 11 The Use anti Abuse of History" where Nietzsche 
explains the task of history. First and ~oremost, Nietzsche believes that 
history must serve life because history is the means by which the indi-
vidual gains solace and strength. In addition, for Nietzsche history 
must be critical and reveal facts as they really are. However, as in the 
universe, Nietzsche denies that there is comprehensive order in history. 
History is not the work of immanent reason; it is full of accidents. On 
the other hand, while denying perfect order, Nietzsche does not assert 
perfect chaos, The overall fact may be lawlessness, but within it 11 a 
little wisdom is possible indeed." 2 
1. Ibid., in Morgan, What Nietzsche !•leans, p. )2). 
2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 278. 
)0 
In "The Use and Abuse of' History 11 Kietzsche describes the various 
types of' history. Among the more important are: ''monumental history, 11 
which is the exemplary portrayal of' great men and events of' the past in 
order to derive comfort and inspiration from the fact that man is capable 
of' greatness; "antiquarian history," which is piety toward the past for 
those who come after; and critical history, which is the ordinary study 
1 
of history on an intellectual level. Nietzsche writes both critical and 
monumental history. For example, his work on the Nineteenth Century and 
on Christianity is monumental. For individuals and nations possessing the 
most strength Nietzsche maintains there is a need for both critical and 
monumental history. Nietzsche thinks every ruan and nation needs certain 
unbiased knowledge of the past. However, a strict and critical historical 
sense tends to weaken a person or a nation. By itself it does not provide 
any uplifting force or ideal. Remembering the discussion on the Eternal 
Recurrence, which may be understood as a moral doctrine for the strong in 
psychical power, Nietzsche shows that empirically speaking the 11 unhis-
torical" and the "super-historical" mediations are two antidotes against 
the overpowering of' life by critical history. 2 Via these two methods men 
and nations learn how to forget and how to remember at the proper time. 
Furthermore, in the "super-historical" view one feels that the world is 
finished at every moment.3 This feeling of greatness is the individual's 
Will to Power working to produce that st§te of 11amor f'ati 11 spoken of 
previously. 
Consequently, Nietzsche envisages the need for both methods; but 
1. Nietzsche, 11 The Use and Abuse of History," PP• 16, 20. 
2. Ibid., PP• 16-17. 
3· Ibid., P• 17. 
Nietzsche hopes that 
history will not find its whole significance in 
general propositions, and regard them as its blossom 
and fruit. On the contrary, its real value lies in 
inventing ingenious variations on a probably common 
place theme, in raising the popular melody to a 
universal symbol and showing that a world of depth, 
power, and beauty exist in it.l 
Being a ~an of great power, the fine historian must have the task of 
providihg a model to his contemporaries. 
Thus history is to be written by the man of experience 
and character. He who has not lived through something 
greater and nobler than others, will not be able to 
express anything great and noble in the past •••• If 
you live yourselves back into the history of great men 
you will find in it the high command to come to maturity 
and leave that blighting system of cultivation offered 
by your time.2 
Nietzsche believed that the majority of men in his age lacked this 
ability to write 11 real 11 history because the weak in the Will to Power had 
triumphed over the strong. Nietzsche bases this judgment upon observation 
of his own generation. Looking upon the scene both as an observer and as 
a critic, Nietzsche says that humanity 
does not represent a development toward something 
bette~r stronger or higher in the sense accepted 
today. "Progress" is merely a modern idea, that is, a 
false idea. The European of today is vastly inferior 
to the European of the Renaissance: further development 
is altogether not according to any necessity in the 
direction of e!evation, enhancement, or strength.) 
By reading about the past and comparing it with his own age, Nietzsche 
infers that his generalizations on morality are valid. Before some of 
these are investigated, it must be shown how Nietzsche evaluates his age 
1. llii·' P• 46. 
2. Ibid. , p. 48. 
). Nietzsche, The Antichrist, p. 571. 
)2 
and mankind's previous historical epochs. 
2. The Cultural Decline in Europe 
In the section of 0 0ur Striving for Distinction" in The Dawn of Day 
Nietzsche explains that culture begins when the individual man wishes to 
excel his neighbor. Here Nietzsche suggests a scale of "degrees of 
excellence 11 where the striving to arouse a neighbor 1 s admiration is 
placed very high on the scale. Nietzsche extends this suggestion in 
Thus Spake Zarathustra to include a contest between nations. 
According to Nietzsche, culture is, before all things, 11 the unity 
1 of the artistic style in the expressions of the life of a people • 11 
Abundant knowledge and mechanization are not essential to culture, nor 
are they the signs of its existence. In fact, Nietzsche believes they 
may exist more harmoniously with the very opposite of culture--with 
barbarity. ¥nd for Nietzsche the Europe he sees is a society full of 
barbarism because it lacks any indigenous style. Nietzsche argues that 
11 our modern culture is not a real culture, but a kind!. of knowledge about 
culture, a complex of various thoughts and feelings about it, from which 
no decision as to its direction can come. 112 Nietzsche sees his age as 
degenerate, and looking to the past, especially to Ancient Greece and the 
Renaissance, he indicates that mankind has been corrupted through the 
valuing of the like-minded more highly than the differently minded. As 
Hietzsche 1 s thinking progresses, he expands this initial hostility of con-
temporary culture until it becomes a comprehensive criticism of modernity, 
by \'Thich Nietzsche fulfills the philosopher 1 s duty to be the 11 bad con-
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, David Strauss: The Confessor and i~riter, /J87:iJ 
in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 111. 
2. Nietzsche, 11 The Use and Abuse of History," P• ,31. 
science" of his time. 
Apart from the Ancient Greeks only the men of the Renaissance 
incorporated to the full Nietzsche's ideal of culture. This passage from 
Twilight of the Idols is typical of Nietzsche. 11 Ages must be measured by 
their positive strength--and then that lavishly squandering and fatal age 
of the Renaissance appears as the last great age. 111 Nietzsche argues that 
everything since the Renaissance is a decline except for a temporary halt 
in Seventeenth Century France, where some part of the freedom of the 
personality was regained. However, this leads into a study of Nietzsche's 
theory of history in order to explain why things have gone wrong; this 
will be discussed later. 
i. The Nation State 
In Nietzsche's estimation there is an attrition to the creative 
genius in the hun:an race because the European is not developing 11 according 
to any necessity in the direction Of elevation, enhancer::ent, or strength. 112 
Furthermore, Nietzsche thinks that the power to will is spread too 
diffusely among the various peoples. Nietzsche says the situation is 
worst and most varied where civilization has longest 
prevailed; it decreases according as 11 the barbarian" 
still--or again--asserts his claims under the loose 
drapery of Western culture •••• The power to will 
and to persist, ••• is already stronger in GerLany, 
••• in England, Spain, and Corsica, ••• not to 
mention Italy, which is to young yet to know what it 
wants, and must first show whether it can exercise 
will; but it is strongest and most surprising of all 
in that immense middle Empire where Europe as it were 
flows back to Asia--namely in Russia. There the power 
to will has been long stored up and accumulated, there 
the will--uncertain whether to be negative or affirma-
tive--waits threateningly to be discharged.) 
1. Nietzsche, The Idols, P• 54D. 
2. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, P• 571. 
3· Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, PP• 508-09. 
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Qn the whole, however, Nietzsche believes that the po-r1er manifested 
in l';ineteenth Century Europe is the lo,vest degree of power on the 11 Scale 
of Excellence. 11 Nietzsche discloses that this situation is the result of 
the r:1o b 1 s ascension to power, v1hich happened after the fall o:6 Rome. The 
type of European 1,Tietzsche describes is in the habit of admiring the 
values of respectable things, such as 11 humanity, 11 11 pity, 11 and 11 sympathy. 11 
Nietzsche contends that this process is weakening the individual and his 
uniqueness. l:oreover, since the weal: in the \'/ill to Power have gained 
control over the social machinery, Nietzsche shows that the logical express-
ion of the modern State must be some sort of democracy or socialism. The 
aim of this type of state is not to develop the individual, nor to create 
beauty, but to establish a regime of mediocre happiness for most of its 
people. Nietzsche argues that this state with its doctrine of equality 
11 d ' t · t · th · 't 111 squan ers wna ~s mos prec~ous, e sp~r~ • 
In like manner, Nietzsche envisages the modern State as suppressing 
all that is exce~tional to the mass, for Nietzsche shows that that which 
is superior to the mass revolts against its authority. Nietzsche points 
out that the modern State exists to serve only two purposes: to engender 
and protect the weak-willed peoples and to maintain correct attitudes. 
But in so doing this State becomes the greatest foe of progress and seeks 
to multiply the inferior ele:u:ents at the cost of the strong in power. 
Nietzsche illustrates his contention in Twilight of the Idols v1here he 
discusses the relationship between culture and the State. 
Culture and the state--one should not deceive 
oneself about this--are antagonists: 11 Kul tur-Stas.t 11 
is merely a modern idea. One lives off the other, 
one thrives at the expense of the other. All great 
ages of culture are ages of political decline: what 
1. Nietzsche, The Dawn, in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 8). 
is great culturally has always been unpolitical, 
even anti-political.l 
Hence, Nietzsche believes that the design of correcting and improving 
the human race by beginning with the equality of all men is a falsifica-
tion of the natural order. As a matter of fact, Nietzsche discloses that 
this is further evidence that the weak-willed people are now triumphant. 
These weak-willed individuals have become triumphant over the strong souls, 
Nietzsche says, because they are more numerous, more patient, and more 
cunning. Similarly, Nietzsche holds that because Democracy and Socialism 
entail mediocrity they must destroy the aristocratic spirit. They thereby 
2 become responsible, in large measure, for the shortage of great personnel. 
Nietzsche argues that this consequence of depending upon the masses 
to govern humanity is leading to the enactment of legislative measures 
which are prejudicial to the well-being of all men. In summing up the 
effects of the State system Nietzsche writes that these effects 
undermine the Will to Power, they level mountains 
and valley, and call that morality; they mold men 
small, cowardly and hedonistic--everytime it is the 
herd animal that triumphs with them.J 
Another effect this modern State system has developed is the evolution of 
the professional politician who Nietzsche sees as trading on the credulity 
of imbeciles. Nietzsche says: "I do not consider these so-called 'first' 
men as human beings." "They are the excrement of mankind, the products 
of disease and the instinct of revenge ."4 In Nietzsche's estimation the 
State's rulers are demagogues who deceive their followers and resort to 
all sorts of croJked and ingenious methods to obtain political power. 
1. Nietzsche, The Idols, p. 509. 
2. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, pp. 6)2-)8. 
)• Nietzsche, The Idols, p. 541. 
4. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 852. 
The conclusion Nietzsche draws is that the democratic process has, 
with all its scandals, discouraged those who possess any real value, or 
those who are worthy and look upon the interests of man, from entering 
politics. Nietzsche shows that the proof of this lies in the fact that 
all those who in modern times have risen above humanity have either broken 
loose from State control, or else have used the machinery of the State to 
assert their powers. 
Therefore, Nietzsche regards the modern State as something profoundly 
immoral. He argues against the "levellers, 11 who preach peace and good 
will and maintain that in time man can work out his own problems if only 
given a reasonable sociological environment. Nietzsche insists that any 
form of this type of socialism is a despotism of the most reactionary 
sort. Nietzsche sees Socialism and Democracy as nerely the methods the 
weak decadents use to apply remedies which only make conditions worse. 1 
In fact, Nietzsche points out that because Socialism desires Great state 
powers, and because it requires the most submissive behavior on the part 
of all citizens, it outdoes all the past in annihilating the individual. 
Nietzsche writes what the Socialists 
would fain attain with all their strength is the 
universal, green-meadow happiness of the herd, 
together with security, safety, comfort, and 
alleviation of lif~or every one; their two most 
frequently chanted songs and doctrines are called 
"Equality of Rights" and "Sympathy with all Sufferers" 
--and suffering itself is looked upon b~ them as 
something which must be done away with. 
Nietzsche asks, then, what is the consequence of universal suffrage, 
parliamentarianism, and concessions to the masses? Nietzsche answers by 
1. Ibid., PP• 941-42. 
2. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 429. 
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cri 1..:.ici~:>. cf tllc n:cclcr11 .Stu-co v~·J.1ich l.:.e clo.ssifies o..;:; a l~:ixtLlre cf· s.Csurci 
n~_tionalisl:l :oncl conter:.ptible 11 obsequiot:.sncss." =~i.s:tzsc!~e \·:rites, for 
in opposition alone clces it feel necessary, ••• in opposition alon(;; 
dce2 it beco~e nececsary." 1 
culture and co~ld lecrn so~£t~ing on this score fror:. the French.~ 
;;reat criue against real cv.lture in t~1e lc..st :lour Lu..'1dred years.) Fo1· 
ex::.:._:ple, =~ietzsche holds tl18 GerC;.l:.l.r:cs respor!.sible, in le.r~;e EeasL<re, for 
t!le l:opcles::: .:dtu:::.tion i'l:lic:~ no1; exic:ts in Europe. ::ietzsche points out 
t:_a t LuL~er restored Christiani t:,· ti1c: ::loL:ent it luy vanquis:led, and ti-.a t 
tLe Ge1·~.ans, with their v;ars of independence, robbed Zurope of r:apoleon 
HLen he migl1t have 'l'teldeJ that continent intc a polit:..cal and eco:.:lc::ic 
• + 4 I -1 ' • .._ • •• • t h · t . d .... ' t' . 1 . -'- .c> t.l.nJ.c-. n auc..:. ... J.on, .. iJ.e zsc.e J.s no J.c.presse \H<....l Dena J. ... ary po\·ler c .. 
the Ger:.:an Eeicll. It has been shown how ~:ietzsche repudiates physical 
povwr as being but a lovJ degree o:2 power on the "Scale of :excellence • 11 
This is ~ore explicit in the Gc:.-.ealo{':;{ of !:orals \vhere :;iet:::.scl:e discusses 
Gen:an :dlito.ry strenstl1. "Can an;>' one interest hir:self in this Gerccn 
:W:1pire? 'dhere is t:1c ncH tl1ou,:;ht? It ic only a nev1 cotlbination of pov1er? 
, 
..1. • 
..;• 
Iaetzscl1e, The Idols, p. 4C8. 
Friedricl: :~ictzsc:1e, T:1e Birth cf Tragedy, trans. Clifton F. Fadi:11an 
in 'l'he PhiLsophy of :~ietzsche (::e11 Yorl:: Rando:_ riouse, Inc., f.l87iJ 
l n'·,-,' 10-,c 
_.,c:.(;, P• t~· 
:~ie~.:.zscl:lC, :l:'l1e Dawn, in The Portable ~(ietz:::c~~e, P• 84 • 
1 All the worse, if it does not know its own mind."- And Nietzsche believes 
that the Germans do not know their O'\'m mind and where they are going. 
Finally, by accusing the Germans of having lost their breadth of vision, 
which would enable them to pursue more lofty goals, Nietzsche contends 
that they are only political and church puppets of sterile vision who are 
able merely "to exercise faithfulness and, for the sake of faithfulness, 
to risk honor and blood even for evil and dangerous objects. 112 
ii. Education and Science 
One i2portant ramification of this imtolerable situation which 
Nietzsche finds in modern society, and especially in Germany, is the fact 
that the professions of education and science have become completely 
falsified. In Nietzsche's estimation, rather than shaping liberally 
educated men, the modern educational process aims at producing narrow-
minded specialists who are historically and aesthetically trained "babblers 
of old saws and new wisdom on church, state, and art.".3 Nietzsche argues 
and claims that the type of men engendered by this modern educational 
process are merely emasculated specialists, 11 geniuses 11 in one particular 
field, who are nothing but "good clockworks. 11 Nietzsche feels that all 
they can accomplish is to 11 indicate the hour without fail and make a 
modest noise. n4 
Whereas these professions should serve to form the seeker after 
truth, Nietzsche cites how they have now becone places for the procre-
1. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, P• 802. 
2. Nietzsche, The Dawn, trans. Volz, P• 17). 
3· Nietzsche, 11 The Use and Abuse of History, 11 P• 7.3· 
4. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 2.37· 
ation of machines. 1 Nietzsche holds that modern educators want to 
"prepare huge numbers of young men, with as little loss of time as 
possible, to become usable, abusable, in goverm::ent service. 112 And 
very astutely Hietzsche discloses that the ;::eans at hand to accomplish 
this purpose are boredom and duty. 
Philosophy, in particular, has no place in Hietzsche 1 s educational 
scheme if it is to be no more than a system of fact having no expression 
in action. Fietzsc!:le likes to think of philosophies as methods of educa-
ting the mind with their one-sided de:c1ands to see things exactly so and 
not otherwise. Accordingly, !'Tietzsche speaks of having several philoso-
phies and recomrnends that one live through a series of views, finally 
uniting all in one comprehensive vision.3 In this manner Xietzsche 
disparages modern teaching methods of forcing knowledge in one's head 
instead of gaining it through contact. 7hus, the task of philosoph:·, 
science, and education, as Nietzsche sees tl-:em, is to train the individual 
so that he Hill lmo;·r where he is going. But modern education, philosophy, 
and science do not fulfill t~:is task for Nietzsche. They rather foster 
the growth of r:Jany of modern society's woes, such as DeLlocracy, Socialism, 
and pacifis:.J.4, 
Consequently, the whole Nineteenth Century educational process is, 
to Nietzsche 1 s mind, Ol1C of despiritualization. Nietzsche thinks that 
modern education, like modern culture and t~e modern state, is falsified 
because there do not seem to be individuals who can live "super-histori-
1. Nietzsche, The Idols, P• 552. 
2. Ibid. 
3· :;ietzsche, P· 9). 
4. Ibid., PP• 84-91. 
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cally11 and create anything of value. The result is that only the weak-
willed peoples' interests are served by modern education which exists only 
for the protection and creation of mediocrity. 
If this process of degeneration continues to increase Nietzsche 
fears that power might fall into some despot's hands who will demand 
complete acquiescence and uniformity in all issues. This is aptly brought 
out in one of Nietzsche's earliest works, 11 Schopenhauer as Educator." 
Now almost everything on earth is determined by 
the crudest and most evil forces, by the egotism of 
the purchasers and the military despots. The State, 
in the hands of the latter • • • wishes that people 
should lavish on it the same idolatrous cult which 
they have lavished on the Church.l 
Nietzsche reasons that Europe could move to this sort of society because 
while the "universal rights of man" were paramount, modern man wants, if 
possible, only to recline in the shade of the tree planted by the strong 
and to escape the necessity of working to discipline himself. 2 
Nietzsche also contends that more than anything else continuity of 
development has been destroyed and that men live disconnectedly in modern 
times. Nietzsche's indictment against conventionalisn then ends with a 
diagnosis in which he claims that modern civilization is stale and decadent. 
ltl 
As Nietzsche's thought matures, he unites all accusations in a comprehensive 
theory of decadence, which he defines as disintegration, conflict, and 
maladjustment--all phases of the modern age. Viewing his era, Nietzsche 
says that the fundamental symptoms of degeneracy lead to "ressentiment." 
To fight these consequences, Nietzsche argues, is delusory. In fact, 
Nietzsche points out that the means commonly employed illustrate the rule 
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, 11 Schopenhauer as Educator," [i87!fl, in Kaufmann, 
Nietzsche, P• 140. 
2. Nietzsche, Human, P• 46. 
that decadents choose remedies which only make things worse. 1 
Therefore, Nietzsche shows that the basic aim of culture, which is 
to promote the generation of the philosopher, the artist, and the saint, 
has not been accomplished in modern times because the "mob" is in power. 2 
Nietzsche 1 s next problems are to ascertain why this general decline has 
set in and to postulate what the results may be. Once more Nietzsche must 
go to history to gather the material for his generalizations. 
3· Nietzsche's Interpretation of the Past 
H:)storically, Nietzsche believes that he has found the key to the 
whole decadence movement in Jewish history. Nietzsche blames the defeated 
Israelites of the "Babylonian Captivity" period for starting the unnatural 
process of reinterpreting natural causal relations in terms of sinful ways 
and transgressions. When the Jewish people were subjugated, Nietzsche 
asserts in order to survive they invented a system of conduct which would 
secure their continued existence. They realized that initiative would 
mean death. So they replaced their hardier virtues with the safer ones 
of survival. However, Nietzsche says that this system of outer conduct is 
a direct falsification of all natural conditions and that the Jewish people 
adopted it only when they had been stripped of their power. Henceforth, 
lUetzsche discloses how their God became a moral dictator and how their 
morality ceased to be an expression of life but became a condition for 
survival. The Jewish priesthood had to interpret history with a view to 
showing that all sins against God led to punishment and that all pious 
worship resulted in reward. Consequently, 
1. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, P• 94o. 
2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 370. 
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when a people is perishing, when it feels how its 
faith in the future and its hope of freedon arc 
vanishing irrevocably, when submission begins to 
appear to it as the prime necessity ••• it becomes 
aware of the virtues of the subjugated as the 
conditions of self-preservation.! 
Nietzsche says this process began the great "slave rebellion in 
morals. 11 The oppressed Jews took revenge on their masters by devising 
a neans to power through the creation of a "ressentiment morality" which 
eventually put them at the head of all decadence moralities. Nietzsche 
asserts that this "revolt of the slaves" begins in "ressentiment, 11 becomes 
creative, and gives birth to the values of pity, sympathy, and suffering. 
In the chapjer 11 0f the Tarantulas 0 in Zarathustra Nietzsche describes the 
feeling of revenge these people have introduced. It means that the world 
11 should be filled with t~e storms of . . 2 • revenge • 11 Thus, by the time 
Christianity arrived Nietzsche shows how it found the ground well prepared 
by t1:e supre;r:acy of moral values and other-worldly metaphysics. 
In the midst of this cauldron of ressentiment against the strong 
Nietzsche introduces Jesus. Nietzsche believes Jesus was an extreme deca-
dent whose sensitiveness produced an instinctive hatred of reality, and 
of all forn:.s of hostility. According to Nietzsche Jesus' essential teach-
ing was not a theological dogma but a way of life which he practiced as a 
means to inward peace)) In The Antichrist Nietzsche says Jesus renounced 
all enmity and resistance to receive the 11 Kingdom of Heaven, 11 which is an 
inward state. Nm·r Nietzsche indicates that this state, indifferent to the 
priestly hierarchy with its manipulation of punishment and repentance, was 
1. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, p. 583. 
2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 212. 
3· Nietzsche, The Antichrist, P• 608. 
a further development of that reinterpretation of reality which had 
motivated the Jewish 11 slave rebellion~ But inasmuch as Jesus championed 
the outcast and denied the Jewish conception of the "chosen people" he 
was leading an uprising against the foundations of Jewish society and the 
Jewish religion. Nietzsche assumes this is the reason why Jesus was 
killed. 
However, after Jesus' death his immediate followers and the early 
Christian community misunderstood the character of Jesus and the meaning 
of his life. Nietzsche argues that 
Jesus could not intend anything with his death except 
to give publicly the strongest exhibition, the proof 
of his doctrine. But his disciples were far from 
forgiving this death--which could have been evangelic 
in the hi~hest sense--or even from offering themselves 
for a like death in gentle and lovely repose of the 
heart. • •• The natter could not possibly be finished 
with this death: 11 retribution 11 was needed •••• Once 
more the popular expectation of a Messiah came to the 
foreground; a historic moment was envisaged: the King-
dom of God comes as a judgment over his enemies.l 
As Nietzsche views it Jesus' death on the cross was merely the 
supreme example of this new way of life--freedom from resentment directed 
outward. But the disciples could not grasp this fact; they desired 
revenge. So they interprete'd Jesus as a warlike Messiah who would return 
to establish a Kingdom of Heaven for the glory of his disciples and judg-
ment of his foes.2 St. Paul completed this initial perversion.) Paul 
invented his own history of earliest Christianity. 
Still further: he falsified the history of Israel 
once more so that it might appear as the prehistory 
of his deed • • • • Later the Church even falsified 
1. ~., P• 615. 
2. Ibid., PP• 635-36. 
). Nietzsche, The Dawn, in The Portable Nietzsche, P• 76. 
the history of mankind into the prehistory of 
Christianity.l 
1-:S.king an arbitrary selection of a few traits from the life of Christ, 
Paul improvised around them the doctrines which later ruled Europe: sin, 
atonement, and personal imuortality. Nietzsche emphasizes how Paul intro-
duced dogma in place of the way of life and so prepared for the priest-
hoods' restoration to power. And afterwards it is simple for Nietzsche 
to illustrate how the Church, linked with the State, sanctioned war and 
embodied the exact opposite of everything Jesus taught •• 
By Jesus' death Nietzsche wants to prove that all suffering is divine. 
Nietzsche holds that 11all of. us are nailed to the cross, consequently~ 
are divine • 112 Jesus 
died as he had lived, as he had taught--not to "redeem 
men" but t.o show how one must live. This practice is 
his legacy to mankind: his behavior before the judges, 
before the catchpoles, before the accusers and all 
kinds of slander and scorn--his behavior on the cross. 
He does not resist, he does not defend his right;-;e-
takes no step "I'Thich might ward off the worstj on the 
contrary, he _provokes it. And he begs, he suffers, he 
loves with those, lJl those, who do him evi1.3 
This is not Nietzsche's ideal of the passionate man who controls his 
inpulses but is a case 11 of puberty being retarded • 11 4 In their search 
for an explanation as to how God could have allowed his "son" to b@ 
executed the early "Christians" could not understand this fact and fell 
upon the theory that Jesus' death was a sacrifice for man's sins. 
Nietzsche indicates that through the years the Christian community did 
not have any contact witL reality in the realms of morality and religion 
1. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, P• 617. 
2. Ibid,, p. 6)4. 
3· Ibid., PI"!• 608-09. 
4. Ibid., p. 604. 
and possessed only 11 an imaginary theology, 11 the Kingdom of God. 1 
Consequently, Nietzsche contends that as more weak decadents joined 
its ranks Christianity naturally became the hater of all that manifested 
pride, courage, and freedom of the spirit because "Christian is the hatred 
of the senses, of joy in the senses, of joy itself. 112 Finally, 11all the 
failures, all the rebellious minded, all the less favored, the whole scum 
and refuse of humanity ••• were thus won over" and were swept into power 
'trith Christianity's triumph • .? ~/hen this happened Christianity triumphantly 
fought against every elevation of individuals and the growth of culture. 
11 In Christianity the instincts of the subjugated and oppressed come to 
the fore: here the lowest classes seek their salvation. 11 4 
The result, Nietzsche writes, was that Christianity needed sickness 
because 11 to make sick is the true, secret purpose of the whole redemptive 
procedures construlZted by the Church. 11 5 This concomitance of 11 escape, 11 
"revenge," and 11 faith 11 as a way out of one's inability to overcome himself 
seems to be the essence of Christianity for Nietzsche. 
Hence, Nietzsche can show why Christianity made such inroads when the 
Ro~~n Empire was crumbling. It was the culmination of the weak-willed 
people's desire for power. Lacking the Bental capacity for intellectual 
integrity, or of personal strength, these people accepted Christianity 
because it best seemed to express their Will to Power. During this period 
1. Ibid., P• 581. 
2. Ibid., P• 589. 
3· Ibid., P· 619. 
4. Ibid., P• 58B. 
5· ~., P• 6)2. 
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Nietzsche points out how the priests made themselves indispensable by 
attributing to the will of God all those acts which they desired of the 
people. At the same time Nietzsche assumes the upper classes converted 
to Christianity and accepted the values of the 11 Slave Morality" because 
this over-cultivated class was fascinated by a movement which controlled 
the J':lS.sses. Then the r.1ob triumphed when the middle and lower classes 
advanced to positions of actual State power. After this development the 
"herd" justified its morality first under the form of a revelation from 
God and later under the form of a Kantian Categorical Imperative. 
However, within this pattern Nietzsche views the epochs of the 
Italian Renaissance and Sixteenth and Sevemteenth Century France as 
attempts to reinstate the hardier virtues of the strong. But each time 
Nietzsche sees a counter movement restoring the Christian values of the 
weak: first tl1rough the Reformation and then through the French Revolution. 
In the contrast between Voltaire and Rousseau Nietzsche sees the symbolic 
confrontation of the old and the new. One of the last to combine "the 
greatest freedom of mind and a positively unrevolutionary disposition, 
without being inconsistent," Nietzsche views Voltaire as the represenative 
of aristocratic civilization, while he thinks Rousseau is a man "of 
ressentiment 11 whose "return to nature" came of a hatred for aristocratic 
culture and helped to destroy it.l 
Nietzsche now shows why the Nineteenth Century man had been led to 
interpret his suffering as punishment for sinning against God. By the 
continuous use of fear through the ages the moralized conscience rose to 
its maximum in the conception of individual guilt meriting punishment. 
Nietzsche reasons that the conception of God became a very useful tool in 
1. Nietzsche, HU1Clan, II, in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, P• )48. 
the hands of agitators who interpreted all happiness as a reward and all 
misfortune as sin for disobeying God. But because this moral order turns 
all natural concepts of cause and effect upside down Nietzsche believes 
"everything else that is unnatural follows." 1 Christianity was the final 
culmination of this revolution. By degrading the earthly life and by 
maintaining that man 1 s task was to 1'lork for salvation in the after life, 
Nietzsche thinks the expectation of another world has made men condone 
their imperfections in this world. Instead of striving to become perfect 
here and now, man has been taught to put his faith into the future. As a 
result, the doctrine of twa worlds arose. According to Nietzsche there 
developed the Christian world where one must have faith, and there is also 
the terrestrial world where one cannot be perfect, but where the just have 
faith that their sins are forgiven by God. 
In smlli~ry, it has been shown how Nietzsche views modern society as 
degenerate because of its incompatible ideals which are dominated by 
humanitarian optimism, altruis:;1, and pity, Nietzsche sees the weak's 
triurc.ph over the strong on the "Scale of Excellence" as one of the great 
I P 
·~· 
catastrophies of history. In Nietzsche's estimation the weak are levellers 
of everything noble and wish only to evolve a mediocre and stable environ-
ment. Socialism and Democracy are the best expressions of the weak's 
productivity since these are political forms which demand equality. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche contends that the situation in modern Europe is 
becoming worse. Rather than begetting more liberal and better trained 
individuals, Nietzsche evaluates the educational process of his day as 
producing only mechanized robots specialized in one particular field. 
Nietzsche believes that if this process continues universal literacy will 
1. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, p. 595. 
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result in rJ.ullid.nd 's being automatized. Yet Nietzsche is astute enough 
to realize that beneath the humble exterior shown by mankind on the st~­
face there is a rumbling of emotional uneasiness. Nietzsche discerns this 
as man's desire to express his individuality. However, fearing the 
unique the mob must forsake natural leaders to retain group supremacy. 
Nietzsche discloses that this abnormal situation is bound to weaken man-
kind. 
In history Nietzsche illustrates hov; this unnatural process of the . 
weak's ascension to power began with the Jewish Captivity into Babylonia. 
To survive as a group these Jews had to revalue their entire moral code. 
So, they introduced the softer ethics of benevolence for the hardier 
militaristic virtues. In time their inbred ressentiment grew to such 
proportions that it in turn converted all the meek and do~mtrodden to 
behave in this manner. Thus, by the time Jesus had arrived Nietzsche 
feels the time was ripe for the Jewish revolution in morals to become 
the dominant moral code for the world. Finally, Nietzsche envisages the 
modern notion of progress, which conceives of the abolition of pain and 
suffering as the ultimate alia in life, the intolerable consequence of 
Christian morality having become the sole moral ideal. 
OHAPI'ER IV 
NIETZSCHE 1 S CONCEPI'IONS OF !!,ORALITY 
1. Nietzsche's Criticism of Group Moralities 
Nietzsche contends that the Christian values have ruled so completely 
that even philosophy has unconsciously worked in its service. For 
instance, Nietzsche says that philosophers have taken morality for granted 
and suppose that men knov: innately what is good and evil. 1 Nietzsche 
points out tl~t because criticism has long been forbidden morality has 
had unconditional authority. However, Nietzsche believes the foundations 
of morality are 11 n:erel_y a learned form of good faith in prevailing morali-
ty, a new means of its expression, consequently just a matter-of-fact 
within the sphere of definite morality. 112 Nietzsche discloses that he is 
the first to see morality as a problem and to examine it objectively. He 
writes that 11we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values 
is for the first time to be called into question 113 
As a preliminary to his critique of modern morals, Nietzsche plans a 
descriptive study on a comprehensive scale. Thinking that the real issues 
er.::erge from a comparison of many moralities, Nietzsche gets at the problem 
4 by investigating the actual sources. Here Nietzsche's experimental atti-
1. ~., P~· 636-37. 
2. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, P• 474. 
3• Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, PP• 627-28. 
4. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, PP• 650-53· 
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tude by means of his use of critical history is at its best. Nevertheless, 
Nietzsche recognizes that descriptions and explanations are one thing and 
that a standard of criticism is another. However, Nietzsche has establish-
ed the Will to Power as his standard of measurement.and shows how facts do 
become relevant to criticism when they reveal the amount of power which a 
morality expresses. 1 Having established a standard to gauge morality, 
Nietzsche then calls for an inquiry. 
The question, "What is the value of this or that table 
of 'values' and morality1 "will be asked from the most 
varied standpoints. For instance, the question of 
"valuable for what" can never be analyzed with 
sufficient nicety."2 
In addition, while investigating the actual sources, Nietzsche does 
something quite interesting and unique. Since he believes that it is 
first necessary to understand what is being valued, Nietzsche uses psycho-
logical and historical facts together as relevant data in his critique of 
morals. As mentioned previously, Nietzsche reproaches mankind for its 
failure to see and question what modern morality is. Therefore, Nietzsche 
undertakes a natural history of morals in order to help explain the con-
ditions and urges from which moralities arise and which they express. In 
so doing Nietzsche suggests that some features of morality extend down 
into the animal world. Likewise, Nietzsche goes on to say that man first 
distinguished himself from the animals when he learned to relate his 
actions for his well-being.3 Nietzsche argues that man was not a rational 
animal to begin with but lived in groups dominated by customs and myths.4 
1. Nietzsche, Belond Good and Evil, pp. 422-2). 
2. Nietzsche, The Genealogl of Morals, P• 667. 
). Nietzsche, The Dawn, trans Volz, PP• 41-42. 
4. Nietzsche, The Idols, PP• 482-8). 
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This type of morality consisted in nothing more than blind obedience to 
custom, based on a superstitious fear of some vague power. 1 In this 
period of man's history, which Nietzsche calls the pre-moral, individuals 
usually acted without thinking as individuals; instead there seemed to be 
a collective conscience. Nietzsche also shows that the harshness of life 
in this early period of man's history bred a love of cruelty which was 
quite opposed to anything altruistic. In sma~ing up the characteristic 
moral values of pre-historic man Nietzsche writes: 
Suffering was accepted as virtue, cruelty as divine, • 
revenge as virjue, disavowal of reason as virtue; on 
the other hand well-being as a danger, inquisitiveness 
as danger, peace as danger, pity as danger, • 
insanity as divinity, change as immorlity and potent 
of perdition.2 
. . 
Nietzsche indicates that this period of morality had several effects. 
For example, it made men dependable anf uniform, which was the foundation 
subsequent moral development built upon. Furthermore, the phantJstic 
beliefs about natural phenomena and their relation to spirits kept men 
from observing the real causes ~nd effects of their actions. Men mistook 
the sequences of guilt and punishment for those of cause and effect.3 
Finally, Nietzsche thinks that modern moral feelings are permeated with 
superstitious valuations developed from this earlier period. 4 
Nevertheless, there are marked contrasts between the past and the 
present. Nietzsche indicates that moral development does not advance in 
a straight line. "People lack knowledge ••• of what reversals the moral 
1. Nietzsche, The Dawn, P• 12. 
2. Ibid., P• 44. 
3· Ibid., P• 18. 
4. Ibid. 
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judgment has aleeady undergone and how in the most fundamental sense 
'evil' has actually re-christened 1good 1 several times already, Nietzsche 
1 
says. A l::!B.jor difference between the pre-moral and the moral period was 
the transition era with the shift of attention from consequences to 
origins of actions. Nietzsche seems to suggest that it represents an 
early attempt at self-knowledge based on the concern for the origins of 
action. However, Nietzsche attributes to this 11 moral 11 period far more 
ti1an just the change of emphasis in moral judgments. Within it Nietzsche 
traces a complex number of moral types. Among these moral types are the 
healthy and the decadent. 
Every time ha~ in its first measure of power, a 
measure showing which virtues are permissable, which 
forbidden. Either it has the virtues of ascending 
life: then it fundamentally opposes the virtues of 
declining lite--then it also needs the virtues of 
decline; then it hates everything which is justified 
only out of abundance, out of exuberance of forces.2 
The declining life represents, of course, the direct antithesis of 
the v/ill to Polver as a self-overconing force, because degenerating life 
prefers the unhealthy values. Within it Nietzsche distinguishes two 
types. An example of the first is the ascetic morality which breeds self-
hatred. 
The need of redemption, the essence of all Chris-
tian needs • • • is the most sincere form of expression 
of decadence; it is the most convinced, most painful 
assent to it in sublime symbols and practices. The 
Christian wants to get rid of himself.) 
On the other hand, Nietzsche illustrates another type of decadence 
1. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, in Wright, What Nietzsche Taught, p. 280. 
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Wagner Case, !)88§], in lvlorgan, What Nietzsche 
l-1eans, p,... 148-49. 
3· ~., P• 151. 
which directs resentment outward. Anarchists and Socialists who make 
society to blame for their misery, and Christianity, in many o~ its 
developments, are historical examples of forces which make life bearable 
for the weak by taking revenge upon the strong. By betraying the manly 
passions and virtues, such as health, happiness, and self-reliance, the 
weak glorify the opposite qualities. But Nietzsche says their revenge is 
not merely imaginary because they have succeeded in giving the healthy a 
"bad conscience" and in arousing their pity to the point of general dis-
gust with life. 1 
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Nietzsche shows that each particular morality has been developed with 
reference to the interests of some limited group which lives in competition 
with others. The contrast between their respective codes often led to 
antagonisms because every group tends to think badly of what is foreign 
and wishes to restrain the influence of rivals. However, among all the 
types of group morality Nietzsche abstracts something common and calls 
the result "Flock Morality." By this term Nietzsche seems to mean a 
connnunity in which class divisions are unimportant. Nietzsche says that 
the basis of flock formation is weakness and fear and that the 11 herd 11 
emphasizes solidarity and equality. Nietzsche reasons that Flock Morality 
appeals to and tends to produce mediocrity. By extension Nietzsche then 
applies this term Flock l4orality to the sort of values supported by those 
instincts which are attractive to average people, whether they live in a 
herd or not. Therefore, Nietzsche clams that Flock 1-forality includes the 
typical middle-class morality as engendered in his day. 2 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche does not conceive of Flock Morality as a 
1. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, pp. 671-72. 
2. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, P• 552. 
simple type. He shows that it has a complex character based on a duality 
of values. Externally, Nietzsche contends that the "herd 11 manifests ego-
ism; for the sake of self-protection it esteems the warlike virtues when 
exercised against outer dangers. Conversely, though, the 11 herd 11 prizes 
har~less needs and helpfulness for its internal relations and disproves 
of the very qualities which it admires for external purposes. Here 
Nietzsche shows that the ambivalent attitude of a herd to its leader seems 
to reflect this double scheme of values. On the one hand, the 11 flock 11 
needs a leader, for it cannot direct itself; yet the human 11 flock 11 perse-
cutes natural leaders--especially the strong in the Will to Power. 1 
However, Nietzsche points out that Flock l·1orality has changed during 
the course of history. When earlier times were dangerous the herd fostered 
warlike impulses and valued actions only with reference to group welfare. 
But when external dangers diminished fear turned toward other members of 
the herd and produced the other values. Those very impulses which had 
been admired in wartime see1~ed doubly alarming during peacetime. Nietzsche 
illustrates how they were branded immoral and the safe qualities, which do 
not arouse fear in one 1 s neighbor, became the supre~e virtues. Nietzsche 
believes that this is the status of 11 Flock ~1orali ty11 today. 
2. Nietzsche 1 s Application of the l·1aster and Slave Moralities 
Whereas the Flock Moralities arise in classless societies and tend 
to produce them, Nietzsche says that the Master and Slave Moralities are 
associated with societies already divided into upper and lower strata. 
Nietzsche holds that the clue to this hypothesis is confirmed by the dual 
valuations which he expressets by contrasting the terms 11 good and bad 11 and 
1. Ibid., p. 626, and The Gee1ealogy of !'"orals, pp. 6,35, 685 ff. 
11 good and evil. 11 Different languages, Nietzsche maintains, show a similar 
development in the meaning of the words used for "good and bad" and 11 good 
and evil. 11 Nietzsche contends that the tern1s first indicate membership in 
l the upper or lower classes. 
According to Nietzsche the values of the Iviaster Morality come from 
the strong in the Will to Power themselves. Nietzsche points out that 
the strongest on the 11 Sca1e of Excellence" originated their values without 
much regard for unselfish actions. They did not calculate unbiasedly, 
but merely asserted their own individuality. Therefore, Master Morality, 
in Nietzsche's sense, means a kind of self-affirmation where the strong 
express the,i!selves by their creations. Nietzsche recognizes that he is 
not the first to say this. 
How the general judgments have shifted! Those 
greatest marvels of' ancient morality, Epictetus, for 
instance, knew nothing of' the glorification, so usual 2 now, of taking thopght for others, of' living for others. 
The issue here is plainly one of self-affirmation versus running away 
from oneself'. In this next aphorism Nietzsche seeks to ::ake this explicit. 
Against the pessimists he cites Kant. 
Nothing less is aimed at--whether admitted or not--than 
thorough transformation, nay, weakening and abrogation 
of the individual: ••• It is hoped that everything may 
be managed in a cheaper, less dangerous, more uniform, 
and harmonious way, provided only that there are nothing 
but large bodies and their members. Everything which in 
any way corresponds to this all-productive craving and 
its subsidary cravings, is considered as good--that is 
the moral ground-current of' our age; sympathy, and social 
feeling play into each other's hands. (Kant is still 
outside this movement: he especially teaches that we 
ought to be callous to other people's suffering, if' our 
beneficence is to have moral value--a predept which 
1. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of' Morals, PP• 6;4-35· 
2. Nietzsche, The Dawn, P• 129. 
Schopenhauer, as may easily be understood, angrily 
calls Kant's absurdity.l 
Then Nietzsche alludes to savages. "Savages feel with a moral shudder 
when thirucing of the possibility of becoming an object of pity, which is 
the same to them as being of all virtue. 112 
Thus, Nietzsche did not thiruc of his critique of altruisu as anything 
new. For instance, in The Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche writes: 
This exaggerated estimation in which modern philo-
sophers have held pity, is quite a new phenomenon: up 
to that time philosophers were absolutely unanimous 
as to the wort@lessness of pity. I need only mention 
Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld, and Kant--four 
mi~ds as mutually different as is possible, but united 
on one point; their contempt of pity.) 
This exaggerated estimation in which modern philosophers have held pity 
is quite a netV' phenomenon for Nietzsche. Nietzsche thinks that almost 
all the great philosophers of the past have agreed that self-perfection 
was the goal of morality. However, Nietzsche urges that the self-per-
fection for the strong must be accompanied COlmnunally. Here Nietzsche 
takes his cue from the ancient Gree:cs. Nietzsche brings this point out 
in The Dawn where he discusses friendship. 
Antiquity has deeply and fully experienced and 
excogitated friendship, and almost buried it in its 
own grave •••• All great qualifications of the 
ancients were supported by th~ premise that I!JS.n was 
standing side by side to man. 
In Nietzsche's next work, The Gay Science, he establishes a further 
relationship for friendship. 
If one considers, finally, that the whole rest of 
the world seems • • • pale and worthless to the lover 
1. llli·' P• 1)2. 
2. Ibid., P• 1)7. 
). Nietzsche, The Genealogy of l·ioral s, P• 627. 
4. Nietzsche, The Dawn, P• )44. 
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who is prepared to make any sacrifice, to disturb any 
order, and to disre[ard any other interest; then one 
may indeed marvel that this greed and its justice of 
love between the sexes has been so glorifed and deified 
• • • Yes--that one has taken from this love the 
conception of love as the opposite of egoism, although 
it is perhaps the most aandid expression of egoism. 
There is apparently, here and there one earth, a kind 
of continuation of love where this greed~ desire of two 
persons for each other has given way to a new craving 
and greed, a com."'llon higher thirst for an ideal which 
stands above them • Its true name is friendship.l 
In Zarathustra Nietzsche finally conceives of friendship as the real 
relationship between the strong. 11 Have you ever seen your friend asleep--
and found out how he looks? \'lhat is the face of your friend anyway? It 
is your own face in a rough and imperfect mirror. 112 
However, if a friend whom one loves should suffer it occurs to 
Nietzsche that it might be better to hide this feeling under a hard crust. 
"But if you have a suffering friend, be a resting place for his suffering, 
but a hard bed as it were, a field cot: thus you will profit him best. 11 3 
As a result, Nietzsche emphasizes that l!J.a.ster I"'lorality is active and posi-
tive and calls those traits 11 good 11 which make a man respected. On the 
other hand, it tables those qualities which arouse contempt, such as 
weakness and cowardice, as degrading. Nietzsche makes this moral type 
more concrete by stressing that the strong temperament does not consider 
itself an instrument but as the end for which everything else exists. 
The members of this morality believe that duties exist only between equals. 
Moreover, the strong are ready for great responsibilities and risks and 
are not afraid of suffering. Their creations are gifts of the overflow 
of power rather than expressions of pity. 
1. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, P• 320. 
2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, P• 168. 
3· Ibid., p. 202. 
Hence, Nietzsche regards the Master Morality as a discipline which 
the strong have to impose on themselves in order to maintain their 
position. Nietzsche further explains the dynamic character of the 
f.iia.ster 1>1orality by emphasizing the psychological tensions presents in the 
strong; these tensions generate reverence for higher gradations of value 
and cultivate an urge to achieve more sublime distances. 1 
Every elevation of the type "man" has hitherto been 
the work of an aristocratic society and so it will 
always be--a society believing in a long scale of 
gradations of rank and differences of worth among 
human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or 
other. Without the Eathos of distance, such as grows 
out of the incarnated differences of classes, ••• 
that other more mysterious pathos could never have 
ariqen, the longing for an ever new widening of 
distance within the soul itself, the foundation of 
even higher, rarer, farther, more extended, more 
comprehensive states, in short, just the elevation 
of the type 11man, 11 the continued "self-surmounting 
of man. 11 2 
Another kind of tension arises between the strong themselves; from the 
beginning 
the strong strive ~ from one another with as 
natural a necessity as the weak toward one another; 
if the former unite, it happens only in the prospect 
of an aggressive joint-action. • • • The instinct of 
the born 11 masters 11 • • • is at bottom irritated and 
disquieted by organization.) 
It appears, then, that Nietzsche's Master Morality endorses the 
principle of equality among the strong. In this respect it presents 
analogies to the Flock Morality. However, there is one fundamental 
difference--that between stagnation and tension. Nietzsche shows that 
herd animals are 11 levellers 11 and that their values manifest average per-
1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 590. 
2. ~., P• 575. 
3· Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, 
p. 158. 
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formance. On the other hand, the creative values engendered by the Master 
Morality make for advancement. 
In contrast to the I~ster Morality Nietzsche points out that there is 
a Slave Morality which is the creation of' 11 ressentiment. 11 i'lhile the 
l'Iaster I-lorality is active and spontaneous, Nietzsche says the other is 
reactive and degenerate. In the Slave Horality Nietzsche cites "evil" as 
being the priD~ry concept because the weak tr~n resents all expressions by 
the strong. When poisoned by impotence the slave's emotions vent them-
selves in a distorted conception of the strong, whose creative qualities, 
thus conceived, are called 11 evil, 11 In contrast to the strong the weak 
call 11 good 11 the virtues of humility, obedience, and patience, qualities 
even the 'I'Tea:.: themselves do not possess. In like manner, liietzsche 
acknowledges that the weak man is dishonest with himself and others; what 
he parades as the demand for 11 justice 11 is really his small manifestations 
of the Will to Power. 1 And when a slave class attains power, as Nietzsche 
believes it has in l'Iodern Europe, it engenders these principles even more. 
3· Nietzsche's Denunciation of Absolute Morality 
Nietzsche does not mean to imply that the moral types previously 
discussed are delineated in pure form. What Nietzsche does perceive is 
various ramifications of these c ~;stract types, often compromised or con-
fused. In fact, Nietzsche diagnoses modern morality as a hybrid of all 
types, including traces of the Iv2aster Morality. 2 More obvious, though, is 
the fact that Nietzsche sees a relationship between the values character-
istic of the Flock and Slave Moralities, and a fundamental antagonism 
between these and the Master ~-~orality. Nietzsche first suggests that in 
1. 1iietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 418. 
2. Ibid., pp. )81-82. 
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the course of time the herd instincts proved more powerful than the 
strong's. Nietzsche points to the decay of Ancient Greece and Imperial 
Rome and the rise of democratic humanitarianism to substantiate this 
generalization. 1 On the whole, however, Nietzsche believes that the 
Flock l'Iorality is the most important ele1,:ent in present morals, and that 
this fact threatens stagnation for humanity. Nietzsche makes this gener-
alization more concrete in The Genealogy of Morals where he traces the 
development of a sense of guilt. "Bad conscience," Nietzsche holds, began 
from a self-torture which was produced by an inversion of the normal 
predatory instincts. Nietzsche contends that this form of torture was 
perfected by ascetic priests who read into the diagnosis of sin "Christian 
indebtedness." And in time while man was led to interpret his suffering 
as punishment for sinning against God, his will to make himself suffer 
brought the conscience to its maximum. 2 
Nietzsche also discovers another trend in morals. It has been seen 
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that through various stages morals were detached from life and Bade hostile 
to it. Nietzsche shows that Socrates, Plato and Kant contributed to the 
process by treating morals in terms of abstract ideas and investing 
another world for them to i$bit. As a result, the idea of the existence 
of a supernatural world order was born where sin and punishment were later 
read into nature. Nietzsche also shows that morals were denaturalized by 
the separation of act from a'ent when the belief was fashioned that actions 
can be considered as good or bad in themselves, regardless of who does 
them. Therefore, Nietzsche argues that morals have become an independent 
entity whose nature is now considered to be.as sancrosanct as a supernatural 
1. Ibid., p. 6o4, and Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 1078-79. 
2. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, P• 675 and 737 ff. 
being. It is evident that the morality Nietzsche is seeking to criticize 
is the one claiming absolute status, and whose imperatives are categorical 
and beyond criticism. Nietzsche denies that any morality can claim 
universality or that a simple rule pertains to all. Nietzsche contends 
that this type of morality is nihilistic and that its logical conclusion 
is the condemnation ot all existence. 
1. l·1odern Morality 
Nietzsche exposes the errors on which Absolute Morality is based in 
order to destroy its claims; Nietzsche does this because on his view this 
morality expresses the desire of decadents for revenge against life. With 
this in mind, Nietzsche reasons that Absolute !-1orali ty is a nihilistic 
morality. Nietzsche holds that this morality negates life because it 
condemns those qualities of the Will to Power which are essential to 
higher life. So, Nietzsche faces the problem: 11 either do away with our 
venerations or--with yourselves! 111 This is Nietzsche's deepest reason 
for breaking with the old values. Since he diagnoses Modern Morality as 
mostly a blend of the Flock and Slave Moralities, he satirizes the ideal 
of the "good man 11 so manifest in his day. For Nietzsche this ideal man is 
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either a decadent or a flock animal who is uncreative. Nietzsche exclaires: 
At times I have an enormous contempt for good people--
their weakness, their wanting to exercise nothing, their 
wanting to see nothing, their arbitrary blindness, their 
banal revolving in the usual and comfortable, their 
gratification with their good 0 qualities, 11 etc.2 
Essentially, Nietzsche is protesting against the unqualified valuation 
of benevolence and 11 brotherhood. 11 In Nietzsche's sense this docile, meek 
1. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, in Wright, What Nietzsche Taught, p. 129. 
2. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 176· 
man is an ideal slave. 1 Ih the Ecce Homo Nietzsche vituperates against 
those whose 1 goodness 11 consists in trivializing human nature. 
To demand that everybody become a 11 good man," a 
gregarious animal, a blue-eyed, benevolent, 
"beautiful soul," or--as Herbert Spencer wished--an 
altruist, would mean .•• castrating marucind •2 
Related to this ideal of absolute benevolence is the cult of pity. 
Nietzsche comsiders it the only living religion of his day. Here again 
Nietzsche is protesting against the view that pity is always good. 
According to Nietzsche pity is bad. Moreover, Nietzsche reasons that 
any religion which teaches pity assumes that suffering is bad. However, 
Nietzsche believes that self-perfection is possible only through suffering, 
and that tile ultimate happiness of man, who has overcome his passions and 
disciplined himself, does not exclude suffering. Hence, Nietzsche says to 
the pitying ones: "How little you know of man's happiness1 you comfortable 
and good-natured ones!"? 
Furthermore, T~ietzsche regards pity as bad for those who feel it. 
How is it possible to stay on one 1 s ~ path? Always 
someone crying calls us aside; our eye rarely sees a 
case where it does not beco~e necessary to leave our 
o\'m tasl: imn.ediately. • • There is even a secret 
seduction4in all this •••• Just our 
11 own path" is 
too hard. 
Nietzsche concludes that pity is selfish a:r:d is only man 1 s bad love of 
himself. There is a passage in Beyond Good and Evil which corroborates 
this point. 
l. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 928. 
2. Ibid., p. 927. 
). Nietzsche, The Gay Science, in Kaufmann, Xietzsche, p. 321. 
4. Ibid., pp. )22-2). 
In man creature and creator are united: ••• And 
••• your sympathy for the 11 creature in man 11 applies 
to that which has to be fashioned, bruised, roasted, 
annealed, refined--to that which must necessarily 
suffer, and is meant to suffer. And ~ sympathy--
do ye not understand what our reverse sympathy applies 
to, when it resists your sympathy as the worst of all 
pampering and enervation?--So it is sympathy against 
sympathy!l 
These lines are from the same aphorism in t-rhich Nietzsche explains how 
suffering "breeds" strength and depth of soul ar.4 how 11 spirit 11 and great-
ness are born of it. 
Even so, Nietzsche recognizes that pity is not one simple motive but 
is a phenomenon which may involve many, among which are lust, envy, pleas-
2 
ure, and cruelty. Nietzsche holds that pity is always egoistic, for 
the pain one seeks to relieve is not the same as the real one. In addition, 
Nietzsche believes that the call to pity is contagious and, what is worse, 
often tempts a man away from his own task in life; in Zarathustra Nietzsche 
meets it as his last sin. Against pity \'Thich sacrifices the future to 
relieve present misery, Nietzsche commands 11 Be hard." Behind both pity 
and comfort, however, Nietzsche senses the modern belief that suffering 
is absolutely evil and is something to be destroyed.) Nietzsche attacks 
this assumption as an expression of weakness and decadence; instead, 
Nietzsche rraintains that the strong live for purposes which may make both 
themselves and others suffer. 
You want if possible--and there is not a more foolish 
11 if possible 11 --to do away with suffering; and we?--
it really seems that we would rather have it increased 
and made worse than it ever was! ••• The discipline of 
suffering, of great suffering--know ye not that it is 
1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 530. 
2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, pp. 157-58. 
3· Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, PP• 607-08. 
only this discipline that has produced all the 
elevations of humanity hitherto?l 
All this does not mean that Nietzsche disregards other-regarding 
impulses; in The Dawn lJietzsche writes that he even experiences pity. 2 
2~ietzsche, then, is fully aware of the existence of such impulses; but 
he sees no moral worth whatever in such inclinations. For Nietzsche, 
morality means mastery over the impulses.3 Until man has achieved self-
mastery and self-perfection Nietzsche believes he must be concerned \'lith 
self-overcoming. Running off to help others seems like a weakness, as is 
giving alms to others rather tham making something of oneself. 
However, Nietzsche's criticism is in keeping with the philosopher's 
mission. He believes that ever since Socrates the greatest philosophers 
have always "disclosed ho;1 much hypocrisy, indolence, self-indulgence, and 
self-neglect ••• was concealed under the most venerated types of contempo-
rary morality • 11 4 vlhat Hietzsche attacks, in other \'Fords, is that state 
of n:.ind >'l'hich frequently hides behind the respectablt facade of absolute 
virtue. Of the motives \'lhich Nietzsche discusses in this context the one 
1'lhich he e:.::phasizes most is 11 ressentiment, 11 This is one of the key 
conceptions in Nietzsche's philosophy. It has been pointed out above that 
1-l'hen one is too weak and tir!lid he must act obligingly in order to survive. 
Nietzsche also mentions that such morality goes together with i:s.rotent 
hatred and envy for revenge. But the weak are too impotent to attain 
pm·rer by the usual neans. 11 Verily, I have often 1 aughed at the ';leal-:1 ings 
1. Ibid., PP· 529-30. 
2. Nietzsche, The Dawn, P• 119. 
3· Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, P• 836. 
4. :aetzsche, Be;yond Good and Evil, PP• 515-16. 
who thought themselves good because they had no clm·ls, 11 ::ietzsche v;rites. 1 
On the other hand, Eietzsche thinks that those \'/ho possess strength 
should nanifest 
the Ecce Hono. 
.... ~ ..... n·ietzsche develops this the:::e in Zarathustra and in 
But if you ho.ve an eneJr,y, do not requite him evil 
vdth good, for that vrould put him to shame. Rather 
prcve that l~ did you some good. 
And rather be angry t:1an put to shame. And if you 
are cursed, I do not like it that you ,.;ant to bless. 
Ruther joil-1 a little in the curs in~. 2 
It also seems to be that the rudest word, the rudest 
letter, is more good-natured, m.:,re honest, than silence. 
Those who keep silent are almost ah1ays lacking in 
delicacy and refineLent of heart; silence is an object-
ion; to swallow a grievance necessarily produces a bad 
temper • .? 
The difference between Nietzsche 1 s ethics and what he himself ta~es 
to be the modern Christian ethics thus revolves around the individual's 
psychological state. Nietzsche's critique of ressentiment is an integral 
part of this philosophy. To illustrate this fact, and to elucidate further 
on the significance of ~Tietzsche 1 s conception of ressentiment, it may be 
helpful to cite a long passage in The Gay Science. 
Every art and every philosophy n::.ay be considered a 
remedy and aid in the service of growing and struggling 
life: they always presuppose s~~fering and sufferers. 
But there are two kinlls of sufferers: first, those who 
suffer from the overfullness of 1 ife and \·rant a Dionysian 
art • • • and t:10se who suffer from t:.Je impoverishment 
of 1 ife and seek • • • rede:c1ption from themselves through 
art and knowledge, or intoxication, convulsion, anaesthesia, 
and frenzy •••• Those w:.o suffer most and are poorest 
in life would need mildness, peacefulness, and goodness 
most ••• and if possible, also a god '1ho would really 
be a god for the sake, a 11 savior 11 • Thus I gradually 
learned to understand ••• the 11 Christian11 who is 
1. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 230. 
2. Ibid., p. 180. 
3· Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, P• 825. 
essentially a romantic--and my eye became ever 
sharper for that most difficult bacbward inference 
in which the most mistakes are ~ade--the backward 
inference from the work to the maker, from the deed 
to the doer, from the ideal to him who needs it, 
from every way of thinking and valuing to the 
crayin~ behind it which prompts it •••• The 
desire for destruction, change, and becoming can 
be an expression of overfull, future-pregnant 
strength (my term therefore is, as one knows, the 
'I'Wrd 11 Dionysian11 ); but it can also be the hatred 
of the misdeveloped, needy, underprivileged who 
destroys, who~ destroy, because the existing, 
and even all existence, all-being, outrages and 
provokes him. To understand this feeling, one 
should closely examine our anarchists.l 
The basic distinction which Nietzsche proposes is that between two states 
of being--power and impotence. Nietzsche admits that both may express 
thenselves in seereingly similar ways, but Nietzsche judges the expressions 
not according to appearances, but in the light o~ their origins. Thus, 
Nietzsche believes that Christianity and :godern Morality are expressions 
of a deeply rooted ressentiment developed in weaklings. 
From this history of morals Nietzsche concludes that criticism is 
needed. Nietzsche draws a similar conclusion from the fact tl:at tradition-
al morality depends upon the existence of a supernatural God whose right-
eousness establishes the moral law, who speaks through man's conscience, 
and who re\vards obedience and punishes sin. 2 But if, as Nietzsche claims, 
the belief in God is dead and one breaks a single liruc in the chain of 
belief, then the conscience cannot claim to be the oracle of truth. 
Therefore, Nietzsche contends that 
toda;y ~1e still see the consequences: where a man 1 s 
feeling is exalted, that imaginary world somehow 
plays a part: it is sad: but for the present all 
1. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. )28. 
2. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, pp. 606-07. 
loftier feelings must be susp1c1ous to the scientific 
man, so much are they fused with delusion and nonsense. 1 
Here Nietzsche believes that the conscience and the feeling of any 
"categorical imperative 11 is merely the expression of the need for 
obedience that the flock habit has instilled and has taught. This is 
Nietzsche's reason for rejecting intuitionalism and moral consciousness 
as valid criteria for judgBent because, on his view, being self-evident, 
they are beyond criticisn. Instead, Nietzsche regards such views as 
moving toward nihilism. 
When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the 
right to Christian morality out from under one's feet. 
This morality is by no means self-evident: this point 
has to be exhibited again and again • Christianity is 
a system • By breaking one concept out of it, the faith 
in God, one breaks the whole: nothing necessary remains 
in ul1·3 1 s hands. Christianity presupposes that man does 
not know, cannot know, what is good for him, what evil: 
he belie':es in God, who alone knows it. Christian 
morali tr ·is a corn:nand; its origin is transcendent; it 
is beyo:tJ. all criticisu, all right to criticism; it has 
truth only if God is the truth--it stands and falls \·rith 
faith in God.2 
ii. Nietzsche 1 s Denial of Absolute !~orality 
As in other parts of his system Nietzsche uses a twofold method for 
criticizing morality. :Tietzsche considers first those phases \-Thich are 
based on judg .. ents of facts, and later applies them to judgments of 
value. \lith tegard to the former he ,-;rites: 
So I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that means, 
I deny its assU&ptions: but not that there have been 
alchemists who believed in these ass~nptions and acted 
on them.--I also deny immorality: not that countless 
men feel themselves immoral, but that there is a basis 
in truth for feeling oneself so. I do not deny--as 
goes without saying, supposing that I am no fool--that 
1. Nietzsche, The Dawn, p. 42. 
2. Nietzsche, The Idols, PP• 515-16. 
many actions 'lvhich are called immoral are to be avoided 
and combatted; likevrise that many which are called moral 
are to be done and encouraged--but I mean: the one as 
the other on other grounds t1:.an hitherto. \"l e have to 
learn differently--in order finally, perhaps very late, 
to attain still more: U feel differently.! 
Nietzsche sums up his position by maintianing that there are no moral 
phenomena but only moral interpretations of phenomena. Thereupon, 
Nietzsche singles out certian features of Absolute !.forality, na:nely: free 
will, responsibility, and selflessness to criticize. He says that morality 
is based on misunderstanding and really has no claim on man. In addition, 
Nietzsche argues that the ideas of sin and guilt presuppose moral responsi-
bility which, in turn, rests upon freedom of will and conscious motivation, 
both of w·hich Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche seems to imply that individuals 
never know the real motives for their actions. Therefore, "we are learning 
to think less of all that is conscious: v:e are learning not to make our-
selves responsible for our self, since we, as conscious, purposing beings, 
are only the smallest part of it. 112 
Hence, in so far as will means "conscious will" its freedom is 
irrelevant to the moral judgment of conduct, because consciousness is not 
the cause of actions. Xietzsche may deny the fact but not the feeling of 
freedom, however. 11 He who feels that the will is unfree, is psychopathic: 
he who denies it, is stupid."? This means that the Will to Power might be 
released in any of several ways. But what Nietzsche really means is that 
there is no free will in the strict sense of the term; a man's nature is 
the resultant of all the elements which influence past and present things.4 
1. Nietzsc~~' The Dawn, P• 101. 
2. Nietzsche, The Will to Po\ver, in Wright, ~/hat Nietzsche Taught, p. 28), 
). Ibid., in !-forgan, \~hat Nietzsche Means, p. 171. 
4. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, PP• 64Lr ff. 
Lastly, Nietzsche asserts the egoism of the Will to Power. Life 
must exert its force to grow, and growth, Nietzsche feels, is at the cost 
of t1::e environment. To realize, as Nietzsche does, tl1at all actions are 
necessarily assertive, reL::oves the anti thesis between good and evil. 
Consequently, :'Jietzsche can affirm that good and evil are 11 comple::1entary 
value-concepts" and not realities in conflict. Moreover, they are 
interdepe:-1dent. 
Altruistic actions are only a species of egoistic ones--
and that the degree which one loves, -v;ants oneself, is a 
proof of the degree of individual power and personality. 
In short that, in making t::an more evil, one makes hir.: 
better--and that one is not either without the other • 1 
On the ot:1er hand, Nietzsche believes that th!' conflicts of values 
in European history have had so1:1e good effects. Although the unnatural 
values prevented European man from growing to his full stature and caused 
a deep split in civilization, nevertheless, ~Tietzsche does point out that 
the fight betweer: t::e two :::1oralities has kept Europe alive and has created 
o. 11 splendid tension of spirit 11 lvith which man can 11 shoot at the most 
distant .r;oals. 112 Nietzsche thus acknmdedges an indebtedness to the 
Christian heritage. Vlhile it raised the passions of the soul, sharpened 
;.U. I 2 rc~·chological insight, and has Jeen USefUl for keeping tl1.e lower 
classes contented \·rith their lot, Nietzsche il :.ustrotes how it has also 
been a valuable discipline for classes rising to power. And as a hierarchy 
lvhich gives spiritual men the highest rank and believes in tLe power of 
spirituality, Nietzsche reasons that the Church is a nobler institution 
than the State.3 
1. l'Jietzscl':.e, Hur,,an, p. 112. 
2. I:ietzsche, The Dawn, pp. 135-36. 
3· :~ietzsche, The Will to Power, in i.Organ, 'l'ihat Nietzsche Heans, p. 350. 
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Even so, the fact remains that in Nietzsche's estimation Christian-
ity has spoiled. the h1.1man race. l·fan naturally produces a large proportion 
of failures which, Nietzsche urges should be allowed to drop out for the 
betterment of the strong ones. Instead of realizing this fact Christian-
ity acts as an antidote to nihilislil by preventing the decadents frorr. 
committing suicide and by breaking the self-confidence of the strong. 
Therefore, Nietzsche categorically believes that modern society is 
degenerate because rr.an has become more and ::1ore alilre over the past two 
thousand years. Nietzsche reasons that Christianity has been the greatest 
triurr.ph of the weak-willed people who came to power with the fall of the 
Roman Empire. Nietzsche shows that the result of their breeding has been 
conventional morality in all its det;eneracy. However, Nietzsche thinks 
that this morality, based on the virtues of pity, sympathy, and equality 
is decaying into nihilism. And this arrival of nihilism is the hope 
which Nietzsche needs to show how a better individual and ~ace may be 
engendered. 
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CHAPTER V 
NIETZSCHE'S IDEAL SOCIETY 
1. The Rise of Nihilism 
It is within this complex of decadence and nihilism that Nietzsche 
bases his prediction for the next two centuries. Nietzsche says the 
absolute values which originally protected decadents against nihilism 
by giving them a compensatory faith have been collapsing since mankind 
no longer has faith in a supernatural God or in various secular substitut-
1 
es. Nietzsche is convince& that modern decadence will result in 
nihilism because 
the whole of the \'lest no longer possesses the instincts 
out of which institutions grow, out of which a future 
gro\'rs: perhaps nothing antagonizes its "modern spirit 11 
so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, 
one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called 
"freedom." That which makes an institution an insti-
tution is despised, hated, repudiated: one fears the 
danger of a new slavery the moment the word 11 authority 11 
is even spoken out loud. That is how far decadence has 
advanced in the value-instincts of our politicians of 
our political parties: instinctivel:r2they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end. 
!Jietzsche also supports this view by adding Asiatic parallels. In India 
Nietzsche regards the decline of culture with a similar self-destruction 
of political and religious foundations. Atheism, produced by a hightened 
concern for truth, was followed by an atter:1pt to make moral values supreme. 
Chima, I'!"ietzsche says, had an analogous moralistic movement. And both 
1. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, pp. 629 ff. 
2. Nietzsche, The Idols, PP• 543-41t• 
7" .~
countries ended with cultural stagnation. 1 
Correspondingly, Nietzsche predicts a similar movement for Europe. 
The continental economic system and the democratic movement are producing 
a social machine in which individuals become equal and trivial parts. 
Nietzsche illustrates that the final result might be the flock's dream 
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come true: safety, comfort, and mediocrity for everybody. Apart from the 
remaining strong-willed souls, the future European under an industrial 
democracy will be an ideal slave. Here Nietzsche differs with Herbert 
Spencer who believes that increasing industrialism will aug2ent civil 
liberties and the opportunity for a better life. Instead, Nietzsche sees 
the increase of conwunication and mobility as only the manifestation of 
adaptability. Nietzsche thinks that this kind of development will be held 
in check by nationalism in the Twentieth Century. Likewise, Socialist 
agitations will contribute to the same end. But '\"Then the various European 
nations will have fought themselves out, and when marucind will discover 
that it has lost its belief in God, then the whole order of contemporary 
society \'lill collapse. Nietzsche holds that a profound and popular react-
ion against nationalism and \·rar will arise with the evolution of a 11 peace 
party. 11 Based on universal fraternity this movement will practice pacifisu 
and will renounce conflict in all forms. 
However, in this respect Nietzsche believes Europe is unique. Unlike 
the Orient, Europe has accumulated tre;::.endous tension because of the 
struggle between the antithetical value SJ'stems. Therefore, the nihilistic 
struggle will involve more than the "passive nihilism" of any peace party. 
Nietzsche predicts that there \·Till also be an "active nihilism. 11 In this 
lies hope. Because of the residual strength left in the strong, ITietzsche 
1. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of l•Iorals, p. 790. 
contends that Europe will not simply fade out in nihilism as Asia has 
done. The crisis will weed out the decadent elements and will compel the 
healthy to revalue the whole system of values. From this point of view 
nihilism becomes only an interlude betNeen the death of the old and the 
birth of the new ideal.1 
Since the value of this crisis depends upon provoking a very sharp 
reaction, Nietzsche wishes to na.ke it as acute as possible. One may 
argue that his weapon for this purpose is the Eternal Recurrence. 
Nietzsche believes such a doctrine will hew out what is strong. 
Vlhich will prove the1 selves the strongest thereby? 
The most moderate, those who have ~ of no extreme 
articles of faith, those who not only admit but love a 
good deal of chancf, senselessness. Those who can think 
of ;:.an with a considerable reduction of his value, 
without thereby becoming petty and weak: the richest in 
health, who are equal to the most misfortunes are there-
fore not so afraid of misfortune--men who are sure of 
their power and who represent the attained strength of 
man with conscious pride. 2 
The strong will also be stimulated to a hightened endeavor by basing 
their virtues on a "revaluation of values." Thus, Nietzsche thinks that 
the strong, in adopting ideals which will no longer condemn life, will 
make themselves glad to think of this world as repeated ad infinitum. 
Now Nietzsche knows the outcome of this forthcoming crisis is by no 
means certain. Events may not at all happen the way he anticipates. Yet 
Nietzsche believes it is more propitiouw to risk destroying humanity 
altogether than letting it go on declining. Nietzsche does think humanity 
will face alternatives in the future. As seen above, Nietzsche has a 
strategy for meeting these alternatives. Nietzsche welcomes the social 
1. ~., PP• 668 ff. 
2. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, P• 357· 
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and economic forces \'lhich obliterate boundaries and put an end to the petty 
politics of nations.l For the Twentieth Century Nietzsche predicts great 
wars which will settle the question of world dominions; he hopes that the 
danger will force Europe to unite and become "mistress of the earth. 112 
Then, when the world is politically and economically unified, the docility 
of the ~sses will be very easy to control. In fact, Nietzsche suggests 
that this increasing docility of the multitude offers a great opportunity 
for a daring group of men to seize control of the social machinery and 
make it support a new ruling caste. 
A race fit to be master can spring up only from fearful 
and violent beginnings. Problem: where are the 
barbarians of the Twentieth Centu.ry? Evidently they 
will become visible and consolidate themselves only 
after enormous socialistic crises--they will be those 
elements which are capable of the greatest severity 
with themselves and can guarantee the longest will.) 
This is what Nietzsche wants. The first step towards cultural rebirth 
will be taken, Nietzsche hopes, when the newly installed revolutionaries 
will set up a different social structure. But Nietzsche believes that 
the new leaders will not rely on sheer force. 
1. 
2. 
). 
4. 
And perhaps the great day will come when a people, 
distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest 
development of a military order and intelligence, and 
accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these 
things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break 
the sword, 11 and will smash its entire military establish-
ment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself 
unarmed when one had been the best-ar.rr.ed, out of a 
height of feeling--that is the means to reah peace, 
\vhich nust always rest on a peace of mind • 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 510. 
Ibid., pp. 508-09. 
r~ietzsche, The \'/ill to Power, in Wright, What Nietzsche Taught, p. )06. 
Nietzsche, "The i'landerer and His Shadow, 11 trans. i'/al ter Kaufmann in 
The Portable Nietzsche (Nelv York: The Viking Press, {_f88<jJ1954), p. 
72. 
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Later Hietzsche hopes that ideas will become predominant. Eventually he 
believes that the world will fall into the hands of the wisest who will 
direct its destinies with philosophic foresight. 1 This expectation 
certainly implies the SU!Jerior power of the man of knowledge who, Nietzsche 
insists, is a more valuable member of society than those sin.c;ularly strong 
in muscle. In Zarathustra iHetzsche presents this very dramatically. 
Hietzsche writes: 11lJot around the inventors of new noise, but around the 
inventors of new values does the world revolve; it revolves inaudibly. 112 
!.feanwhile, Nietzsche holds that it is imperative that the begin.."ling 
of true culture be preserved through the time of strife until the day 
when men of thought shall possess the world. Therefore, the 11 Good Europeans" 
must unite and prepare for the ultimate inheritance of power by the 
strong} It seems that their task will be to become head of an inter-
national ruling class in which all nations and races will be represented. 
But there is much preliminary work to be done first, namely--the coming of 
nihil ism. Then, after '"inning the struggle for power, the victorious 
11 party of life 11 will dedicate humanity to the creation of its highest 
possible individuals--11 overmen. 11 This is what ITietzsche means when he sa~·s 
that the species man does not matter and must be overcome for the production 
4 
of a higher type. 
1. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, pp. 159-60, an~eyond Good and Evil, P• 603. 
2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 243. 
3· The 11 Good European 11 r::.eans a number of things for Nietzsche. In the 
sense used here it probably refers to those beings disgusted with 
modern society and who, possessing a positive will for power, wish to 
give man some aim to his life. In other ways Nietzsche uses this 
11 Good European 11 idea to mean the intermarriage between different 
nations with a resulting mixed race of European men being produced. 
L[aufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 34, 37~ 
4. 1\ietzsche, Zarathustra, pp. 126-27. 
Once this struggle for po\.1er has been \-ton there will be a 
moment of supreme self-consciousness, ~ Great Noontide 
when it [humaniti7 will gaze both backwards and fowards, 
when it will emerge from the tyranny of accident and 
the priesthood, and for the first time pose the ~uestion 
of the \'lhy and Wherefore of humanity as a whole. 
The words "as a whole" are the important ones in the last passage because 
with this declaration Nietzsche reaffirms his belief in values. Nietzsche 
has argued that humanity is not a >-thole and is not automatically on the 
right path. 
A thousand goals have there been so far, for 
there have been a thousand peoples. Only the yoke 
for the thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal 
is lacking. Humanity still has no goal. 
But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still lacks 
a goal--is humanity itself not still lacking too?2 
In Nietzsche's sense hw=anity becomes a living thing instead of an 
abstraction when it learns to give itself a purpose. And for Nietzsche 
the goal of humanity is to produce "overmen." The man Nietzsche sees as 
his ideal is one free to develop himself to the limits of his strength and 
capability. Here the meaning of Nietzsche's social ideal comes into focus; 
the highest exemplars of the human race is Nietzsche's goal. It will 
become more evident that Nietzsche finally thinks of the 11 oven'1B.n11 as the 
ideal to which men who possess great psychical strength can approximate in 
ever increasing numbers if only the rest of humanity does not tyrannize or 
prevent them. 
Such is :Nietzsche 1 s final answer to nihil ism. Though existentially 
existence may be senseless because of 11 the terror of absurdity of existence, 11 
man cah create a meaning for it by living for a cause great enough to 
1. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 887. 
2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, P• 172. 
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justif~ a11. 1 And Nietzsche beli8V-es that he has found the purpose which 
will redeem humanity. 
2. The 11 Higher :.:an" as a Bridge to the "Overman" 
In Nietzsche's estino.tion there is a connection between the ideal 
self towards which all uen can strive and the conception of the overman. 
Hietzsche believes, hovrever, that modern Europe does not possess any 
overmen because 11 botl~ tl1e greatest and the smallest man . . . are still 
2 
all-too-similar to each other. 11 This, of course, goes right along \·ri th 
Nietzsche 1 s \thole critique of nodern society. IHetzsche denounces mono-
t!;.eism and the idea of a categorical imperative preaching the existence 
of only one nom: because these beliefs imply that somehow there must be 
a standard to ivhich al J. :"Jen must conforr::.. This is the real meaning of 
=~ietzsche 1 s Human, .All-too-Eu:::.an, in lihich he brands the carnal '~an. In 
this 11ork :;ietzsche also charges Christianity with breeding only conforoit~-
and ILediocri ty and 11i th thv1artint; the development of single superior 
individuals. Hietzsche maintains throughout his discourses t:1at the over-
~an could never be created because the converse type was wanted, bred, 
:z 
a-:J.d attaL".ed./ 
In the mediation on history Nietzsche had already declared that "the 
60al of humanity canno:: lie in the end but only ~nits higi-.. est specimens. 114 
In 11 Schoc·.enhauer as Educator" Nietzsche claL1s that the goal of development 
can be found only in "single great beings" who are not the M:ast ones in 
1. ~ietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 934-85. 
2. IHetz s che, Zara thustra, p. 20.). 
)• :~ietzsche, The Antichrist, P• 371. 
4. ~ietzsche, "The Use an~ Abuse of ~istory," p. 69. 
point of time" but are "apparently scattered and accidental existences. 111 
Then in Zarathustra Nietzsche first talks of the overman, the Eternal 
Recurrence, and the Vlill to Po\ver together. In fact, Zarathustra 1 s 
opening speech to the throng begins with the words: 11 I teach you the over-
2 
:::lan. ~!an is sooething that must be overcome." Therefore, it is certain 
tl1at Nietzsche 1 s ideal type of man culminates in the version of the over-
man. Once Nietzsche ~as found his goal his problem is to develop the 
overman. Nietzsche makes it quite clear that the 11 Good Europeans" are 
to engender the overman. Nietzsche brings this theme out in Beyond Good 
and Evil. 
With all the more profound and large-minded men of 
this century, the real general tendency of the 
mysterious labour of their souls was to prepare the 
way for that new synthesis and tentatively to 
anticipate the European of the future • .5 
This task of preparing for the overman is also explicit in Zarathustra. 
\"/hen Zarathustra experienced the instinct for pity on hearing the cry of 
distress in the wilderness, he finds the 11 higher men 11 in danger both from 
the ignorance of the populace and from the restrictions of their environ-
ment. Leading them to his cave, Zarathustra points out the course they 
have to take in order to hasten the arrival of the overman. 4 In this 
sense the higher men lay the foundation for the overmen. 
P...a.ving overcome the petty virtues and refinerr:cents of ,modern civili-
zation, the higher men must not surrender to the slogan of "the 'happiness 
of the greatest number! 1 n5 And after these higher men begin working 
1. Nietzsche, 11 Schopenhauer as Educator," in \'/right, \"/hat Nietzsche 
Taught, P• 44. 
2. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 124. 
,5. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, P• 572. 
4. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, pp. ,598-408. 
5· Ibid., pp. 399-400. 
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tO\vard the creation of a better man by their own self-improvement, a 
better race ,.,ill follow. Nietzsche suggests that their striving and 
discipline will be an age of experimenting to find the best method for 
creating the overman. 1 
Now, one must keep in mind that Nietzsche is thinking of this experi-
::,enting as most likely taking place right after the 11 Great Noon" when the 
higher men had attained political power. Once the~ad succeeded in 
gaining control over the social machinery these higher men could deviate 
fron the conventional moral code of the vteal: to remove the burden of 11 bad 
conscience" from the \vo~ld. Thus, Nietzsche believes that these higher 
;:len are the ones to rededicate hurD.anity to creativity. 2 Then, Nietzsche 
says, the horizon will appear free for lJan to venture out to face any 
danger "the lover of knovrledge 11 desired .'5 
). The 11 0verman 11 
Nietzsche probably would accept modern biological data shov:ing the 
lack of distinction bet>veen the various races of n:ankind; one can test 
this critical interpretation by looking to Nietzsche's later \'lorl:s. At 
the beginning of The Antichrist Nietzsche explains himself as follovts: 
The problem I thus pose is not what shall succeed 
mankind in tl:.e sequence of living beings (man is an end), 
but uhat type of man shall be bred, shall be \'lilled, for 
being hig~er in value, v10rthier of life, r:1ore certain of 
a future. 
It has been shovm in the section on history that !Tietzsche repudiates 
1. Ibid., P• 405. 
2. ~., P• 1t)2. 
3· Nietzsche, The Gail Science, in The Portable Nietzsche, P• 448. 
4. Nietzsche, The i.ntichrist, P• 570. 
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the modern notion of progress and says that his overman is not to be 
r:.isinterpreted as ceaning a different S[>ecies of man. Nietzsche reiter-
ates this in the Ecce Homo. 
The word "Superman, 11 designating a type of man ,.:hose 
appearance \vould be a piece of the greatest good fortune, 
a type opposed to 11 modern men," to 11 good 11 Den, to 
Christian and other nihilists,--a word vrhich in the 
mouth of Zarathustra, the destroyer of morality, becomes 
profoundly significant--this word is understood almost 
ever;y>·lhere, and "d th perfect innocence to corresponf to 
those values of which Zarathustra is a flat repudiation--
he has considered man 11 ideal" type, a higher kind of n:an, 
half saint, half 11 genius. 11 ••• Other learned cattle 1 have suspected me of Darwinism on account of this vrorcl. 
Therefore, Nietzsche 1 s overman is not tel be construed as o. nevi 
species of ~an, nor as an individual society will fashion. !Jietzsche 
asserts that he is valuable in himself because he embodies that state of 
being vvhich all ne~1 desire. Vlhile Nietzsche says that only H:en can rise 
above the animo.lic mass because tl1ey possess art, religion, and philosophy, 
Iaetzsche contends also that the great nul titude of r::en are essentially 
2 
animals viithout any unique development. Nietzscce believes that the goal 
of development cannot lie in the mass of specinens or in their well-being, 
but only in great human beings. Nietzsche holds that the overman has the 
1. Nietzsche, Ecce Ho~.1o, p. 856. 
2. This triad of art, religion, and philosophy seems very similar to 
Her;el's realm of the Absolute Spirit. Both Hegel and Hietzsche 
consider art, religion, and philosophy among man 1 s most sublime 
pursuits. For Hegel, hmvever, the great turning point is from the 
Philosophy of Nature to the Philosophy of Spirit. Even primitive man 
is included in the Philosophy o:tr Spirit. But Nietzsche shows in The 
Dawn that primitive man lives in fear of animals and his gods. Thus, 
IJietzsche insists that instead of wanting to return man to nature 2an 
must be cultivated and improved. On the other hand, Nietzsche regards 
the entire realn: of Hegel's Objective Spirit as still part of hature. 
The State is only a complicated version of the herd and as long as 
~.:an conforns he remains animalic. For Nietzsche, the turning point 
is from the Objective to the Absolute Spirit, from the State to art, 
religion, and prlilosophy. 
ff,:aufu.o.nn, Nietzsche, PP• 14Lt-1527. 
only ultimate value that tl:ere is and that society harms itself insofar 
1 
as it insists on conformity and impedes development of great individuals. 
Now, what distinguishes the higher and stronger from the lower and weaker 
man in Hietzsche 1 s scale of values is the individual's im:ermost craving 
and will for power. 
At this stage of development I:rietzsche is not arguing that all men 
must gauge their actions and set up a moral code based on relativism or 
atomism where each acts according to his wishes. Nietzsche states that 
the overn~n will have to develop control over his faculties and will have 
to integrate, naster, and sublimate the passions, or else they will lead 
him to chaos. Nietzsche reasons that the powerful man is strong enough to 
give vent to his passions and yet is able to prevent tJ:1en from overflowing 
and destroying life. What Nietzsche means is that the passions are intended 
to be manifested, but that they must be subject to the ultimate control of 
the reason. 
Goethe and Socrates approach Nietzsche's conception of the overman 
closer than other men of whom Nietzsche knows. Nietzsche says Goethe over-
came his animal nature, organized the chaos of his passions, sublimated 
his impulses, and gave style to his character. In Nietzsche's words Goethe 
"disciplined himself into wholeness," and became 11 the man of tolerance, not 
2 from weakness but from strength," a 11 spirit who has become free • 11 
Nietzsche indicates that Goethe did not retire from life 11 but put himself 
into the nidst of it" because "what he wanted was totality; he fought the 
mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will .•• 3 
1. Nietzsche, The Idols, PP• 547-48. 
2. Ibid., pp. 554-55· 
3· ~., P• 554. 
It is evident that for Nietzsche power, as exemplified in the super-
historical vie'l"tpoint of glorifying each moment of existence, is what he 
ueans by self-discipline. This is abe of Nietzsche's central points. 
Nietzsche believes that the overman knows how much his freedom over fate 
has "sunk right down" to his innermost depths and has become a dominating 
instinct. 1 I~ietzsche indicates that by great effort man can transcend 
his carnal self. In addition, Nietzsche thinks the strong-willed man will 
do this by first "organizing the chaos 11 in himself and then by 11 thinking 11 
2 
himself back to his true needs. These overmen will also be the most 
spiritual and kind souls humanity has yet produced. They will find their 
happiness where others find their downfall: 
in the labyrinth, in hardness against themselves and 
others, in experiments; their joy is self-conquest; 
asceticisr:J. becomes in them nature, need, and instinct. 
Difficult tasks are a privilege to them; to play with 
burdens which crush others, a recreation. Knowledge--
a form of asceticis~. They are the most venerable 
kind of man; that does not preclude their being the 
most cheerful and the kindliest. They rule not 
because they want to but because they are: they are 
not free to be second.3 ----
Postulating a goal for himself, the overman will realize that his 
higher nature demands fulfilJing the loftiest visions. Therefore, his 
development must not be self-expressionism but will have to be a striving 
which is moderated by self-discipline. Nietzsche believes this learning 
control is necessary to meet the challenges of life because the free man 
"still has to face a sharp conflict between the higher self and the lower, 
between the ideal aspired to and the contemptibly imperfect present. 114 
1. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Horals, p. 671. 
2. l\ietzsche, 11 The Use and Abuse of I-listory, 11 p. 78. 
). Hietzsc:1.e, The Antichrist, p::. 645-46. 
4. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, in l-~or.c.;an, Hhat Nietzsche Means, p. 41. 
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But to overcome his own limitations the over;nan has to generalize his 
ideal and seek fello'l':ship >vi th ot!1ers \vho also aspire to the noble virtues. 
They will thereby constitute a 11 coillffiunity of men dedicated to the gener-
ation of great individuals who shall achieve perfcction. 111 ro 6ether such 
a group can create the conditions in which life will be rehdered tolerable. 
It becomes their duty to inculcate the values which give life meaning. 
Similarly, Hietzsche shows that it is in order to fulfill the need for 
creating values that they are to be engendered. Tl1en, when they have been 
freed from the masses the most select will create a different ethics for 
hUlllE.nity. 
For these reasons Nietzsche feels that because the over:nan alone is 
in possession of full and integral freedom, he should be freed from the 
traditional et!lics of the weak. The dogma. of equality is completely 
abhorent to the overman. His acts must admit to no standard, save that of 
the vlill to Power. For Nietzsche the human being who is free 11 spits on 
the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, 
cows, fe:r.,ales, EnglisiT::Jan, and other denocrats. The free man is a warrior . 112 
Seen from this perspective l'Jietzsche 1 s overman seems to be only for 
those :11en who can be a "law unto then:sel ves 11 and can emancipate themselves 
from conventionalism.~ Nietzsche writes only the; "shall be the greatest 
who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the 
man beyond good and evil ."4 
1. Ibid., P• 42. 
2. Nietzsche, The I do 1 s, p. 542. 
3· Nietzsche, Zarathustra, P• )08. 
4. Nietzsche, Be:t:ond Good and Evil, p. 517. 
4. Nietzsche's Standard of Value 
Nietzsche argues that when he looks upon the modern scene he sees 
Christian love, with its virtues of justice and pity, as the manifes-
tation of impotent hatred and selfishness. Hietzsche maintains that be-
cause resentment is at the core of modern morals the goodness of modern 
man is not virtuous and that his truths are not truthful. Since modern 
man's values are worthless, Nietzsche holds that his ends no longer give 
purpose to his life and that his pleasures do not give him happiness. 
Nietzsche, however, has found a goal which gives an aim to human lifej 
his problem is 'tlhether a new sanction can be found in this world for 
values. Nietzsche points out that "God is dead" as an empirical cultural 
fact and posits the question if any values are universally valid in this 
godless world? Nietzsche realizes that there are many obstacles to 
finding some new standard of ~aluing because the institutions of his day, 
among them the ancient and venerable, are considered to rest on axiotlntic 
truths. In addition, Nietzsche points out that conventional morality, in 
the guise of an absolute intimidation, has hitherto discouraged investi-
gations. Nevertheless, all these institutions, including Absolute r..torali-
ty, Nietzsche insists are only so many hindrances preventing the ful-
filment of the ideal which is based on sterner forms of conduct. 
Af~er Nietzsche realizes the purpose of life--to create the highest 
forms of manhood--he directs all his energy toward a "revaluation of all 
values" as an instrument to aid in the overman's procreation. 
The standard by which Nietzsche condemns the old hierarchy of values 
and wishes to erect his new ones is by means of life and the Will to 
Power. Nietzsche writes: "What are our values and tables of moral goods 
themselves worth? What comes of thtr rule? For whom? In what respect? 
l 
--Ansi-Ter: for life. 11 In t:1is respect loyalty to life is Nietzsche's 
basis for his de::1and of a revaluation of values. About the Christian 
good r.:a:1, the supporter of the old ideals, Nietzsche concludes: 11 8o he 
ends ••• by understanding nature as evil, man as depraved, being good 
as grace •••• In sum: he negates life •••• ~.iith that he should con-
sider his ideology of good and evil refuted. 112 In adopting life as his 
standard laetzsche intends to maintain that the highest r::anifestation of 
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the Uill to Power, as exemplified by the triu.~ph of the spirit over passion, 
is the strongest and best for~ of life. 3 
But life exists in ~any forms, and Nietzsche recognizes that a 
further approximation to a definite standard of value is necessary. The 
doctrine of gradation, Hhich T\ietzsche postulates in The Daim of !ay, has 
been pointed out above. It now appears that this value-judg::1ent based on 
the abundance and growth of life is Nietzsche's standard of value. 
Xietzsche stresses this fact in Thus Spake Zarathustra w:1en he makes the 
co::tl·c.st between heal thy and decadent, and rising and declining forms of 
life. l•ccordin,sly, since the feeling of the ~Till for pov;er distinguisJ:-1es 
the heal thy fron the decadent, Nietzsche takes the fulfiln~ent of the basic 
urge of all higher life for his criterion of values: "There is nothing in 
life that has value beside the degree of povrer--assuming that life itself 
is will to power. 114 This r.::.eans that the ~/ill to PcHer dictates alJ value-
judgmer1ts. In the second volume of The \Jill to Fewer Nietzsche brings tl:is 
out even further. 
1. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 115. 
2. Ibid., P• 116. 
3· Ibid., p. 122. 
4. Ibid., p. 118. 
All 11 purposes, 11 11 goals, 11 11 meanings 11 are only 
modes of expression and transformations of the lone 
\iill inherent in all happening; the will to po'I'Ter • 
• • • Hilling in general is nothing else but \villing 
to become stron£:e1·1 willing to grow--and also willing the means thereto. 
Power is still the standard of value which Nietzsche affirms. There 
is just one goal in :Tietzsche 1 s scheme--nar1ely power i and Nietzsche 
~_-_easures L1e worth of any particular life by its amount of power. It has 
been :rentioned that Eietzsche speaks of po'l'ier in two forms: intrinsic and 
external power. No\t Nietzsche's scorn for measuring greatnes:: by the 
success of physical manipulation has already appeared. Eore explicitly, 
lTietzscl:e says that these sar.:1e nanifestations of external power 11 do not 
come into consideration; they have no value of their own, but are only 
useful for something better." 2 
Conversely, Nietzsche finds the power he does value for its own sake 
quite dissociated from external power. In the discussion on the Will to 
Power and the overman it has been mentioned that a degree of self-organi-
zation was necessary before the individual could function at his best. 
Then, Nietzscr.e says, 11~ power is won over nature, ••• one can use 
this power in order freely to develop oneself further: will to power as 
self-er.l"ance:::,,ent and strengthening. n3 
Therefore, Nietzsche is convinced that t:.e only self-justifying ends 
can be individual lives and not classes or societies of humanities. 
Fundamental mistake: to place the goals in the 
flocl: and not in particular individuals! The flock 
is means, no~! But now people are trying to 
conceive tl1e flock as an individual and ascribe a 
1. Ibid., in \'/right, What Nietzsche Taught, P• 310. 
2. Ibid., in ll.organ, What Nietzsche Heans, p. 122. 
3. Ibid., p. 123. 
higher rank to it than to the individual--deepest 
misunderstanding!!!l 
In the overnan it has been shown that strength of will consists in the 
integration and controlling of the urges. Such strength by integrating 
the passions is clearly Nietzsche's idea of the highest forms of the Will 
to Power. However, organization implies limitations, and here Nietzsche 
includes the person as an individual. Nietzsche shows that by sublimation 
the organism can function for the hi&hest harmony. 1~ietzsche includes 
sublimation in his neaning of power because if power is measured by re-
sistance overcome, those who overcome the most are strongest. Nietzsche 
also confirms this point by believing that the most intelligent are able 
to lead the hardest life--one of spiritual independence and adventure--
and to do the most difficult thing: create new values. 
It is the business of the very few to be inde-
pendent; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever 
attempts it, even with the best right, but without 
being obliged to do so, proves that he is probably 
not only strong, but also daring beyond measure. He 
enters into a labyrinth, he multiplies a thousandfold 
the dangers which life in itself already brings with 
it; not the least of which is that no one can see how 
and where he loses his way, becamee isolated, and is 
torn piecemeal by some minotaur of conscience.2 
It can now be established that the distinctions between the external 
and the intrinsic forms of the Will to Power are of degrees. The former 
is a low grade organization of power while the latter is one of a higher 
grade. Hence, Nietzsche concludes that the exceptional individual is 
richer in high grade power, true power, than the mob which usually beats 
him in the struggle for po\ver. But within the individual himself Nietzsche 
believes that the sublimation of 1nany passions constitutes greater power 
1. Ibid. 
2. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, P• 414. 
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than that of a few. Therefore, Nietzsche's conception of power can also 
be neasured in terms or three variables: the nur.1ber, the strength, and 
the variety of the things controlled. Nietzsche actually emphasizes all 
three. 
The higher type presents an incomparably greater 
complexity--a greater sum of coordinated eler::tents. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The highest T!len uould have the greatest :c:ultiplicity 
of urges, and have them also in the relatively 
greatest strength which can still be borne.l 
As a result, Nietzsche holds that the highest power is power over opposites 
and that the greatest men are those who unite the most antagonistic traits. 
This tension betv;een opposites appears to have an important place in 
Nietzsche's thouc~t because Nietzsche believes tension to be the essential 
source of stimulation in life. 
In truth a strong antagonism belongs in every-
thing, in ;narriage, friendship, state, confederation, 
corporation, learned societies, religion, that some-
thing proper may grow, Resistance is the form of 
force--in peace as in war. 2 
Consequently, :Hetzsche thinks that tension is the condition of 
hur.Jan advancement. Here again one touches Nietzsche 1 s view that chaos 
is needed to offset the tendency to stagnation and that when society is 
tired and overcivilized it must revert to barbarism to obtain fresh 
energies. This is one ground for Nietzsche's justification of strife.3 
i. The Revaluation of Values 
The famous revaluation of conventional morality is the formula 
Nietzsche provides for a different system of ethics to meet the conditions 
l. Nietzsche, The Vlill to Pov1er, in ~1organ, What Nietzsche Heans, P• 131. 
2. Ibid., P• 132. 
). Nietzsche, Hu:r..an, pp. 35 ff. 
of producing the overoan. This has been brought up before in the section 
on nihilism where, after the Great Noon festival, it was shown that the 
lover of knowledge could venture out as far as he lvished on the "open 
sea. 111 Nietzsche insists that the higl:er men must be willing to make new 
experiments and must retain an open mind at all times. r•!oreover, the 
superior individual must be prepared "boldly at any time to declare him-
self against his previous opinions." 2 This sense ofquestioning means 
experiencing and experimenting critically. Nietzsche says that those "who 
thirst for reason want to look . . . experiences in the eye as severely 
as at a scientific experiment!") The failure to question seems to Nietzsche 
more synonymous ivi th weakness and a lower degree of po'lter. 
Therefore, although Nietzsche does not want to deduce answers from 
a system whose premises are beyond question, he realizes 
by far the most lack an intellectual conscience • 
by far the most do not find it contemptible to 
believe this or that and to live according to it, 
without first having become conscious of the last 
Efnd surest reasons pro and con, and without even 
taking the trouble to consider such reasons after-
wards--the most gifted men and the most ~oble women 
still belong to these 11 by far the most." 
On the other hand, Nietzsche desires to consider each problem individually, 
because this method seens the best way to get at particular truths and to 
correct previous mistakes. i'li th this experimental attitude as the basis 
for discovery, Nietzsche then denies "the type of man who formerly passed 
as the highest--the good, the benevolent, the charitable .n5 In addition, 
1. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 448. 
2. Ibid., in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 64. 
3· ~., p. 9). 
4. Ibid., pp. 82-8). 
5· Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, P• 926. 
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Nietzsche has indicated in the discussion on morality that "good and evil" 
are signs of the Slave Horality and that 11 good and bad" represent the 
qualities manifested in the l!iB.ster Eorality. But in Zarathustra Nietzsche 
astutely points out "what is good and evil no one yet knows unless it be 
he who creates. 111 Nietzsche contends that in the strong man 11 good 11 is an 
essentially different thing from the "good" of the resentful nan. Here-
over, these two "goods" arise from different sources. The strong man's 
good is spontaneous, natural, and inherent in himself, while the \'leak nan 1 s 
good is manufactured and conditioned to ameliorate his existence. "Evil 11 
and 11 bad, 11 Nietzsche says, are also attributes '\'Thich originate in '\'Tid ely 
separating sources. The 11 evil 11 of the weak man is any condition '\'Ihich 
works against the ideals of "goodness" and is the basis of his Slave Mo-
rality. The strong man, however, envisages 11 bad 11 out of his feeling for 
"good," and it has no application to other individuals. Thus, Nietzsche 
can enjoin the strong man to "take his stand beyond good and evil and 
leave the illusions of moral judgment beneath himself. 112 
As indicated above, Nietzsche directly relates these ideas of good 
and bad bac~: to the inheritance of the will for power the individual feels 
in himself. All this means that in Nietzsche's scale of values the strong 
r.1an does not obey any dispassionate lmv because the in:pulse to justice 
11 wi thout the povier of judgnent" vdll cause more harm than good to man. 3 
For l~ietzsche the just rlan is able to see all sides of a situation ana can 
;::alee a clear distinction; he possesses the ability to look "with a variety 
1. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 308. 
2. Nietzsche, The Idols, p. 501. 
3· !Hetzsche, 11 The Use and .libuse of Eistory," p. 42. 
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of eyes and consciences • • • from a height to any distance 
IJietzsche believes that his proposals for neasuring justice by the 
auount of true power :oresent in <my being are not Lased on abstract a 
prioris~ but are e~pirically grolu1ded in natural events. Since man is 
unique, l~ietzsche argues that he should be able to generate his O'l'ln 
standards. If he doe::::, IJietzsche holds that those who Hill be creators 
11ust follow a different code of ethics from the masses. They Hill need a 
"transvaluation of values ••• so as to bear the \"Ieight of such responsi-
bility. 112 
The revaluation of values !aetzsche talks about, however, is not 
anythin;; really nevl. ::::..etzsche does not discover any new tables but is 
;:.:erely speaking of another code of ethics built on strength, courage, 
honesty, and determination. l\ietzsc;w thinks this revaluation will better 
:r:JCei> the conditions of life. It i'lill free modern r:can from the choking 
restrictions of conventional life and morality and vlill lead to more 
:;erfect individuo.ls c.nd a more ;:-:erfect society. 11 It can fairly be stated 
that it is on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human society, 
the sacerdotal for~, that man really becomes for the first time an inter-
estin;: anioc..l. n3 :Tietzsche assumes that only by brea..1dng free from the 
stifling conditions of modern life can rr:an create anything of value. 
~ience, Xietzsche concludes that the strong man n:.ust obey only the 11 noble 11 
virtues of strength and determination. Whenever ~~ietzsche discovers tl1is 
type of ~1oral i ty in various historical epochs, such as the Greek Classical, 
the Rocan, and the Renaissance, he finds that the \'lill to Power as a 
1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, P• 514. 
2. Ibid., P• 496. 
3• I~ietzsche, '.::'he Genealogy of r.lorals, P• 642. 
principle of life and self-affirmation is distinctly present. In place of 
the old in.perative "thou shalt" these periods seem to bring forth the 
conditional "I must" of the creator for Iaetzsche. 
Nietzsche thus c.akes a sharp distinction betl'leen the powerful, with 
whom he is especially concerned, and the \veal:, \'1ho are not capable of 
complete integration of thesselves. Hardness against oneself and one's 
friends is essential for those who contemplate being overmen; but hardness 
a£_;ainst those t·!ho cannot stand such treataent is unpardonable. Nietzsche 
says 
hatred against mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher: 
it is almost a question mark concerning his "!ight to 
philosophy." Just because he is the exception, he 1:.:ust 
protect the nor1:: and encourage self-confidence in all 
the mediocre .1 
!Jietzsche 1 s point is not that the happiness of the weak should be 
sacrificed to that of the strong, but that the weak are incapacitated for 
ultimate happiness. As a result, Nietzsche :rakes room for higher and 
lower types, each capable of greater or less perfection on its own level 
in his scale of values. 
ii. The "Caste-System" 
It is to the exceptional man that Nietzsche looks for the realization 
of his ideal. But the mediocre, too, may lead useful and happy lives. 
"For the mediocre, to be mediocre is their happiness; mastery of one thing 
2 
and specialization--a natural instinct." Nietzsche regards a high 
culture as a pyramid which can only stand on a broad base. "Its first 
presupposition is a strong and soundly constructed mediocrity. 113 The 
1. Nietzsche, Notes, in Kaufmann, Hietzsche, P• 336. 
2. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, p. 647. 
). Ibid., p. 646. 
sciences, the greater part of art, and all professional activities, are 
only compatible with a mediocre amount of ability and ambition, Nietzsche 
thinks. There is nothing improper in this conception and Nietzsche regards 
it as 'l"rrong for a "more profound spirit" to consider 11 a person's mediocrity 
1 
as an objection." It is just a fact to be realized. 
Now it is obviously not Nietzsche's intention to have the over~n 
tyrannize the mediocre or exploit them in any way. In Nietzsche's plan 
these mediocre people are to live contented and happy lives, and nothing 
is to be do:me to rJ.S.ke them wretched. In the Nietzschean ideal society 
there is a need for unpretentious, mediocre people. 
Nietzsche is also aware that to be free is not so important as what 
the individual is free for. Nietzsche believes that the new ideals and 
values the strong man will create is what real freedom entails. But only 
those imbued with the strongest amounts of the Will to Power can create 
lasting values. 
Thus, Nietzsche recognizes that the capacities and needs of some men 
are very different from those of others. 2 The attempt to ignore these 
differences of nature only results in hypocrisy and an impoverishment of 
life. Nietzsche argues that it is impossible to impose the sa:c.e code of 
conduct on all because 11 what is fair to one may not at all be fair to 
another 113 The "requirements of one morality fer all is really a detri-
ment to higher r.1.en 11 since "there is a distinction of rank bet\'leen man and 
man and consequently between morality and morality. 114 The ideal state of 
1. Ibid., P• 647. 
2. Nietzsche, Beyond Sood and Evil, p::. 534 ff. 
3· Ibid., P• 5)4. 
4. Ibid. 
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affairs would be to haVe one law for the overman so that he can be free 
to create his own standards without fear of reprisal, and another for the 
rest of huna.nity. Nietzsche thinks that this \'lill benefit all men since 
it 1.1ill entail far greater freedom for the more creative and worthier 
members of society. Therefore, I~ietzsche 1 s scale of values makes room 
for ~.::any types. Eietzsche 1 s slogan is: "Do not be virtuous beyond your 
strength! :end do not desire anything of yourselves against probability. 111 
Since the ordinary I::an is largely dependent on the opinions and 
examples of others he prefers to respect the prescribed norms. Hietzscl1.e 
recognizes the need for imposed prohibitions and codes of conduct for the 
ordinary r:1an; but Eietzsche maintains that these are only applicable to 
those who want to follow a prescribed manner of life. 
To ordibary men, to the 1:najori ty of the people, 'l'lho 
exist for service and general utility, and are only 
so far entitled to exist, religion gives invaluable 
contentedness wi tl1 their lot and condition, peace 
of heart, ennoblement of obedience, additional social 
happiness and s~'Tilpathy .2 
Consequently, Nietzsche does not wish to destroy Christianity but only to 
end its tyranny of prescribing itself as the only salvation for n~nki~. 
In his bitterest diatribes against Ci:1ristianity Nietzsche 1 s object is not 
to s:1a~:e the fait£1 of the great n.ajority of mankind but is merely to free 
the strong man from the restrictions of a rel i~;ion vlhich fits only the 
v;eaker me:r:bers of society. Nietzsche sees the necessity of maintaining 
Christianity. Nevertheless, if Chri:Jtianity is to do useful work among 
the masses it has to be restricted to those 1vhose ideal it is. The majori-
ty of r:2ankind find satisfaction 1vi thin this religion; others, hov1ever, have 
1. !Jietzscl1e, Zarathustra, p. 40). 
2. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 4lr 7. 
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their own diametrically opposed ideal. 
Hence, Iaetzsche realizes that for any society to reach the highest 
stages of culture the rulers are to preserve the faith of the serving 
classes. Religion can overcome the weak's resistance to the exercise of 
authority since it becomes the "bond which binds rulers and subjects in 
cor;:;mon, betraying and surrendering to the former the conscience of the 
latter • 11 1 
The syste~ Nietzsche conceives might be envisaged as a triangular 
caste. Above all would be the superior men who create the values for 
all the rest. Below them would be the caste which relieves these overmen 
of the drudgery and detail of ordinary, but necessary work. Lastly, and 
at the base of this pyrflmid is the lo\'test caste which would do the every-
day tasks. Nietzsche regards the order of castes as 
merely the sanction of a natural order, a natural 
lawfulness of the first raru{, over which no arbi-
trariness, no "modern idea" has any power. In every 
healthy society there are three types which condition 
each other and gravitate differently physiologically; 
each has its own hygiene, its own field of work, its 
own sense of perfection and mastery. Nature, not lf.anu, 
distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual ones, those 
who are pre-eminently strong in muscle and temperament, 
and those, the third type, who excel neither in one 
respect nor in the other, the mediocre ones--the last 
as the great majority, the first as the elite.2 
Although this order of castes would be difficult to construct and maintain, 
Nietzsche demands that man do his best for the future of the human race 
without allowing himself to be defeated by false pity about the hardness 
of the task. Nietzsche urges the 11 higher men 11 to be guided by the aris-
tocratic values of courage, strength, and sincerity. He writes that in 
former times those men 
1 • Ibid • , p • 446. 
2. Nietzsche, The Antichrist, p. 645. 
still in possession of unknown strength of will and 
desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more 
moral, more peaceful races, ••• or upon old mellow 
civilisations •••• At the commencement, the noble 
caste was always the barbarian caste: their superi-
ority did not consist first of all in their physical, 
but in their psychical power--they were more complete 
men •••• The essential thing, however, in a good 
and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard 
itself as a function either of the kingship or the 
commonwealth, but as the significance and highest 
justification thereof--that it should accept with a 
good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of indi-
viduals, who for its sake, must be suppressed and 
reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. 
Its fundamental belief must be precisely, that society 
is not allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as 
a foundation and scaffolding by means of which a select 
class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to 
their higher duties, and in general to a higher 
existence .1 
An inspection of Nietzsche's 11 revaluation of values" has sho\"m ho\"r 
it is possible to accept the values of the overman without abrogating the 
softer ethics of the mediocre. The two systems of morality are both 
necessary for the construction and continued maintenance of the social 
structure. However, Nietzsche is realistic enough to realize that t\-10-
thousand years cannot be effaced in a day; furthermore, Nietzsche holds 
no vision of an entire race of overmen as ever being produced. 
Every elevation of the type 11 man 11 has hitherto been 
the \-.rork of an aristocratic society and so it will 
ah-.rays be--a society believing in a long scale of 
gradations of ranks and differences of worth among 
human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or 
other. 2 
Slavery is required because 11 where there is ruling there are masses: \"rhere 
1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 575-77• This 11 psychical 11 po\"rer 
Nietzsche talks about might be considered the attained unconscious 
state of perfect mastery talked of earlier. Nietzsche considers 
both the man who acts on impulse alone and the man who deliberately 
counteracts his impulses inferior to the man who acts rationally on 
instinct. 
2. T~ietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, P• 575· 
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there is slavery the individuals are but feiv, and have the instincts and 
conscience of the herd opposed to then." 1 Progress consists in having 
the masses subju2:c.ted to the rule of law, w~_ich Nietzsche designates as 
11 slavery, 11 for the condition of all developn:.ent is "making possible a 
selection at the expense of the n;ultitude." 2 
On the whole, however, it does not seeru that Nietzsche believes in 
the hereditary fixation of ::.an's place in the class system. A person's 
rank is chiefly detern,ined by what he himself is, not by what his fore-
fatl:.ers have been. In the end, it appears as if Nietzsche wants each indi-
vidual to choose his o\'m place in the system and to take the consequences 
of his actions. After all, the ideal of the Nietzscbean over.:r:an is not a 
soft option, but is a severe discipline. This assumption >-wuld mean that 
=aetzsche believes in the free intercourse of individuals between the 
various social classes in the 11 caste-systelu ." 
Novr Iaetzscl:e has shol-m that the man who conquers himself possesses 
greater pO\·rer than he who conquers others. Since :Hetzsche thinks that 
the highest degree of power consists in self-mastery, he considers the 
artist and the philosopher as the most powerful of ~en. The power of 
these n:en consists in their ability to sublimate and organize the chaos 
~r their passions. That the overman suffers througl1 his attempts to 
synthesize new or different creations is not unjust, because it is neces-
sary that some suffering be done in creating. As pointed out above, 
I~ietzsche stresses that suffering is needed for gaining self-perfection 
and insists that the individual overman must be cruel against himself. 
Nietzsche brings this out quite v1el2 in The Genealogy of r,:orals where he 
1. Uietzsche, The Joyful \'lisdom, trans. Common, P• 125. 
2. I~ietzsche, The Hill to Power, in 1-:organ, iihat Nietzsche I-:eans, p. C'·l. 
deals with "bad conscience. 111 In this work Nietzsche points out that 
man cannot become conscious of the beautiful without becoming conscious 
of the "evil." To become powerful and to gain freedom rr.an must f~rst 
develop the feeling that his impulses are evil. When man recognizes 
that his passions are evil he becomes aware of the contradiction between 
"good and evil 11 and is divided against himself. But eventually man can 
obtain ultimate power if he learns ho\'l to sublimate, control, and employ 
his passions, and does not fight or extirpate them. 
After a period of time, Nietzsche suggests that the elite exhaust 
themselves. The reason why there are continuous cycles of cultural births 
and deaths is now more apparent. ~lhen any culture reaches its peak the 
Will to Power undermines itself and seeks some rest. Similarly, when the 
greatest individuals have created to their full capacity the age is replete 
and seems doamed to decay. It would appear that decline is inevitable. 
As decline sets in the masses obtain mastery over their former masters 
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and inculcate what Nietzsche calls a "slave rebellion in morals." Neverthe-
less, even if conditions change there remains a need for creative minds. 
Nietzsche implies that during this hiatus stage between cultural epochs the 
second caste holds some semblance of power; but they are not strong enough 
to create enduring values. Only the "overman" can do that. So, when the 
struggle with the lowest caste becomes crucial and decisive someone or 
some group has an excellent chance to gain control over the political 
machinery. 
On first glance it appears as if Nietzsche does not believe ih a 
per:nanent ideal society which will "happily ever after." Instead, 
Nietzsche suggests that the "lawgivers of the future" will direct hl.lr.l.anity 
through cycles 
1. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, P• 705. 
as short and as high as possible • • • to bring 
out the form of multifariousness of man, to sr:18.sh 
him when a variety of type has had its admiration--
to be thus creating and annihilating seems to me 
the supreme delight that man van have.l 
The resulting formation of a new ruling caste will then make the charac-
teristic beginning of another cultural cycle. Actually, what Nietzsche 
thinks is that once entrenched the overrua.n 1 s will for power is worn out 
through constant creations and degenerates into "barbarism." This is the 
reason why Nietzsche constantly demands tension and conflict. 2 To avoid 
lapsing into barbarism Nietzsche hopes the greatest ainds will guide 
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humanity into the respective classes so that a real culture can consciously 
choose its ends and means. However, on closer inspection it can be seen 
that I~ietzsche does not desire this recurring upheaval in cultural births 
and deaths. Although Irietzsche emphasizes that all grat things must 
perish by theraselves, he dislikes thinking about the inevitability of 
decay and hopes that the process might be spread over a long period of tine. 
1. Nietzsche, The Will to Pm-1er, in }.rorgan, \vhat :aetzsche rt.eans, p. 363. 
2. It seems dubious that Nietzsche is speaking of a physical war when 
he vtri tes "On War and Warriors 11 in Thus Spake Zarathustra. Nietzsche 
does speak of "loving peace as a Ieans to new war" and "the short 
more than the long Peace. 11 Eowever, Nietzsche is not speaking of vtar 
in the literal sense of the word, but is discussing the quest for 
knowledge. Evidently, Nietzsche believes that this quest for knowl-
edge can be made into a contest as it vras in the days of Classical 
Greece. Thus, when Nietzsche speaks of peace he means that the 
antagonists should gain some re~~ite before further arguments. 
LKaufmann, Eietzsche, PI'• 3-)8-)2./ 
This conception of 11 war 11 really goes back to r:ietzsche 1 s belief 
that happiness is not found in complacency but in activity. The 
quest for knowledge and high culture then et1tails frequent clashes 
of O?inions and ideas. In these cases Nietzsche believes that disa-
greer.:J.ents are beneficial. Therefore, what Nietzsche usually means 
by the terms tension and war is the op,osition to oppressive con-
ventions and the strug[le of ideas. In the section on nihilism 
Nietzsche holds that a real war is the cure for modern society's 
degeneracy, but Nietzsche does not recom.'llend it as so:nething good in 
itself. Nietzsche even shows that in time it makes the vanquished 
revengeful and the triumphant lazy. 
Throughout this entire cultural process Nietzsche maintains that 
the higher must not degrade itself to be the tool of 
the lower, the pathos of distance must to all eternity 
keep their missions also separate •••• They alone 
are the sureties of the future; they alone are bound 
to man's future.l 
Nietzsche recognizes that the ancient Greeks practiced this principle of 
class separation. So, Nietzsche believes that this society can be exempli-
fied as one of the most ideal man has ever established. 
5. Ancient Greece as an Ideal Society 
In the course of his literary development Nietzsche manifested a 
predilection for the ancient, pre-Socratic Greek culture, with its breeding 
of great individuals. As a philologist Nietzsche's contact with the Greeks 
gave him a clear idea of the Greek aristocratic co:1ception and showed him 
a civilization in which he thought he recognized his own ideal of life. 
Nietzsche seems to discover his "real" self in con~ct with the Greeks; 
it follows that only the existence of a race which is strong and powerful 
in the will for power can afford such a justification of life. 
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Because of their strength, Nietzsche believes that the Greeks were able 
to raise themselves above pessimism and undue optimism. Nietzsche shovrs 
that in the beginning of their history the Greeks were in danger of being 
ovenrhelmed by a flood of foreign forms and concepts. Nietzsche reasons 
that the Greek genius was in learning to or[anize this chaos. Their 
originality, however, did nor preclude their tre: endous debt to earlier 
civilizations, and to the Oriental religions in part:.cular. Beginning 
with a barbaric idxture of ideas and values, the Greeks achieved rr.uch 
because they gradually learned to organize the chaos by re=embering their 
genuine needs. 
1. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Ilorals, P• 751. 
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Nietzsche points to the fact that the c.ncient Greeks considered 
trat;edy, vlith its suffering and pain, to be a necessary factor that added 
to the value and beauty in life. 3ut it is in connection with Apollo and 
Dionysus, the Greek art deities, that :;ietzsche learns of the anti thesis 
in Greek life. Though these heterogeneous tendencies ran parallel to eac~:c 
ot:1er, they constantly incited each other to new and more powerful births. 
The one restrained through forra vlhile the ether pulsated with dynamic 
energy. Thus, the Dionysian and the Apollonian augmented each other and 
bred the Hellenic spirit. 1 Although Nietzsche considers the Will to Power 
as dualistic in The Birth of Tragedy he still envisages it as the real 
basis of Greek culture and as the basic drive of all human effort. In his 
later writings Nietzsche fuses the opposing elements of the Will to Povler 
into a single drive which overcomes and conquers itself. 
For it is only in the Dionysian mysteries, in the 
psychology of the Dionysian state, that the basic 
fact of the Hellenic instinct finds expression--its 
11
'1'1ill to life." What wqs it that the Hellene guaran-
teed hir:lself by JJ.eans of these mysteries? Eternal 
life .2 
Therefore, Nietzsche believes that the ancient Greek is the first 
great binder and synthesizer of everything Oriental and European. Ac-
cording to Nietzsche, the Greeks in their best days stowed a will to 
pessin::.is;:. which allowed them to beget strength to face the ugly and terrible 
aspects of existence. Similarly, Nietzsche aduires the Greek religions, 
for they expressed gratitude to the gods rather than fear. Consequently, 
Nietzsche believes these Greeks justified their strongest impulses by 
forming and EB.intaining an aristocratic society. Hence, the Greeks could 
utilize their energies to the production of real culture and men of genius. 
1. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 962. 
2. taetzsche, The Idols, p. 561. 
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In the ideal society Nietzsche shows how the artists, philosophers, and 
those strong in the will for power convert their joy in destruction to 
rivalry for honor. Nietzsche regards this contest as the secret of Greek 
advancecnent. The individual in ancient ~reece did all he could to excel 
his competitors in politics, art, and philosophy. The presence of these 
rivals held tyrannical impulses in check and created the highest pitch of 
endeavor. 
Nietzsche regards the peak of Greek culture as the age of Aeschylus 
and the early Ionian philosophers. This was the time when Classical style 
reached perfection. In the early philosophers Nietzsche observes the 
inception of the highest types of men--the overmen. However, the Persian 
wars broke out and Socrates wrecked the continuity of the tradition by 
introducing abstract concepts and dialectics. With Socrates decline set 
in. 
Nietzsche pictures the model philosopher as a physician who applies 
the knife of his thought 11 vivisectionally" to the virtues of his time. 1 
As an example of such a philosopher Nietzsche portrays Socrates, whom he 
would like to emulat~ by uncovering the lack of self-discipline in con-
temporary morality. 2 
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Like Socrates, Nietzsche also offers a critique of his age and prepares 
the groQ~d for a new value-creation. But Nietzsche further indicates that 
Socrates was not only the 11 gadfly11 of Athens and the 11vivisectionalist 11 of 
Athenian conceit and hypocrisy, but also the creator of characters. In The 
Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche first introduces Socrates as a demigod. In this 
work ~rietzsche describes the great dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and 
1. ?aetzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 515. 
2. Ibid. 
the Euripidean attack upon them. Nietzsche says: "Euripides \'las, in a 
sense, only a mask: the deity that spoke throu2h him was neither Dionysus 
nor Apollo. It \'las an altogether new-born demon. And it was called 
Socrates. 111 Here Hietzsche seems to think that Euripides embodies the 
extreme rationalism which set forth the decline in Greek culture. In this 
sense, Nietzsche views the rationalistic tendency as being injected into 
the Greek mind before Socrates and only gaining expression through him. 2 
IJietzsche finds 
in Socrates the turning-point and vortex of so-called 
universal history. For if one were to imagine the 
"l'rhole incalculable sum of energy which has been used 
by that universal tendency,--used not in the service 
of knowledge, but for the practice, i. e., egotistical 
ends of individuals and peoples--then probably the 
instinctive love of life would be so much -v1eakened 
in general \'Iars of destruction Lthag thus a practical 
pesshlism might even give rise to a horrible etilics of 
general slaug:oter out of pity .3 
Thus, Nietzsche considers Socratic rationalism as the force which saved 
Western civilization from destruction. Similar to Nietzsche's feelings in 
the HineteenUl Century, Socrates understood that the world needed hir.2; 
only Socrates had one choice--to be rational. Hence, Nietzsche sees 
"Socratism," but not Socrates as decadent because it could not produce a 
cure. But by thl'larting destruction it did make a regeneration of culture 
possible. Socrates himself realized this: 11 in the wisdom of his courage 
4 to die" he recognized that for himself death was the only cure. 
In his lectures on 11 The pre-Platonic Philosophers" :Tietzsche includes 
1. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, P• 1012. 
2. Ibid., P~· 1020-21. 
3· Ibid., p. 1030. 
4. Nietzsche, The Idols, p. 479. 
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Socrates as one of the purest types of the 11 eternally and every\vhere 
seeking one; 11 in a lecture on Socrates Eietzsche shows that Socrates was 
11 the philosopher of life" who made thought serve life. 1 Nietzsche says 
also tl1at Socrates wanted death to show his personal triu::rrph over fear 
and weakness. In his lectures on 11 The Study of the Platonic Dialogues" 
I:-ietzsche >vrites: "Plato seems to have received the decisive thought as 
to how a philosopher ought to behave to'\'1ard men from the Apology of 
Socrates: as their physician, as a gadfly on the neck of man. 112 
As with Goethe, Nietzsche finds in Socrates a man who has 11 given 
style to his character" and has disciplined himself into wholeness. 
1. Nietzsche, Notes, in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. :A7. 
2. Ibid., p. 348. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
There is no ready made label which can properly fit Nietzsche who 
combines within himself the greatest versatility. Like Lucretius, 
~Hetzsche attains that combination many strive for but few ever succeed 
in obtaining--a fusion of literary style and philosophy. But by this 
brilliance in his writing Nietzsche sacrifices an organized style, which 
often goes with lucidity and clear presentation. Therefore, because 
:;ietzsc~:e does not systematize his th<)ught along logical lines but criss-
crosses and builds up his plan from book to book, it becomes impossible 
to understand l~ietzsche 1 s social philosophy unless one considers all his 
works. 
ilhen this is done it can be seen that Nietzsche's aim is to create 
a new culture which is based on a class-system and a dual morality. 
Basing his claims on the trends wl1ich history has taken in the past, 
:-aetzsche believes that he constructs an empirically valid social organi-
zation which is best able to meet the conditions of modern life. Among t:;e 
more probable generalizations Nietzsche makes is the claim that there will 
be a ;-rorld crisis t:;reater than any in previous ~:istory. :taetzsche is con-
vinced that this crisis will end in nihilism and that the decadence, so 
evident in tLe modern age, \"!ill be overcome in the struggle. This point 
is quite evident in 'l::he Genealogy of ;..;orals where l'-:-ietzsche says that he 
hs.s no doubt that moralit~- is going to pieces. "This is the great 
hundred-act play that is reserved for the next h10 centuries of Europe, 
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the most terrible, the ;-;-;ost mysterious, and perhaps the most hopeful of 
all plays. 111 
Decadence and nihilis~, however, are not Nietzsche's last words 
about the modern age; :r:Jietzsche believes that Europe still has ter;sion 
left. "I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able 
to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in 
2 
yourselves. 11 Consequently, the nihilistic struggle Hill involve an 
active nihilis~ where the stronger men will react in an illogical rage. 
In this lies hope. Because the ensuing crisis will weed out the decadent 
ele":ents, Nietzsche hopes that the strong :''en, who have overcor.":e the de-
cadence of modernity and have outlived nihilism, will, in the violence and 
confusion of the tine, breed t~1e rc:.en of strengtl: \·rho vrill not be hampered 
by .\bsolute l:orality. :'his is the ai}:: of Nietzsche 1 s Nhole program. lie 
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1:ants a stru.;.;le so that the strong Hill revalue t}:e whole systen of 
ethics. Fro~, tnis viewpoint :Tietz~;c~"e pictures nihilism as only an inter-
lud.e betv1een t:r.e deatr. of t!1e old and the birth of a nev: culture. 
The increasing docility of the ;;;asses of: ers an unequaled op:r;ortuni ty, 
:Tietzsche tr.inks, fer a daring group of 1::en to seize control of the social 
__ ac!linery and :.1ake it support a ne1·: ruling caste. Nietzsche hopes tl:e 
first step will be taken when the strong will set up the new aristocracy. 
Iievertheless, Nietzsche believes that this nevi aristocracJ will not rernain 
in po'<'rer by sheer physical force. Eventually the world will be governed 
by the \visest. 
Those legislative and tyrannical minds \vho are 
able to set fast, to hold fast, an idea, men \·rith this 
spiritual povrer of will, ••• this srecies of legis-
1. Eietzscl:1e, The Genealogy of ;.:orals, P• 792. 
2. l;'ietzsche, Zarathustra, P• 329. 
lative Len has inevitably exercised t~e strongest 
influence in all ages.l 
In t:wir hands humanity becor;,es a living thing and learns to give itself 
a purpose. 
Such is ~Tietzsc'r.e 1 s answer to the decadence of his era. Thoug11 
existence is senseless from the existential point of view, Nietzsc~e 
believes Lankincl can create a ;:1eaning for itself by living for a cause 
2 great enouGh to justify all. Here the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence 
must be accepted as the ideal whicl-' ... glorifies life so much t:mt t~:e strong 
si10uld be glad to think of this worldly life repeated ad infin2twn. In 
this respect Eietzsche 1 s purpose aims at giving 1:-:.an a goal to point at. 
This is his contribution to hur,;anity for the way out of the perplexity 
of dissolusionient. 
However, although :::ietzsche may be correct in showing that the indi-
vidual's integrity is being usurped by modern democracies, he does have 
some serious difficulties in his rival conception of a caste-systei based 
on a dual morality. Among the rr:ore glaring is a lack of sociological 
principles. For instance, 1\ietzsche insists that there are only two 
~oralities for cankind: one vulgar and unfruitful, given up to t1,e mob, and 
the other superior and productive of great things, and reserved for the 
elite. ::ow this contradicts the idea of a universal norality or of any 
categorical iE;.perative concept to vthich all men can rationl':!lly appeal. 
The fact that all men hav$. morality does not constitute a universal mo-
rali ty. It merely establishes the fact that there is morality ever:f1-lhere. 
The universality of the moral fact does not seem, in Nietzscl:e 1 s sense, 
to be the same thing as an identity of all morality. Therefore, as it has 
1. ~Jietzsche, The i'iill to Power, in Horgan, What Nietzsche l-:eans, p. )60. 
2. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Horals, pp. 792-9). 
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been shown before, Nietzsche concludes that morality is not the same for 
all Lcen. In Nietzsche's system every can feels compelled to act in 
accordance with the amount of force accorded him by the i'lill to Power. 
In addition, Nietzsche holds that there are no moral obligations of any 
kind except those that man makes for himself. 
Yet this ubiquity of the two moralities seems, on closer inspection, 
somewhat dubious, for there can be a sliding scale anywhere along the 
line. Nietzsche does not say where the line to this scale must be drawn, 
nor does Nietzsche tell where the mob ends and the elite begins. ~·:oreover, 
~ietzsche 1 s conception of two separately distinct moralities wtich arbi-
trarily divide mankind into two rigid classes does not appear to have much 
empirical validation among modern sociologists. Instead, it seems that 
modern evidence points to an infinite number of degrees between so-called 
classes. 
But seen from Nietzsche's point of view the dual system of morality 
is cerely an attempt to extract more freedom and latitude for the strong 
and less fro:'- the weak. However, in creating such a sharp abyss bet;veen 
the great and small one may ask whether Nietzsche's caste-system Kight not 
paralyze any initiative that exists among the weak to become potential 
creators? It may be said, then, that Nietzsche's system of morality is 
too rigid and arbitrary. Between the strong and the \veal: in the \Hll to 
Power there is too much of a gap. Furthermore, Nietzsche's dual morality, 
if followed literally, might breed hereditary privileges and license. 
What Nietzsche wishes to point out, though, is that modern morality 
encroaches upon and restrains the true artist and philosopher in society. 
Nietzsche has shmm that since Socrates 1 day morality, under different 
guises, but especially in the name of Christianity, has pretended to be 
the only end of human actions. As a result, morality has implanted in 
10/ 
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mankind the idea that it alone is respectable and that all other values 
are worthwhile only as a function of morality. Nietzsche maintains that 
this is an error because morality encleaves to itself the creative artist, 
and like all other encroachments, makes everything serve it. Looking at 
the history of mankind, and especially at his ovm age, Nietzsche asserts 
that morality has paralyzed human forces which have a right to existence 
and \vhich have their o•vn utility. This enslaving of the quest for truth 
and beauty by morality in order to serve humanity has meant their sup-
pression. Because of this Nietzsche feels that the value of humanity itself 
has been shorn. 
All this comes back to Nietzsche 1 s contention that morality is not a 
sacrosanct and independent factor to which all else is subservient. 
Nietzsche holds that there are some particular moralities, indirectly 
related to the dual moralities, but whicr. are not its agents. Here 
Nietzsche seems to be talking about something akin to the so-called ethics 
of various professional organizations. If one follows Nietzsche's reasoning 
at this juncture he must conclude that these unique moralities are more 
important than the moral code to which one is committed. For example, if 
an artist creates something which he believes is beautiful and is concerned 
whether it is inu:c.oral because of the possibility of its being called "bad" 
or 11 evil 11 then, in Xietzsche 1 s sense, he acts 11 immorally." But this may 
• 
be pushing Iaetzsche too far. Nietzsche is not concerned so much about t:-:e 
formal presentation of his theory, and indeed, one may question \vhether 
:~ietzsche really consciously thought out al::. t~1e necessary points to his 
social philosophJr. It is probably true that :;ietzsche has not sufficiently 
clarified his thoughts on particular issues. Yet it is evident that 
J.~ietzsche 1 s aims--to create a fifferent social animal and to construct a 
better social organization--are more important for him than planning every 
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fact in detail. 
Along wiU1 the probleL of tl1e dual morality t:;ere is also tl1e question 
of whether the higher class of :-_:_en may not become stagnant and more in-
volved in maintaining their Oi'VD vaunted positions than in creating. 
I~ietzsche recognizes this fact but he is ambivalent about his ul tLnate 
stand. i\ietzsche as;:f:'rts that the overman '!Till direct htEJS.nity through 
various cycles. On the other l1andt Nietzsche says that he desires t:~e 
over:..1an to carefully choose his ends and goals. The thougD.t coLc.es throug~" 
t!:at Iaetzsche realizes the inevitability of the recurri~ problem of 
aristocracy. It is a crucial problem for Nietzsche; he wants an aris-
tocracy of capable over::c1en \-Tho Nill be free to create. Of course, this 
necessitates that the oven;an must recognize his limitations and ;.rhen 
cha=lenged and proven umwrti:1y will, of his oNn volition, \dthdrat·: from 
the highest caste. Consequently, the highest class must al'\';ays be flexi-
ble and moral enough to permit social fluidity. But remembering the 
discussion on the dual morality, and looking bac;.;: upon history, it is 
probler.:a.tical Hhether Iaetzsche is justified empirically in clai:ning that 
the oveu:an will relinquish povJer for the benefit of the race. In his 
investi,sations :~ietzsche knows that even in the Greek golden age, w:1.ich he 
greatly admires, dictators such as Pericles arose and consolidated their 
grip on society. 
Furthermore, as ::::entioned above, Nietzsche does not give an entirely 
satisfactory account of the relationship betv;een t:-"1e 11 higher cen 11 and the 
over an. It has been pointed out that just prior to the time when the 
over:::.an '!Till be engendered the "higher men 11 (Good Europeans) Hill direct 
and nurture their procreation. However, after their inception Nietzsche 
does not make it clear w~:ether these higher 1::en ':Till continue to function 
as caretakers of the political arena, like Plato Is guardians' or W'r}ether 
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they will voluntarily give up their power to the overmen. Nietzsche 
implies that the overr::en are to have ultimate po'r1er but vrill not bother 
with the details of govern:"llent: 11 Beyond the rulers, detached from all 
ties, live the highest men: and in the rulers they have their instruments. 111 
One could assu:.11e that Nietzsche probably means that either there is no 
clear-cut distinctior1 bet\'l'een the higher men and tbe overman, as such, and 
that a period of time will ensue between the nihilistic era and the comin6 
of the first real overman, or that the overraen will leave the task of 
govern;:;.ent to the 11 higher men." 
There is one more grave problem that one nJB.y point to in :Uetzsche. 
This concerns the meaningfulness of the l'lill to Power and the Eternal 
Recurrence as metaphysical and psychological facts. Nietzsche believes 
that there is no end nor significance in things; yet Nietzsche wishes the 
overman to become the goal for humanity. Likewise, nothing is really true 
for Nietzsche; yet Nietzsche feels that human beings find it necessary to 
invent true principles. This is exemplified in I1ietzsche 1 s questioning 
wh~ the human beliefs about perceptions and logical abstractions are true 
2 
rJerely because the human mind synthesizes them in this way. Instead, 
Nietzsche suggests that "for the sake of the preservation of creatures 
like ourselves" such judgments must be believed to be true "though they 
still might be false judgments!") Eere Nietzsche is not so different from 
Kant. 
Even more important than the epistemological controversy is the 
relation of the Will to Power to a universal ground. While Nietzsche 
1. Nietzsche, The \'{ill to Power, in \~right, What Nietzsche Means, p. 310. 
2. Nietzsche, The Idols, p;;. 482-84. 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 393. 
questions the existence of God e1~1pirically, he seems to conceive of the 
Will to Power as a universal feature of human construction whose fictions 
must at least be considered necessary for all ~en. Nietzsche says that 
all knowledge is a "footprint of my will; verily, my. will to power walks 
on the heels of your will to truth. 111 Like Kant's synthetic a priori 
judgments Nietzsche 1 s hypothesis of the \'lill to Power might be one empiri-
cal interpretation of human behavior of which man is capable when he 
considers the evidence. At this p~int the obvious criticism is that it 
11.3 
nay not be true that human minds are so constituted that, when one considers 
phenomena and thinks about it carefully, that one must assume that the 
Vlill to Power is the basic principle of the universe. If this is the case 
then Iaetzsche se@ms to acknowledge that truth and knov;ledge serve prag-
i;:;atic functions only. t\ietzsche seems to justify this assumption. In the 
T1rril ight of the Idols he writes that in ueeting the struggle for existence 
life has to treat the clmnging conditions as permanent entities. As a 
result, one builds up categories, such as a 11 thing 11 and "substance." 
Insofar as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit 
unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thing-
hood, being, \te see ourselves somehow caught in error, 
compelled into error. So certain are we, on the basis 
of rigorous examination, that this is where the error 
lies.2 
Consequently, the problem which returns is the same one which was 
mentioned in chapter II, that of Nietzsche 1 s monisn,. IJietzsche 1 s monism 
raises the question as to how there can be any control whatever in the 
universe besides the Viill to Power. In regard to \'l'hat overcomes the Will 
to Pov1er Nietzsche '\'lould have to reply that t:r"ere is no other principle 
besides the \1ill to Power, and that this \till to Power must overcome it-
1. ~:ietzsche, Zarathustra, P• 227. 
2. Nietzsche, The Idols, P• 482. 
self. One may \'lell question -vrhether this conception is neaningful, 
ho1V'ever. The demand thnt spirit sho:~J.d ovc1·co..:e passion is couprehensible. 
It appears more cUfficul t in the ce.se of the self-overcoming of the ·.rill 
to PoHer. Granted that uhen the ::_dec:. of overc01:.ing does iL,ply two forces 
it is realistic, ho11 significant is it to say ttat when there is but cne 
force sel::'-overcomin;; is po~.sible? The question is \v!1ether ~\ietzscl:le 1 s 
version of the Hill to Pov:er is an atte1::1pt to ansv;er 11 sn~all single 
questions" with an experinent or is an effort 11 to solve a11 with one 
stroke, with one word 11 and so unriddle the universe? 1 
Nietzsche does not ansvler this criticism. ::evertr.eless, perhaps 
:~ietzsche 1 s conce::;tion of Uw Will to Po\·:er is not a strict metc:.physical 
interpretation in the sense that forLal ptilosophers attach to it. B~ the 
concept of the 'dill to Po1-rer :Hetzsche could mean an er:;pirical hypothesis 
c:.rrived at by induction. If this is so, self-overcordng may be conceived 
of in psychological terms and ::-;ains ne\> significance. 
In svzmary, IJietzc che 1 s heritage teache·s that the only ri,hts i~~anldnd 
can legitimately clc:.im are tl:ose v;hic:1 it has conquered. I~ietzsche is not 
aD iconoclast, nor an immoral "prophet." On the contrary, one can discern 
t::..at i:ietzsci1e 1 s critic ism is not immoral but is a confession of :tis 
devotion to true cultural ideals. ~ietzsche desires a movement tow&rd 
tlle liberation of t~e individual from the shackles of external authorit;y, 
excessive conventionalism, and other-\10rldliness. With this in ::ind 
l~ietzsc:.e also maintains that philosophy must be lived and not rr.erely 
learned from books. TTietzsche 1 s object is to make :nan surer of himself 
and to ignite in him a sense of pride and daring. In this sense Nietzsche 
gives to :philoscp:l;'l the gift of personal experience as a :tr.eans for criti-
1. ~ietzsche, The Dawn, P• )47. 
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cism. 
IC:aybe humanity needs a Nietzsche and a Socrates to avoid becoming 
complacent. A Nietzsche may be beneficial in the long run. If one 
reflects on Nietzsche's teachings he becomes more tolerant to different 
ideas and attitudes and more democratic--a word Nietzsche despises. This 
is the truth. Nietzsche has said that there is no universal morality and 
that each man must choose for himself the code he will live by. Or:.ly the 
individual can decide if Nietzsche is correct when he asserts that man 
should not aim at the utilitarian happiness of the race but at the 
procreation of the best. This is the great question which rival value 
theories fight over. 
In conclusion, Erici" Fromm, a highly penetrating psychologist, 
maintains that people are not able to comprehend the reasons why they have 
such a propensity for 11 evil 11 and submission. Fron:u:-~ remarks that "o~ly a 
few . .ad been aware of the rumbling of the volcano preceding the outbreak. 
1 
:Tietzsche had disturbed the complacent optimism of the nineteenth century • 11 
It appears from wr.a t Fromm and other psychologists, as well as philosophers 
of history are now saying, Nietzsche ;.uay have been acutely aware of t:~e 
difficult times society is facing. 
Perhaps it is \'lOrth\'Thile to have somebody like Hietzsche come along 
every so often to shake human opinions and beliefs and make ruen ponder and 
take cognizance of themselves. Nietzsche has rendered the world a great 
service in criticizing modern morality wtich, most psychologists and moral 
philosophers say, needs much revision and overhauling. For this intel-
lectual courage alone Nietzsche deserves commendation. 
1. Erich Fromn:, Escape from Freedo:n (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 
1944)' p. 8. 
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ABSTRACT 
Friedrich Nietzsche believes that there is one basic force in the 
universe which he calls the ~1ill to Power. Both organic ~atter and the 
spirit are two o.spects of this force and are ahrays at war with each other. 
::ietzsche thinks that the spirit is superior to brute physical power and 
that the greatest amounts of the \'/ill to Power exist by harnessing the 
passions to the control of the intel:ect. However, Nietzsche is concerned 
~ost in showing hovr this vlill to PoHer is related to man. By means of a 
"Scale of Excellence" Nietzsche shows that the will is psychically greater 
in some humans than in others. Horeover, Nietzsche assumes that the \'lill 
to Power is dominantly powerful in only a minority of men. Nietzsche also 
argues that the majority of people who do not possess a will for power are 
in co~nd of the political machinery. These men, Nietzsche says, only 
1,1ant peace and content2::ent from their earthly existence. The fact re1;1ains, 
though, that they are unable to create and that their values reflect this 
inability to produce anything of value. 
~·Tietzsche traces why the modern age has developed the conditions 
Hhich he calls "barbarism." Nietzsche points out that after their most 
\·real thy periods the ancient civilizations declined because the will for 
power had dried up among the greatest individuals. Nietzsche shows that 
as a result of the tieaker-willed peoples 1 gaining control over the social 
machiner;, the more worthy members of society were not able to create any-
thing unless it conformed to the rule of Absolute Horality. But ~aetzsche 
also shovrs that once the weak had expressed their resentment against t:-;.e 
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former upper classes they settled down to a vegetative existence and 
wished only to sit under the shade of the tree planted by the labors of 
any remaining great men. Nietzsche believes this action breeds discontent 
and frustration and will eventually lead to nihilism. 
Horeover, during this period 'I':Len the weak have gained control they 
must subject everyone to the doctrine of equality. Those not conforming 
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are either physically or socially ostracized by the will of the majority. 
I-:-ietzsche points out ho'l'r this levelling ll'.akes it impossible for those 
'\'ranting to be different to express their individuality. In time, however, 
IJietzsche thinks that the strong-willed men can express their individuality. 
Because of their inability to fathom important situations and act according-
ly, :;ietzsche discloses that the weak-willed souls must inevitably lose 
their grip on the social machinery. Then, ivhen the age is replete and 
ready for a change, the strong will 11 destroy 11 the old society and will 
cultivate a different ethics. For r:ietzsche, this revolution constitutes 
a cultural rebirth. 
liietzsche exposes this formula'to the modern age and shows that 
modernity has been the expression of the ~veak 1 s i'lill to Potver for over 
h;o-thousand years. Nietzsche acknoHledges that Christianity and Social-
isn: are the logical developments of the v:eak 's Hill to Power urging ere-
ation. Nietzsche argues that Christianity and Socialisu only cultivate 
confor:~i ty and robotism. 
In his plan ::ietzsche urges the e:1gendering of c. different morality 
\:l1ich vrill be created after a series of catastrophic v1ars Hhich, by the 
Frry, he predicts for the THentieth Century. After the strong->dlled Llel1 
have re;:::ained power, m_etzsche indicates tl:lat t:;ey \'Jill begin to set up 0. 
"caste-system" into tvhich t::ey tvil-, direct all nen who, voluntarily, vlill 
seel: their place in this society. This is Nie-tzsche's ideal society. 
However, Eietzsche recognizes t:1at it has to be crectecl by hardship and 
strife. ;.-'urt:,erncro, it has to be maintained by a. code of strength o.::1d 
courage. The individtcals Hho :~ietzsc:1e thinks o.re capable of upholdin.c 
this code are 11 over:-r"en. 11 These are tl1e individuals vrLc lJ.ave the createst 
a:..:.ount of passion orca.nizecl into a. har:::onious, or,;anic lrhole. These nen, 
who wil! create i~telligently, are the only ones able to cive value to 
hunan lif'e. Their creations will be intel:i.ec"i...t.;.<::.lly Lonost c.~1d 1dll 
reflect their spirituo.l strent;th. 
The point :Tietzsche is stressing is that in his ideal society tl~e 
11 over;~an 11 \:ill be free to create; ~~iet.zsche 1 s ar~:::ument is tl:at in LlOc~ern 
tiJ1es L.e stron.;-'1-:illed man can not create because society, ;::;ade up rwstly 
of wecJ~-v!illed. people, prohibits hi!CJ from erecting. The result is that 
society as a v1hole is st.l.ffering. 
The closest society to Xietzsc~e's ideal is ~ncient, pre-Socratic 
Greece vi it:. its 11 f'ree individualities • 11 This culture had a greater nLu;:ber 
of near over~.:.on tlw.:·. had any other society. Li::e•·:ise, the closest an~· 
living r,1an ccz::te to being an ovenan 1·ras eitt.er Socrates or Goethe, both of 
r;l:1orr. :,ad the grec.test control over t~wir passions a::-1d had sublLel;y 
cr(;anized the chaos in the1c:selves. ·,:Lat =~ietzscl-:.e argues is tl1at more .. en 
can beccBe Goethes' and Socratest if cnly society will not restrain the~. 
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